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Preface 
 I am interested in the Arabic language and Arab people because I was raised to 
associate Islam with terror and its people with violence. In my own home, although not 
marred by explicit prejudice, the Middle East was only ever discussed to the extent that 
it was a “dangerous place that produced great evil.” Like many Americans, my vision 
of the Arab world was limited, extending from Aladdin's magic carpet only as far as the 
bold typeface of headlines in The New York Times. 
  It was an incident in high school that initially woke me up. The thing I 
remember most clearly is his face. While his body was twisting down the staircase of 
my high school’s English wing, his face was frozen in the reality of what was 
happening to him. The words of his attackers seemed to bounce around us, “f***ing 
terrorist!” I leaned back against the white-tiled walls and watched in silence. Thinking 
back to September 11th, 2001, when I was in the first grade, I remember the alphabet 
carpet I was sitting on, crisscross apple-sauce, when my mother appeared at the 
classroom door. She had watched the collapse of the Twin Towers from our porch. My 
town, just outside New York City, suffered many losses to the attack. Less obvious is 
how my community further suffered as intense Islamophobia became deeply embedded 
and frequently expressed within my community. The violence I witnessed on the 
staircase in high school, while frozen by fear in silence, is just one example.  
 As a first-year student in college, I signed up for my first Arabic class on a 
whim. While the Arabic alphabet and its delicate script are incredibly beautiful, I soon 
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realized that the root of my infatuation with the language was not just its words, but its 
people. My professor, Martin Isleem, a scholar from Palestine, spent hours correcting 
our pronunciation and teaching us unique cultural expressions that illustrated the 
richness of Arab culture. I remember learning the importance of initially refusing 
coffee when offered and of engaging in heated debate in an attempt to pay the table’s 
bill at restaurants.  
When I decided to study abroad in Madaba, Jordan, although well aware by that 
time of the prevalence of Islamophobia and the fear/hate of Arabs, the disdainful 
reactions of my American friends and family shocked me. Who will be teaching you? 
ISIS? Do you have to wear a burqa? I thought about how learning about the actual 
cultural practices and traditions of Islam— how the hijab represents freedom to many 
women, and how the Quran preaches love and acceptance— allowed me to question the 
assumptions of my childhood. After witnessing the discrimination and hatred endured by 
the Arab-American community in my own town and at my university, I developed the 
aspiration to become fluent in the Arabic language and culture and to help dismantle the 
stereotypes surrounding Arab representation.  Fighting Arab discrimination and 
Islamaphobia, which together shape everything from our presidential campaigns to our 
foreign policy initiatives, begins by listening to these voices. Learning Arabic taught me 
many words, but most importantly, it taught me how to listen. 
This thesis is my philosophical account of how and why listening to others, 
learning from others, and living with others is so crucial. My aim is to help reduce the 
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number and power of dangerous stereotypes and to help foster authentic communication 
across difference, especially in the context of the Middle East and Western perspectives 
toward the region. I hope this thesis will do some good. Perhaps it will, as Mohammed 
says, the ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.  
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Abstract 
 This thesis is a philosophical study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict employing 
feminist, epistemological, and social and political philosophy to analyze linguistic 
processes such as narratives, naming, and stereotype formation. The framework of this 
thesis is the Wittgensteinian paradox of the self defined by the other, according to which 
individuals are always dependent upon others not merely for the satisfactions of their 
needs, but for their very conception of self. Following Wittgenstein, I argue that this 
essential co-dependency is due to the character of our necessarily shared language 
conventions. Moreover, I apply this framework in an attempt to better articulate the 
necessary contours of any possible solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
 Narratives, accounts of a people’s memories and experiences that function to 
connect the past with the present stand at the intersection of the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine and prospects for peace. Opposing groups often have contradicting collective 
narratives about the same events, a phenomenon referred to as “dueling narratives.” 
Dueling narratives contain and create images that other (as a verb) the opposing side, 
perpetuating and ingraining an us vs. them mentality. Representations of the other 
frequently develop into or further support stereotypes and often contribute to the 
formation of both implicit and explicit biases.  
 The complex Israeli and Palestinian “dueling narratives” are informed by 
reactions to selective humanitarian intervention, the US economic and political 
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sponsorship of Israel, and the use of the label “terrorist” to characterize exclusively 
Palestinian, but not Israeli acts. Through stereotypes and bias embedded in language and 
imagery, Palestinian narratives and corresponding lived realities are misconstrued, 
obscured, and, often, silenced, creating a significant “moral distance” between Americans 
and Palestinians and a failure of empathy.  
 Bridging this distance requires the reconciliation of these dueling narratives and 
their internal discrepancies, first, through recognizing the complexity of the multiple 
perspectives at hand. True recognition of Others and of the vast diversity of forms and 
conditions of being human demand the recognition of the multiplicities represented in and 
created by language, which convey many different lived realities constituting what it 
means to be human. In other words, prior to even considering possible solutions to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we must experience, hear, and learn from the lived realities of 
Palestinians, and these narratives must come from the perspective of empowered and 
expressive Palestinian voices. 
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Introduction 
On Solving the Unsolvable 
To Alef, the letter 
that begins the alphabets 
of both Arabic and Hebrew— 
two Semitic languages, 
sisters for centuries. 
May we find the language 
that takes us 
to the only home there is—  
one another's hearts. 
… 
Alef knows 
That a thread 
Of a story 
Stitches together 
A wound. 
― Ibtisam Barakat 
 Over the course of seventy years, Palestine’s borders have effectively shrunken 
from the boundaries of the Gulf of Aqaba and Nazareth to the confined, occupied 
territories of Gaza and the West Bank. From a geographical perspective, Palestine has all 
but disappeared, but its people and their stories remain. Narratives, as accounts of a 
peoples’ memories and experiences, serve to connect the past and the present and stand at 
the intersection of this conflict — between the Israeli occupation and prospects for peace. 
Therefore, before we can attempt to address solutions to the seemingly intractable Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, we must take a step back and look at the core problems we have in 
our language, namely within the conflicting Palestinian and Israeli narratives. Due to the 
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American economic and political sponsorship of Israel, the Israeli narrative has grown to 
overshadow its Palestinian counterpart. For this reason, I seek to primarily highlight the 
Palestinian perspective, through the lived realities of Palestinians.  
 One of the biggest myths about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the idea that it has 
been going on for centuries, inevitably and deeply rooted in ancient religious hatreds. 
While religion is involved, the conflict is better understood as a territorial dispute 
beginning in the early 20th century, centered by the influence of British and American 
imperialist pursuits, the desire for a Jewish state, the displacement of a people, and the 
systematic favoring of one narrative over another. Up until the early 1900’s, the region 
along the Eastern Mediterranean that we now refer to as Israel-Palestine had been under 
Ottoman rule for centuries and included religious diversity, mainly Muslims and 
Christians with a Jewish minority, all living in relative peace.  During this time period, 1
the context of this conflict was changing in two important ways: people within the region 
were developing a distinct national identity, not as just ethnic Arabs, but as Palestinians; 
at the same time, in Europe, the Zionist movement was gaining traction among Jews 
facing religious persecution.  The Zionist movement was founded on the concept that 2
Judaism is not just a religion, but a nationality deserving of its own state.  After centuries 3
of discrimination, many believed a Jewish state was the only adequate means to safety 
 Shafir, Gershon. Land, labor and the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1882-1914. Univ of 1
California Press, 1996.
 Tessler, Mark. A history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Indiana University Press, 2009.2
 Goldberg, David J. To the promised land: a history of Zionist thought from its origins to the modern state 3
of Israel. Penguin Group USA, 1996.
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and that their historic homeland in the Middle East was the ideal location to establish this 
state. In the decades that followed, thousands of Jews immigrated to Palestine, especially 
after the atrocities of the Holocaust in 1945, which furthered American and European 
support for the establishment of a Jewish state.   4
 After a failed UN Partition plan and the breakout of the Arab-Israeli War, the State 
of Israel was established in 1948, evicting the people occupying the land claimed by the 
Jews and creating a massive Palestinian refugee crisis, whose numbers have risen to over 
5 million today.  The following map, using data compiled by the organization Jewish 5
Voice For Peace, represents the Palestinian loss of territory over the course of sixty-four 
years, beginning just before the creation of the Israeli state.  6
Figure 1 
 Môrîs, Bennî. Righteous victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-1999. Vintage, 1999.4
 “Palestine refugees.” UNRWA. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the 5
Near East. Accessed March 17, 2017. https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees.
 Loss of Palestinian land from 1946-2010. [Map]. (n.d.). In Jewish Voice for Peace: Chicago.6
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 Although through official treaty establishments or unofficial implicit agreements, 
the neighboring Arab states, including Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, have made peace with 
Israel, the Israeli occupation of Palestine continues today. Alongside the formation of 
Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories on the West Bank, Israeli military presence 
and the formation of a “security” wall has made life for Palestinians in the occupied 
territories exceedingly difficult. The 280 mile long wall constructed in 2006 along the 
West Bank negatively affects Palestinian livelihood, limiting access to food, water, 
medical care, and viable means of economic engagement.   7
 According to Human Rights Watch, Israel enforces “severe and discriminatory 
restrictions on Palestinian’s human rights and it builds and supports unlawful settlements 
in the occupied West Bank.”  These human rights restrictions include the excessive force 8
against Palestinian demonstrators, extra-judicial killings, the practice of punitive home 
demolitions, and the closure of Gaza, supported by Egypt. The cumulative result is the 
collective punishment of over 1.9 million civilians and the prevention of infrastructural 
development and repair.  The blockade of Gaza has left over 70% of Gaza’s population 9
completely reliant on humanitarian assistance and, in 2015, the inhabitants received less 
than half the levels of incoming goods allowed before this closure in 2006.  In addition, 10
 “Israel/Palestine.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 17, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-7
africa/israel/palestine.
 Ibid.8
”Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories 2016/2017.” Amnesty International. Accessed March 17, 9
2017. 
 “Israel/Palestine.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed March 17, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/n-10
africa/israel/palestine.
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Israel has seized control of Palestinian aquifers underneath Gaza, leaving only 10% of 
Gaza’s population with access to safe drinking water.  The human rights abuses 11
committed by Israel and the illegality of many of the state’s practices are staggering, yet 
when met by regulatory mechanisms of international law, including UN resolutions and 
the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the US has used its Security 
Council veto power to protect Israel from being prosecuted under international law. 
 As a result of this veto power, granted by its status as a permanent member of the 
UN’s peacekeeping body, the US is uniquely positioned geopolitically in relation to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An explanation of domestic Arab discrimination, namely 
through the active perpetuation of American media stereotypes, will illuminate the state’s 
policies abroad. In American television programs, advertisements, and films, ranging 
from Disney animated classics, such as Aladdin, to popular television series, such as 
Homeland, Arabs are almost exclusively portrayed as violent criminals, suicide bombers, 
or generally untrustworthy characters. Moreover, the representation of Arabs typically 
isolates them within the narrative of the protagonist by placing them outside or beneath 
generally accepted moral norms. Together, media images help form and maintain 
collective beliefs about what the Middle East is and who its people are. These beliefs 
have become internalized, reinforced through repetition in news broadcasting and article 
headlines, and seem to justify America’s foreign policy initiatives that are in conflict with 
the democratic ethical standard many Americans identify with: humanitarianism.   
 “Water Situation Alarming in Gaza.” World Bank. Accessed March 17, 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/11
en/news/feature/2016/11/22/water-situation-alarming-in-gaza.
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 Likewise, in American media, the “Middle East” is represented as a vast, 
monolithic expanse of “-stans,” contorted by Islamic extremism, the oppression of 
women, undemocratic values, deep hatred for America, and never-ending violent conflict. 
The distinctions among Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners are often ignored in US 
media. “Arab” is an ethno-linguistic category identifying people who speak the Arabic 
language, which in itself has an enormous dialectical diversity. The “Middle East” is an 
equivocal phrase that refers to a region whose boundaries are highly contested. “Arab” 
and “Middle Eastern” are not synonymous; countries like Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan 
are Middle Eastern, but they are not Arab. “Muslims” are people who practice the 
religion Islam. Despite common misconceptions, Muslims are not confined to being Arab 
or Middle Eastern. In fact, Southeast Asia has the largest regional concentration of 
Muslim people.  
 In addition to explicit biases, American media stereotypes express and reinforce the 
implicit biases that exist outside the conscious control of an individual. Ignorance 
surrounding the distinctions among Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners, concentrated 
within a monolithic stereotype, can reinforce implicit biases about these social groups. In 
this manner, stereotypes lead to judgements about the character of others that can distort 
and even conceal the lived realities of those represented. These judgements include 
delegitimizing the credibility of others, resulting in what Miranda Fricker calls epistemic 
injustice.  Character theory, as articulated by John Rawls, accounts for how an 12
 Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. New York: Oxford 12
University Press.
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assessment of moral character is a function of whether or not a person is perceived as 
morally virtuous.  Conceptions of moral character stand at the intersection of issues in 13
normative ethics and empirical psychology. Because approaches to virtue make character 
and its components central to ethical theorizing, it is critical to frame these philosophical 
approaches with psychological data involving the perceptions of the character of others.  
 The perpetuation of both implicit and explicit forms of bias is reinforced through 
the use of narrative. Narrative is a basic human strategy for processing and developing an 
understanding of experience, situating us in time, process, change, and within complex 
series of events and happenings.  Using the medium of story telling, narratives provide 14
accounts of what happened to a particular people from different perspectives. Collective 
memory narratives, just one kind of narrative, are biased, selective, and distorted, often 
omitting certain facts and changing the sequence of events in order to describe a past that 
is useful for the functioning or even the continual existence of a certain group.  This is 15
because the nature of collective memory, as always in flux yet fixed in tone, is controlled 
by groupthink, making it a particularly unreliable source of information. Shared by group 
members, collective memory narratives are treated as truthful accounts, including 
memories of past events as well as more recent, conflict-related events. Daniel Bar-Tal 
 Rawls, John. “The independence of moral theory.” In Proceedings and addresses of the American 13
Philosophical Association, vol. 48, pp. 5-22. American Philosophical Association, 1974.
 Herman, David, James Phelan, Peter J. Rabinowitz, Brian Richardson, and Robyn Warhol. Narrative 14
Theory. The Ohio State University Press, 2012.
 Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Gavriel Salomon. "Israeli-Jewish narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 15
Evolvement, contents, functions and consequences." History's double helix: The intertwined narratives of 
Israel/Palestine (2006). P 23.
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and Gavriel Salomon argue that “these more recent memories, some of them personal 
memories that intertwine with the collective memory pool, turn into historical memories 
the longer a conflict lasts.”  In other words, particularly in instances of intractable 16
conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these narratives shape present-day 
attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors. 
 In addition to the narrative of collective memory of the past, societies construct 
narratives about the present, the ethos. Bar-Tal and Saloman define the ethos as providing 
“the epistemic basis for the present direction of a society, its major aspirations, goals, 
means, concerns, and images.”  The ethos of a people constructs the behavior of 17
society’s members as a coherent and systematic pattern of knowledge within which 
decisions of leaders and the structure and functioning of the society are justified based on 
true beliefs.  An ethos is supported by the collective memory narrative and the same 18
themes appear in both. Opposing groups often have contradicting collective narratives 
about the same events. For example, two sides of a conflict can view themselves as the 
victim and the other side as blameworthy. Following Padraig O’Malley, I refer to this 
particular phenomenon, by which the collective memory narratives and the ethos of two 
groups are conflicting and opposed, as dueling narratives.   19
Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Gavriel Salomon. "Israeli-Jewish narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 16
Evolvement, contents, functions and consequences." History's double helix: The intertwined narratives of 
Israel/Palestine (2006). P 23.
 Ibid. P 25.17
 Ibid. P 23.18
 O'Malley, Padraig. “Dueling Narratives and Addiction to Narratives." The Two-state Delusion: Israel and 19
Palestine -- a Tale of Two Narratives. Print.
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 Dueling narratives, consisting of elements of both ethos and collective memory, 
contain and create images of the opposing side, the other, perpetuating an us vs. them 
mentality making conflict seemingly irresolvable. Authoring representations can 
materialize in common stereotypes,  for example the violent Arab and the greedy Jew, 
that contribute to the complex process by which even individuals who consider 
themselves tolerant of a certain group have negative implicit biases towards the group. 
Naming, the process of whether assigning labels to people, events, or places, plays an 
enormous role as a functional component of narrative formation. As argued by Julie 
Peteet, our analytical approaches to lexicons are embedded in historical, political, and 
cultural frameworks: “Names form part of cultural systems that structure and nuance the 
way we imagine and understand the world. They embody ideological significance and 
moral attributes and can be consciously mobilized for various projects of power.”  20
Naming practices and the influence of language formation are major undercurrents of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its dueling narratives. In what follows, I analyze the 
interlocking mechanisms of collective memory, narrative, ethos, naming, and bias 
through the framework of Israeli and Palestinian dueling narratives and their perpetuation 
of the us vs. them/ we vs. they mentality. 
 In this thesis, I utilize a theoretical framework within which narrative, language 
use, and naming processes are central to understanding how the particular combination of 
selective humanitarian intervention, bias, and stereotyping that we see in the US 
 Peteet, Julie. “Words as interventions: naming in the Palestine–Israel conflict.” Third World Quarterly 26, 20
no. 1 (2005). P 153.
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perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict results. I aim to offer a comprehensive, 
philosophical analysis of the ways in which narrative and bias, in the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, create a self-perpetuating cycle that justifies Israel’s occupation of 
Palestine and effectively prevents the prospects for peace. My argument unfolds in five 
chapters and draws on social and political philosophy, ethics, feminist theory, and 
epistemology. 
 In the first chapter, I analyze several theories that conceptualize the relationship 
between the self and the other, including Miranda Fricker’s examination of “epistemic 
injustice,” José Medina’s discussion of the importance of “elsewhere,” and, most 
centrally, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of the paradox of the self defined by the 
other. Together these theories clarify the ways in which empathy and inclusive language 
use mutually inform one another. In the second chapter, I provide a brief account of the 
history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, informed by both Israeli and Palestinian 
narratives of the events leading up to the reality of the dispute today. The third chapter 
expands upon this timeline with an analysis of the inner-workings of the Israeli 
occupation and its American economic sponsorship. Particular attention is given to a 
philosophical analysis of the naming of persons as terrorists or their acts as terrorism, as 
well as the use of “terrorist” to identify certain groups and not others. The fourth chapter 
analyzes the philosophy behind American foreign humanitarian intervention and how this 
intervention can result in cynicism towards the “human rights industry.” This 
philosophical analysis is informed by theories of international relations and 
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corresponding accounts of the conflict itself, revealing the highly political consequences 
of the dueling Israeli and Palestinian narratives.  
 These narratives exist in a cyclical relationship with both implicit and explicit 
forms of bias, through means including American media’s use of Arab stereotypes. I 
understand both the beginnings and the consequences of dueling narratives, 
psychological components of bias are further contextualized in the fifth chapter. This 
chapter also features the results of a survey conducted and quantitatively analyzed using 
Qualtrics survey tools. Although the results of this survey are limited by its small sample 
size of Bucknell University students, the data reveals patterns of behavior that correspond 
to those found in psychological and philosophical studies involving bias formation. The 
results of this survey support my recommendation of how best to approach the seemingly 
intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is expanded upon in a final, concluding 
chapter. Ultimately, my thesis is that voicing the lived realities of Arab people is a 
necessity and an effective tool against Arab stereotypes because it requires an integration 
of the self and the other. 
 My aim is not to advocate for a direct solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Instead, I approach the daunting question of how to solve the seemingly unsolvable 
conflict, conceiving of an approach rooted in the ways we use language to construct and 
support the dueling narratives that contribute to this conflict’s intractability. Biased and 
often politically manipulated discussions of Israel and Palestine must be reckoned with 
before any feasible solution can even be entertained. In this manner, I argue that by 
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working to eliminate the perpetuation of the we vs. they mentality essential to US foreign 
policy in the Middle East, we can begin to reconcile the dueling Israeli and Arab 
narratives, and perhaps unearth the lived realities of Palestinians.  
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Chapter I 
 The Philosophy of Peace: Language and Empathy 
“Returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already 
devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness. Only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out 
hate, only love can do that.” 
 — Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 When conflicts become intractable, the language used to describe acts of war and 
lapses in humanitarianism pervade everyday life, twisting our understandings of events 
and further entrenching our conflictual positions. As a tactical force of narrative 
formation, language is used to identify and label people, places, and events, as a way to 
systematically separate them from us, there from here, that from this, and then from now. 
Within this process, by drawing divisions we can fail to recognize our connections and 
even dependence upon those around us. Thus, subjective self-understanding is dependent 
on our relationship with others because it is through the conventions of language and 
processes of identification-based negation that we come to understand who we are. We 
witness this process at many of the world’s greatest political fault lines, in which 
deceptive language processes stall peace processes and even degrade the meaning of the 
word peace itself. This is evident in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which decades of 
naming techniques and selective applications of international law have effectively 
prevented an empathetic understanding of the suffering of Palestinians. By exploring the 
paradox of the ways in which the self is defined by the other, the work of philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein has particularly important implications for our understanding of 
!14
both self-knowledge and knowledge of others, in terms of recognizing the epistemic 
value of the other side. 
The Wittgensteinian Paradox: The Self Defined by the Other 
 Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus deals with the problems of 
philosophy in terms of the concept that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The 
connection between world, language, and thought rests in the logical form they share. 
Wittgenstein constructs a sense of the self that is defined by this connection, stating that 
“I am my world.”  In this manner, there is no subject that can think or form ideas 21
independent of the world. Wittgenstein therefore argues that the subject is “a limit of the 
world” in such a way that the subject does not belong to the world. This is further 
exemplified by the use of a visual field diagram, by which the eye (Auge) itself is not a 
part of the visual field because nothing in the visual field allows one to infer that it is seen 
by an eye. 
  Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a  
 non-psychological way.  
  What brings the self into philosophy is the fact that ‘the world is my  
  world’.  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by Pears, D.F., McGuinness, B.F. 21
Routledge Classics, 2001. Print. P 68.
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  The philosophical self is not the human being, not the human body, or the  
 human  soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the 
 limit of the world — not a part of it.  22
When the eye in this diagram is understood as the self, it is clear that the self is not 
subjectively experienced as within the world to the extent that it can stand independently. 
Rather, the self, as a metaphysical subject, is the limit of the world, based on one’s 
relationship to the world-thought-language connection and its human conventions. 
 Therefore, the conventions of language use and their depth take part in the 
formation of the self. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein adjusts his focus 
in the Tractatus to show that it is the language use of the logic that is forgotten. This shift 
in focus introduces the complexities of language that act as the basic common thread of 
our life. It is language that allows us to think and speak. Without the harmony of 
language that sets up the philosophical problems of dualism, tragedy, and the concept of 
my existence, we couldn't have the context to struggle with them. The following remark 
demonstrates Wittgenstein’s understanding of the subjective life and its dependence on 
the conventions of language use.  
 Well, everyone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! —  
 Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a “beetle.”  
 No one can ever look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a  
 beetle is only by looking at his beetle. — Here it would be quite possible for  
 everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a  
 thing constantly changing. — But what if these people’s word “beetle” had a use  
 nonetheless? — If so, it would not be as the name of a thing. The thing in the box  
 doesn't belong to the language-game at all; not even as a Something: for the box  
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 might even be empty. —No, one can ‘divide through’ by the thing in the box; it  
 cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say, if we construe the grammar of the  
 expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, the object drops out of 
 consideration as irrelevant.  23
  
In this analogy, the “beetle” comes to simply represent what is inside everyone’s box, 
alluding to what is inside everyone’s mind, as a sense of the subjective self. Since there is 
no way to see what is inside another person’s box, or even to determine if there is 
anything at all, the usage of the word “beetle,” if it is to have any meaning, would refer to 
“what is inside the box” or “what is inside one’s subjective mind” — the self. The 
subjective life is only real because we preserve the basic agreements we have. Even when 
we speak of the subjective or the self, we are using this term based on a shared, public 
discourse of what it represents. Our sense of internal self is not independent of language 
because our inner lives depend on the context of its usage. Therefore the meaning of such 
sensation words as pain or color is not given by referring to some private, inner thing. 
Therefore, the actual beetle in the box (what it looks like or if it even exists) is irrelevant 
to the shared usage of the word. 
 Wittgenstein’s conclusion that “the thing in the box doesn't belong to the 
language-game at all,” parallels his concept of the self in the Tractatus. Just as the subject 
(the beetle) does not belong to the language (or the ‘world’), the self is not a subject in 
the world, but rather the limit of the world. Wittgenstein further clarifies this in 
combination with considerations of the depth of convention. As clarified by the analogy, 
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there can’t be more to the public meaning of our knowledge than we are capable of 
teaching each other, and the private ‘beetle’ has no role in that public teaching. The 
meaning or knowledge (world-language-thought) is limited by the subject. But what 
mechanism regulates the correctness of the meanings talked about through language use? 
Wittgenstein points to the forms of “being human” and the depth of convention as 
determining the correct or incorrect instances of language usage.  
 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”  
  —What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their   
 language that human  beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather  
 in forms of life.  24
Human agreement does not determine what is true and false, but rather reflection on the 
conditions of our forms of life makes true and false possible. The conditions of 
possibility are within language use. Therefore, while our language is shared, their exists a 
multiplicity in the conventions of language and the ways in which language is used. We 
can use similes, metaphors, imagery, and other language conventions differently, but they 
are all based in the forms of our language— the forms of life. 
 The forms of life that coincide with the depth of our human convention in 
language use are further elucidated in Wittgenstein’s examination of the temptation of the 
hidden. The temptation to find what is hidden is related to the notion that there is a 
singular “essence” of language, something that is beneath the surface of its every day 
conventions and usage. 
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 This finds expression in the question of the essence of language, of propositions,  
 of thought. —For although we, in our investigations, are trying to understand the  
 nature of language — its function, its structure — yet this is not what that   
 question has in view. For it sees the essence of things not as something that  
 already lies open to view, and that becomes survivable through a process of  
 ordering, but as something that lies beneath the surface. Something that lies  
 within, which we perceive when we see right into the thing, and which an analysis 
 is supposed to unearth.  25
In this remark, Wittgenstein claims that his investigations seek to understand the usage, 
rules, and conventions that exist within world-language-thought and their connection. 
The agreement in the forms of life and the condition of being human (the type of creature 
that uses language) are meaningful to understanding the nature of language. However, the 
desire to find the singular essence of language, as something wholly independent of 
language use, Wittgenstein argues is misplaced. 
 This idea of the essence as something hidden can be used to frame Wittgenstein’s 
depiction of the self, and the desire to have a private essence of one’s self. However, as 
demonstrated by language use, the idea of a private essence is impossible because of the 
dependency we have on language and the depth of convention, which together ensure the 
possibility of even talking about things like the self. Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of 
a private language to relate the concept of the hidden to the relationship between world, 
thought, and language.  
 A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame, and  
 punish  himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. So one could   
 imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue, who accompanied their  
 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Anscombe, G.E.M. Hacker, P.M.S. 25
and Schulte, Joachim, Revised 4th Edition, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009. Print. P 49. (92.).
!19
 activities by talking to themselves. — An explorer who watched them and listened 
 to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would  
 enable him to predict these people’s actions correctly, for he also hears them  
 making resolutions and decisions.) 
  But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could  
 write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so  
 on — for his own use? — Well can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But  
 that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the  
 speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person  
 cannot understand the language.  26
The concept of a private language, having usage and meaning completely distinct from 
that of others, is not possible. In order to prove this, Wittgenstein analyzes the 
preconditions of language use as they relate to shared phenomena. A private language 
would be inherently unteachable because it is understandable only by a single individual. 
Yet, language is governed and driven by rules because these rules and conventions set 
limits and enable meaning and understanding. When rules are obeyed and practiced, this 
specific interpretation depends on specific human agreements in action and judgment, 
which in turn are established by a criteria of correctness and incorrectness. As such, this 
criteria is learnable and therefore teachable, preventing a private language from ever 
being able to be practiced, making private language an oxymoron.    
Wittgenstein identifies a potential hole in this logical construction — the possibility for a 
subjective justification as a criterion of correctness. However, subjective justifications, 
like memory for example, cannot alone show that a mistake has or has not been made 
because they rely on contexts and frameworks provided by the relationship between 
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world, thought, and language — and the others involved in these frameworks. Therefore, 
Wittgenstein concludes that there cannot be a private language, not by telling us, but by 
asking us to imagine the possibility of such a language and discovering the logical fallacy 
that results.   
 Despite the fact that a private language is not logically attainable, its appeal 
remains, based in the temptation of the hidden, in order to create a defining boundary 
between oneself and others. Throughout his Claim of Reason, Cavell struggles with the 
question of how skepticism introduces the problem of others, eventually concluding that 
Wittgenstein is not providing a refutation, but rather is describing the truth of skepticism. 
Philosophical skepticism can be related to the concept of self because it is based in the 
notion that we tend to perceive others as outside of ourselves and therefore open to doubt 
and problems of knowing. Therefore, Wittgenstein concludes, others are needed for 
skepticism as a condition for the outside — to talk, write, and doubt requires an 
acknowledgment of others. It is critical to understand that we cannot have skepticism 
without others, thereby accepting a basic view of humanness by which the very idea that 
we doubt the knowledge of others presupposes their existence. In the same way that 
others make skepticism possible, privacy and the appeal of a private language are not 
attempts to exclude others but rather attempts to use the notion of others to appeal to an 
inside something — an essence.  
!21
 Cavell further explores Wittgenstein’s deconstruction of the role of others in 
language use by looking towards the purpose of asking whether or not we can imagine a 
private language. 
 So what is the point of “trying” to “imagine” a “language” which “another  
 person” “cannot” “understand”? Evidently, the effort is to illuminate something  
 about the publicness of language, something about the depth to which language is  
 agreed in. I would like to say: its point is to release the fantasy expressed in the  
 denial that language is something essentially shared.  27
In this way, we cannot even think about the possibility of a private language without the 
shared conventions of language. Cavell’s remark supports the concept that the self is 
inherently dependent on the depth of convention, and therefore others, because of the 
requirements of language use and the logic that unites world, thought, and language. Yet, 
why are we so tempted to hold on to this idea of  privacy? Wittgenstein claims that this 
temptation, as the desire to “find the hidden,” is a result of a fear of inexpressiveness or a 
fear of what we express being out of our control. Cavell revisits this tension, stating that 
“I was led to express the fantasy of inexpressiveness as a sense of powerlessness to make 
myself known, and this turned out, in pursuit of the idea of a private language, equally to 
be a powerlessness to make myself known to myself.”  This is directly related to the idea 28
of a powerlessness to make oneself known to oneself and to others through a sense of 
control, as the negation of privacy. 
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 Both the desire to be private and the fear of not being understood result from the 
need to have control over one’s own essence. Wittgenstein actively rejects the fantasy of 
the hidden, expressed through the desire for a private language, because the inner and the 
outer are already deeply intertwined, as a precondition for this insistence to even make 
sense. The fantasy of the private language attempts to enforce a connection between inner 
and outer, but an inside means an outside, so this insistence mistakes both the conditions 
of possibility and the usage of language. This results in a loss of talking about an inside 
something in a meaningful way, and the fantasy of private language fails. Consequently, 
as Cavell states “the wish underlying this fantasy covers a wish that underlies skepticism, 
a wish for the connection between my claims of knowledge and the objects upon which 
the claims are to fall to occur without my intervention, apart from my agreements.”  29
Both skepticism and the failure of the fantasy of a private language are based in a desire 
to escape the foundational necessity of the other. Such an escape would enable words to 
be directly connected to objects without the shared conventions of language use.  
 This fantasy appeals to the same notion that drives skeptics to want a firm 
unshakable foundation — an effort to gain control of one’s life. We want to own our 
words like private property, yet as Wittgenstein evaluates in the Tractatus and in the 
Investigations, this concept is implausible because our language is shared and is fluidly 
constructed by the depth of our human conventions. To say that one owns one’s words is 
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to defy the very meaning of language and its usage. This same error is seen in the fantasy 
of the private language and the skepticism surrounding the other. 
 A dynamic application of this error is demonstrated through Cavell’s explanations 
of phenomenons including racism and artificial intelligence.  
 When religion and morality are moved to speak of duties to others simply as  
 persons, this does not imply that duties owed to them under their special titles are  
 as it were duties to non-persons. It is sometimes imperative to say that women or  
 children or black people or criminals are human beings. This is a call for justice.  
 For justice to be done, a change of perception, a modification of seeing, may be  
 called for. But does it follow that those whose perceptions, or whose natural  
 reactions, must suffer change have until that time been seeing women or children  
 or black people or criminals as something other than human beings?  30
Cavell notes that the way we treat a king maintains his humanness, yet when oppressing 
individuals, such as women or black people, a “call for justice” requires a reaffirmation 
that these people are persons with moral standing and moral duties owed to them by 
others. Such a recognition may require a new perspective. It may require “seeing the duck 
as the rabbit.” As a complication, Cavell questions whether or not these initial 
perceptions that allowed black people or women to be treated unjustly were in fact based 
on seeing them as non-human. Cavell concludes that if it makes sense to speak of seeing 
human beings as human beings then as a condition of possibility, it makes sense to 
imagine that a human being may lack the capacity to recognize others as humans. 
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 Here, we begin to see an interesting and somewhat troubling consequence of 
Wittgensteinian conceptions of the other. Cavell references Wittgenstein’s concept of 
face recognition in the case of the duck-rabbit. 
 When we see this image, we contemplate a face and then after noticing its likeness to 
another, decide that it is in fact the face of a duck or the face of a rabbit. This “noticing an 
aspect” process implies that when we do notice similarities between ourselves and others, 
we notice that human beings are human beings. Yet, this appears to give us the option to 
notice such a thing, implying that there can be cases where such a recognition is not 
made. Cavell critiques the burden of this concept, stating that “What is implied is that it is 
essential to knowing that something is human that we sometimes experience it as such, 
and sometimes do not, or fail to; that certain alterations of consciousness take place, and 
sometimes not, in the face of it.”  The idea that it is possible for someone to not 31
recognize another person as a human being is troubling to theories such as systematic 
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racism, which are based in the idea that racism is an active exclusion — the recognition 
that someone is human but the choice to not treat them as such. 
 In these instances, when people deny certain rights to others or treat them as 
fundamentally different from themselves, such individuals are put on the defensive — the 
burden of prejudice always falls on the other. Yet, in these cases, the burden should be on 
the perceiver, whose prejudice dehumanizes or at best fails to humanize, and not the 
subject of discrimination. Racists don’t miss anything about others, rather they miss 
something in themselves: a recognition of their reliance on the other and the human 
connections this dependency implies. Our failure to see this connection is related to our 
fear of losing control over ourselves and thus of our essences. Denying certain rights 
despite recognizing humanness is the logical equivalent of excluding others from that 
humanness in order to appeal to a special internal essence. Yet “othering” can also be 
interpreted as a process of self identification, through erasing and distancing what is seen 
as dissimilar to oneself.  
 In order to understand the conflicting implications of this idea, we must examine 
other Wittgensteinian constructions of the self-other relationship and the paradoxes 
created. As mentioned, the appeal of a private language is not an attempt to exclude 
others but rather the use of the notion of others to appeal to an inside something — an 
essence. Therefore, if we perceive a racist’s perception of another as similar to the mental 
processes of the desire for privacy, this perception must not be an attempt to exclude but 
rather an appeal to use the other to identify the self. This is consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
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assertion that the other is dependent on the self and gives rise to an associated paradox — 
though the racist is oppressing the other with an assumption of his own private and 
independent “essence,” the racist remains reliant on the other as the source of self-
identification. Therefore, although, as Cavell points out, there are disturbing aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s view, namely that it is possible for a human to find another human not-
human, this concept is consistent with the appeal of a private language.  
 Thus, we see how Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language elucidates how a failure 
to recognize and perceive our dependency and connection to others has severe 
consequences beyond the failure itself. Cavell states that “we should not make life easy 
for ourselves here, because we are to test, not merely the limits of our identity, but the 
limits of our humanity. Being human is the power to grant being human.”  In order to 32
recognize a human other, a capacity for projecting humanity on another being is a 
necessary precondition. This capacity is internal to the individual. Deciding whether or 
not a thing is human is similar to deciding whether the image is in fact a duck or a rabbit. 
Cavell describes this as a “power” that humans have, but Wittgenstein simply refers to it 
as a burden — the responsibility to identify an other as human. Although power and 
burden have different tones, they both underscore the importance of the relationship 
between self and other. Moreover, the capacity to see others as human despite difference 
with one’s self is parallel to the precondition of language conventions. Perhaps, just as in 
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the case of the beetle and of the field of vision, where the subject limits the language and 
the self limits the world, the tensions created by the paradox of self defined by the other 
limit humanity.  
 Biases are reflections of ourselves and evidence of our own capacities to 
recognize and identify humanness because such a failure involves a misunderstanding of 
the shared capacities of language. The concept of the self is only made possible by the 
very character of language and the depth of its convention. Language is always before us 
and between us, as a context and a necessary precondition of who we are. I depend on 
you to figure out who I am, and this co-dependence is the source of our collective fear 
that we cannot be both unique and understood. As Cavell argues, doubt, anxiety, success, 
failure, and living with others are the given of our lives, not problems to be solved. 
Readers of Wittgenstein often reject his ideas because they believe so firmly in their own 
specialness — I’m special but no one understands me. Wittgenstein gives us a different 
sense of self, a self never removed from the other. This is inconsistent with the realization 
of the fantasy of a private language because we seek to control our lives in order to have 
an essence that we are close to. In Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the exclusive character of 
our lives is lost. Subjective life is only real because we maintain the basic agreements we 
have. We are in a way formed and defined by others and this terrifies us because it means 
we lack control over the alleged “essence” we are closest to — ourselves. When we 
attempt to define ourselves by eliminating others we misunderstand the very basis of 
ourselves. This is the paradox of the self defined by the other. 
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Language and Action  
 The most important points to be taken from an analysis of the Wittgensteinian 
paradox involve an understanding of the ways in which language, as a shared aspect of 
our being human, creates an inseparability between the self and the other, and 
consequently between talk and action. The process of defining ourselves by eliminating 
or negating those around us relies on the attempt to use language in an exclusive or 
private way. This in turn has very real implications in our actions because, as Richard 
Fleming claims in Evil and Silence, “talking, whether asking questions, giving directions, 
or reporting events, is doing something and acting in some particular way.”  Fleming 33
uses a Wittgensteinian sense of the connection between talk and action, as “identified 
with the overlapping, criss-crossing fibers of all things,” in order to explore their 
implications in the morality of our lives.  Both individual and collective action may not 34
be just because what we say and do is not always justified, and “understanding the 
possible justifications for our actions and talk requires careful, quiet reflection on our 
conversations with others, including the conditions of possibility for such a life.”  This 35
analysis concludes that revelations and justifications of the self, while often placed at 
odds, are both efforts that are linked by their common understanding of moral 
confrontation “as that of one person’s examination of another.”  In this manner, both are 36
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connected in their reliance on the conversation that is necessary to assess my life and that 
is meant to make myself intelligible to others “by way of making myself intelligible to 
myself.”   37
 As argued by Fleming, determining the justice of our actions, as inherently reliant 
on the conventions of our language use, requires a space for self-reflection through 
silence. Fleming states that “Words and silence are materially inseparable. This is the fact 
of language.”  A “withholding of our words” can or cannot be placed and used in 38
specific contexts, yet is silence really meaningful? Silence is not as commonly 
understood in opposition to words. It continually expresses the facts of language because 
together silence and speech provide conditions for meaningful sound. This conception of 
silence is loosely based on Wittgenstein’s claim that there is no private language by 
which we cannot use words that have never been repeated — language represents the 
shared conditions of possibility for all that we say and do and all that we do not say and 
do not do and “we encounter the communal, the other, in our every utterance and in each 
silence.”  Therefore, silence is meaningful as an opposition to speech, and is used in 39
very particular, context-based ways.  
 Fleming redirects his Wittgensteinian analysis of the linguistic purpose of silence 
by focusing on the relationship between speechlessness and evil. He states that “the fact 
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of evil reduces us to silence. Whereas the problem of evil asks for talk, action, and 
solutions, silence and the threat of paralysis inhabit the fact of evil.”  Sometimes when 40
confronted by staggering levels of what Fleming calls “just plain evil,” we are reduced to 
silence. In these cases, we recognize evil, but talking is required in order to eliminate evil 
because the justice of our actions must be assessed through careful quiet reflection 
followed by conversation with others. Here, Fleming provides a clear link between the 
meaning of silence and its ability to enable the existence of evil. When confronted by 
numbing silence in the face of evil “such predicaments push us and others to engage our 
selves, reflect on and wonder how to talk for ourselves and to others.”  This leads evil to 41
either be eliminated or accepted. Evil is accepted when we fail to see the ties between us 
and them — when we fail to grasp the Wittgensteinian paradox of the self defined by the 
other.  
 Fleming states that “the contrasting positions [accepting vs. eliminating evil] 
reflectively invite a distinction between epistemological and metaphysical uses of the 
concept of evil — a distinction, that is to say, between those uses of evil that demand its 
elimination and those that are resigned to its existence.”  In such instances when it is 42
recognized and accepted, evil is not named as “evil” and language bends to 
accommodate, leaving the victims voiceless within the confines of language use.  This 43
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philosophical understanding also has concrete implications in the social psychology 
theory involving the bystander effect, by which an individual witnesses a wrongful act 
and does nothing in response.  This form of silence represents what Fleming would refer 44
to as an acceptance of evil, resulting cases of epistemic injustice by which the victim of 
this process of othering is left excluded from our shared language. 
Epistemic Injustice and Our Linguistic Obligations to Others 
 The Wittgensteinian interconnections between talk-action and self-other as the 
central basis of Fleming’s analysis can be directly related the work of Miranda Fricker 
involving the philosophical intersections of ethics and epistemology. Fricker argues that 
there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice by which someone is wronged 
specifically in their capacity as a knower.  This form of injustice is therefore critical to a 45
developed understanding of the oppressive forces of narratives, which contribute to the 
knowledge of a certain group. When we “select” one narrative over another, 
systematically favoring its nuanced processes of naming and linguistic deception, we 
discredit the other narrative. This in turn is an act of delegitimizing its speakers by 
questioning their knowledge. In her analysis, Fricker focuses on two forms of epistemic 
injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs 
when prejudice causes a listener to give a lesser level of credibility to a speaker’s voice, 
while hermeneutical injustice occurs at an earlier stage when a gap in collective 
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interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage as they attempt to make 
sense of their social experiences.  An example of testimonial injustice might be that a 46
hiring manager doesn't consider your resume because of your Hispanic last name, while 
an example of hermeneutical injustice might be that you suffer sexual harassment or 
assault in a culture that lacks a full recognition of that critical concept. Fricker notes that 
“we might say that testimonial injustice is caused by prejudice in the economy of 
credibility; and that hermeneutical injustice is caused by structural prejudice in the 
economy of collective hermeneutical resources.”  While both forms of epistemic 47
injustice have a traceable impact in the formation and perpetuation of narratives, due to 
its ties to “voicelessness” through linguistic forms, I give testimonial injustice more 
attention in terms of its relation to Wittgensteinian notions of silence.  
 Fricker incorporates the theories of feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon 
in order to explore the role of silence in cases of testimonial injustice. MacKinnon argues 
that women’s powerlessness in pornography leads to their being given so little credibility 
by their male interlocutors that their speech is effectively silenced. Fricker states that: 
 MacKinnon’s central conception of silencing involves an intriguingly different  
 kind of credibility deficit, and one which makes helpfully explicit the dimension  
 of epistemic objectification that we have been exploring: “Pornography makes  
 women into objects. Objects do not speak. When they do, they are by then  
 regarded as objects, not as humans, which is what it means to have no   
 credibility.”  48
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In this climate of sexual objectification, women’s resulting lack of credibility leads to an 
acute form of testimonial injustice that has starkly real consequences, such as when a 
woman’s “No” is not even registered by her sexual attacker.  It is not the case that the 49
attacker doesn't hear her. Rather, “his stance towards her in the context is such that she is 
prevented from (fully successfully) performing the illocutionary act of refusal in the first 
place.”  This analysis has clear parallels to Fleming’s understanding of “accepted evil” 50
through the use of silence. However, while Fleming mostly focuses on the silence of 
observers, sometimes stunned into this silence by witnessing acts of evil, Fricker adds the 
critical perspective of when the other side is silenced. Such cases of silencing involve a 
“massive advance credibility deficit” that results in an extreme type of testimonial 
injustice that is characterized by a “radical communicative dysfunction.”  This 51
“communicative dysfunction” involves an exclusion of women in the shared language of 
our world, by which their voices are not recognized or understood. In this manner, the 
silencing of women has Wittgensteinian contextual meaning, as an active component of 
the patriarchy.  
 Fricker clarifies the importance of the capacity to give knowledge to others by 
relating it to the capacity for reason that is fundamentally significant to human beings. 
Therefore, undermining this capacity is so significant in that “in the contexts of 
 Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007. P 49
139.
 Ibid. P 141.50
 Ibid. P 140.51
!34
oppression the powerful will be sure to undermine the powerless in just that capacity, for 
it provides a direct route to undermining them in their very humanity.”  As Wittgenstein 52
states, we talk in such a way that is permitted by our human character. When we are 
isolated from this ability — excluded from our shared language — we are consequently 
stripped of our humanity, and others are unable to empathize with us on that same level 
of basic humanness. José Medina refers to this phenomenon in that social injustices breed 
epistemic injustices as two sides of the same coin: “social injustices typically have a 
negative impact on our epistemic relations to each other (deteriorating epistemic trust, 
endangering partiality, weakening the credibility people ascribe to each other, etc.) and 
also on our epistemic relations to ourselves (undermining our epistemic confidence, self-
trust, self-reliance, etc.).”  Social injustices and epistemic injustices therefore depend 53
upon and reinforce one another, as demonstrated by Medina’s analysis of the relationship 
between imposed silences and shared hermeneutical responsibilities.  
 Medina is in agreement with Fricker’s context-sensitive approach to 
hermeneutical injustice but he argues that it must be pluralized and made relational in 
more complex ways: “social silences and hermeneutical gaps are incorrectly described if 
they are uniformly predicated on an entire social context, instead of being predicted on 
particular ways of inhabiting that context by particular people in relation to particular 
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others.”  He calls for a more nuanced, polyphonic contextualization of what it means to 54
break silences and approach their associated epistemic injustices that serves to make 
Fricker’s analysis more dynamic and pluralistic. For example, whereas Fricker analyzes 
the silencing objectification of women as it occurs universally, Medina seeks to qualify 
this theory in order to make it more relativist, dependent on communicative contexts and 
the power relations between the specific interlocutors, beyond spatial differences in 
gender, race, etc. This nods to a more Wittgensteinian understanding of words and 
language as being given meaning through a purely contextual, ever-changing framework. 
Because the ways we learn and use language are completely dependent on others, 
language has a certain multiplicity by which it can not be confined by one, universal 
understanding. If language has this character, as the negation of speech, silence must also 
be understood as multidimensional and context dependent. 
Nowhere and Elsewhere 
 This appeal to context when examining the activations and implications of 
epistemic injustice is also evident in Medina’s discussion of speech in Speaking from 
Elsewhere. Drawing from feminist theory and notions of discursive responsibility, 
Medina argues for the critical, transformative power of speech from marginalized 
sources.  In order to focus on Medina’s use of Wittgensteinian notions of language, I will 55
limit my discussion to his analysis of silence, exclusion, and marginality. Referring to the 
 Medina, José. The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and the 54
social imagination. Oxford University Press, 2012. P 90.
 Medina, Jose. Speaking from Elsewhere. SUNY Press, 2006.55
!36
need for Fricker’s context-sensitive approach to hermeneutical injustice to be pluralized, 
Medina also characterizes silence as polyphonic. He illustrates this by stating that “being 
silent is doing or not doing something: it is a form of action or inaction, a way of 
engaging or a refusal to engage; and it is a linguistic move regulated by norms and 
subject to normative assessments.”  Medina argues that there are many silences that can 56
have many meanings and that whether silence has meaning is a context-specific issue.  57
In this manner, the intelligibility of a silence is an achievement that depends on and 
always remains dependent upon the agency of the speaker.   58
 According to Wittgenstein’s view of intelligibility, whatever boundaries are in 
language are rendered locally and by a set of diverse and heterogenous discursive 
practices. Such boundaries are never final, following the crucial dimensions of language 
use in its normatively and performativity.   Using this framework, Medina provides three 59
central assertions to his construction of elsewhere: 
1. Speech acts are embedded in the situated activities that compose our “form of 
life;” their significance can only be understood in the context.  60
2. Language and action are interwoven in such a way that we cannot separate 
questions about language and agency; a philosophical account of language 
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requires a philosophical account of linguistic performance and the place they 
occupy in our lives.  61
3. Language use is always subject to normative expectations, governed by norms 
and rules.  62
This characterization of the ways in which language becomes intelligible and expressible 
to others provides the foundation for what Medina calls the therapeutic view: the 
conclusion that there is no way to speak from the “outside” because it is only through 
language that we can mean something by something. Therefore, there are no voices 
outside all possible Wittgensteinian “language games” because there is no such thing as a 
private language. Yet, Medina points out that there are those who find themselves unable 
to speak in the discursive practices available to them.  In these cases, the signifying 63
powers of these excluded individuals fall outside the language games that are their home. 
Therefore, he argues that the therapeutic view “ignores the reality of these radical 
exclusions and insists that there is no (meaningful) silence when we don’t have the 
capacity to speak.”  This leads Medina to emphasize the need for us to recognize the 64
radical discursive exclusions and silencing processes that are constitutive of the way our 
language games are played. These radical silences can be very real and call for more than 
“therapy” or reform, rather they require the dismantling of our language games.  
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 This recognition of polyphonic multiplicity suggests that meanings that cannot be 
expressed from our discursive perspective could perhaps be recognized elsewhere from a 
different perspective.  Medina uses an understanding of speaking from this elsewhere in 65
order to refute the notion that there is a nowhere. He states that “this construct, the 
nowhere, is a direct result of construing the here as a hegemonic space: without 
argument, the therapeutic view construes the internal perspective of practitioners, of those 
invested with participatory status and endowed with discursive agency, as exhausting the 
domain of significance.”  Nowhere represents a construct that requires a particular 66
conceptualization of its counterpart, here, in the same manner than we requires a 
recognition of our counterpart they. The formation of these linguistic constructs by a 
process of negation directly parallels the Wittgensteinian way in which an understanding 
of the self requires distinguishing what is not like us, by pointing to and relying upon the 
other. Therefore, when we assume that when someone doesn't speak from here they are 
speaking from nowhere we assume that there is nowhere else but here, just as we often 
suppress and disqualify the realities of people outside our own perspective.  
 Recognizing the presence of this elsewhere requires us to conceive of 
Wittgenstein as an “an enemy to radical skepticism but a friend to radical critique,” by 
which empowering marginalized voices does not involve the rejection of all practice from 
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an a priori, transcendental perspective.  This is because we cannot work outside of 67
language, as a fundamental aspect of being human. Language, as based in context, cannot 
be reduced to simplified, universal understandings and as Medina argues, “we should be 
suspicious of any appeal to the perspective of the language user.”  This essentially 68
means that we cannot systematically uphold one perspective as the perspective because 
there are places different from but not outside of here. The sociology and anthropology of 
language games teaches us that discursive practices include relations of inclusion and 
exclusion, bringing select voices to the center of those practices and relegating others to 
the periphery of the margins. Medina’s polyphonic contextualism attempts to subvert this 
reality through critical questioning: “the destabilization of the normative relations 
between what is at the center and what is at the periphery of a discursive practice.”  69
Therefore, the view from elsewhere, representing an acknowledgement of different lived 
realities from our own, has critical and subversive implications by which the inside/
outside dichotomy is collapsed. 
 The elimination of the inner and outer perspective in favor of a recognition of 
different perspectives coincides with a form of linguistic unity between the self and the 
other. Medina alludes to this process through the use of Hegel’s concept of “inner 
diversity” by which people internalize the perspectives of others. This process involves 
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the individual acquiring individuality and becoming a self by being recognized by others. 
Through symbolic interaction, the individual learns to put herself in the position of others 
and to anticipate their responses, even responding to herself as if she were the other.  70
Hegel’s “inner diversity” and its relationship to Medina’s elsewhere therefore perfectly 
adheres to the Wittgensteinian paradox of the self defined by the other. In this process, we 
can see the foundations of self as first and foremost reflected in the other. Through an 
internalization of this different perspective and differentiation through a second-person 
perspective, the individual adopts a first-person plural perspective — the perspective of a 
We.  Therefore, a failure of an individual to recognize their relationship to other 71
perspectives through the shared character of language would enable the separation of this 
We— a moment of epistemic injustice where others are regarded as the They and 
mistaken as speaking from nowhere. 
 The implications of this failure can be incorporated into the theories of Judith 
Butler in her argument involving precarity and the ethics of cohabitation. Butler 
questions our capacity to respond ethically to “suffering at a distance,” examining the 
ironies of instances when we are “up against another group,” invariably joined, yet 
unable or unwilling to understand to their solicitations in language.  By alluding to the 72
Wittgensteinian notions of the self-other construction, Butler enables the theories of 
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Medina and Fricker, particularly the concept of nowhere vs. elsewhere, to be applied to 
an understanding of conflicting narratives within the same spatial context. Butler does 
this by illuminating the paradox of “closeness and far-ness” in response to the commonly 
held assumption that proximity imposes certain immediate demands for honoring 
principles of bodily integrity, nonviolence, or even territorial claims. Moral outrage often 
does not depend on the spatial-temporal familiarities granted by a common life grounded 
in physical proximity, as proven by the instance in which “bonds of solidarity emerge 
across space and time.”  This occurs when we are solicited by images of distant 73
suffering, the rhetorical starving children in Africa, that move us to act through concrete 
political means and serve to construct a public opinion.  While some images have this 74
response, others do not. For example, in the case of Syria, the plethora of violent, 
disturbing images has in a way overwhelmed and paralyzed Americans. The media often 
distorts the events in Syria, normalizing violence and making the conflict appear 
unsolvable, a phenomenon that has grown to characterize many popular conceptions of 
the Middle East.  
 Butler argues that the answer of why and how we are sometimes moved into 
action by distant images of suffering lies in an analysis of ethical obligation. She notes 
that there is a certain “sensibility” behind ethical obligation, and that it operates in a 
manner that precedes our ego, a “form of responsiveness that implies a dispossession of 
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the egological.”  This dispossession is illustrated by the brief account of what is missing 75
in a photo because what is unchosen in the force of the image articulates something about 
the ethical obligations that impose themselves upon us without our consent. In this 
manner, consent is not a sufficient ground for delimiting the global obligations that form 
our responsibility; rather, there is something implicit in our response to certain distant 
images. Butler traces this implicit something to the limited but necessary reversibility of 
proximity and distance on which our ethical demands depend upon because “certain 
bonds are actually wrought through this very reversibility and the impasse through which 
it is constituted.”  This suggests that in negotiating the “multi-locality and cross-76
temportality of ethical connectedness,” questions of location are confounded in such a 
way that what is happening there also happens, to some extent, here.  Butler expands 77
upon this assertion by comparing the construction of here/there to a personalized 
“dispossession of the egological,” by which the connections between our lives and the 
lives of others are materialized: “In my view (which is surely not mine alone) the life of 
the other, the life that is not our own, is also our life, since whatever sense ‘our’ life has is 
derived precisely from this sociality, this being already, and from the start, dependent on a 
world of others, constituted in and by a social world.”   78
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 Therefore, ethical obligation depends upon our vulnerability to the claims of 
others and establishes us as types of creatures who are fundamentally defined by that 
ethical relation, as a process that precedes individuation. Butler describes this as the 
“unchosen character of earthy cohabitation” as a condition of our very existence as 
ethical and political beings.  This ethical relationship, forged by our cohabitation, 79
explains why great evils, like the prerogative of genocide, destroy not only the political 
conditions of personhood, but freedom itself, understood “not as an individual act but as a 
plural action.”  This is because individual life makes no sense and has no reality outside 80
of social and political frameworks in which all lives are equally valued. Using this 
understanding, Butler argues that we have a distinct vulnerability to destruction by others, 
through genocide or other forms of violence, that follows from a condition of precarity in 
all modes of political and social independency.   81
 This precarity “exposes our sociality, the fragile and necessary dimensions of our 
interdependency.” Yet, while Butler is attempting to argue for a conception of ethical 
obligation that is grounded in precarity, she is not offering a humanist perspective of 
“global” ethics, as she states that “it is not from pervasive love for humanity or a desire 
for peace that we strive to live together.”  She notes that sustainable interdependency on 82
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egalitarian terms is very difficult to foster, and that political efforts to manage populations 
involve tactical distributions of precarity. These political applications rely upon dominant 
norms regarding whose life is grievable and worth protecting and whose isn’t, and these 
are terms are selectively determined by those in power, the voices that Medina describes 
as “made central.” In order to escape this selective attention to one form of precarity over 
another, Butler argues that “it is only when we understand that what happens there also 
happens here, and that ‘here’ is already an elsewhere, and necessarily so, that we stand a 
chance of grasping the difficult and shifting global connections in ways that let us know 
the transport and the constraint of what we might still call ethics.”  In this manner we act 83
ethically towards people when we understand the here as the proximal twin of the there. 
Butler’s analysis, like that of Fricker and Medina, has clear roots in the Wittgensteinian 
notion of the self defined by the other and its ethical implications in the way we live our 
lives as humans. The interconnection between here and there directly parallels Medina’s 
argument that there is no nowhere, only an elsewhere, yet Butler provides an additional 
ethical analysis of the paradoxical ways in which we may be blinded by locational 
proximity.  
The Epistemic Process of Empowering Lived Realities 
 Recognizing the integration of here and there as a derivative of the 
Wittgensteinian self defined by the other requires adjusting the scope of our capacities for 
listening to others elsewhere. In addition to her analysis of the ways silence operates 
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within testimonial injustice, Fricker also provides an explanation of the responsibility of 
“the hearer”: 
 Let us pursue the idea of the hearer’s critical openness to what she is told, an idea  
 that might make sense of the phenomenology of unreflective alertness to the  
 plethora of prompts and cues that bear on how far one should trust. We are  
 looking for a rational sensitivity such that the hearer may critically filter what she  
 is told without active  reflection or inference of any kind.  84
Here, Fricker refers to what characteristically happens in the reception of any given 
testimony. The audience for this testimony operates a type of learning mechanism that 
has certain critical capacities within it. The mechanism is partly innate, but is also 
modified by experience, particularly in the matter of critical capacities. Therefore, the 
reception of a testimony is normally unreflective but is not also uncritical.  Wittgenstein 85
doesn't philosophize about the reception of testimony in terms of its critical capacities, 
yet his preoccupation with the shared character of our language has applications here. 
The understanding that the hearer has some sort of responsibility directly parallels that of 
Wittgenstein and Cavell in their assertions that the fact that the burden of our prejudices 
always falls on the other represents a failure of the hearer to understand his or her 
reliance on the other. However, while a Wittgensteinian solution to this failure would 
simply involve an awakened attention to their interrelation, Fricker offers a more 
perceptual response in which the hearer must see his interlocutors in “epistemic color.”  
 Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007. P 84
69.
 Ibid. P 70.85
!46
 Fricker notes that a hearer’s sensitivity to the occurrences that prompt true is his 
capacity for a certain sort of social perception.  This perceptual capacity would have to 86
be informed by a background “theory,” or body of generalizations, of the competences 
and motivations of a certain context-bound social type.  This essentially means that the 87
hearer would have to receive the word of his interlocutor in light of the probability that 
someone of that character would be capable of and and willing to tell someone like him 
something of credibility in that given context. This flexibility in the “trading in” of social 
types relies on the use of stereotypes as an essential part of credibility judgements. It is 
only when these stereotypes are prejudiced that a “counter-rational current of identity 
power” taints this ability.  This application of the hearer’s responsibility to approach the 88
speaker with a nuanced understanding of their multidimensionality is particularly adept 
because it doesn't attempt to eradicate the presence of social forces like stereotypes. In 
this manner, Fricker presents a solution, referred to as testimonial sensibility, that requires 
the hearer to have “rational sensitivity” in such a way that he or she remains critically 
open to the word of others. Fricker’s sensibility importantly relates to Butler’s 
understanding of a certain “sensibility” behind ethical obligation. This type of openness, 
as a recognition of others’ lived realities, requires an understanding of the Wittgensteinian 
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ways in which we are reliant on others through the shared character of our language and 
our resulting social experiences.  
 Medina also shares Fricker’s insistence that nothing short of a critical awareness 
of one’s social positionality and relationality can correct identity-based prejudices. He 
argues that epistemic responsibility therefore involves obligations to “know oneself and 
to know others with whom one’s life and identity are bound up.”  This is because in 89
order to acquire and transmit knowledge one must have at least a minimal amount of self-
knowledge and social knowledge of others, determined by the context and epistemic 
interactions one has. Paralleling the differences in their context-bound framing of 
epistemic injustice itself, Medina and Fricker differ in the expansionary role of the hearer. 
Medina, while again agreeing with Fricker’s baseline assumptions, argues that differently 
situated subjects’ obligations, in terms of resolving hermeneutical injustice, need to be 
assessed in a pluralistic and relational way. While Fricker states that the virtuous listener 
is obligated to “help generate a more inclusive hermeneutical microclimate,” Medina 
adds an important qualification.  His pluralistic and relational approach adds that: 90
 Differently situated subjects and groups can bear very different burdens and  
 responsibilities with respect to the minimization of hermeneutical gaps and  
 obstacles; and  that, occasionally, these hermeneutical obligations can be   
 suspended and even reversed in order to allow for cases in which contributing to  
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 maintain a social silence or to reinforce the hermeneutical gaps of certain   
 communities may not be blameworthy and unjust, but the ethical thing to do.  91
This approach argues that different social groups and identities carry different burdens in 
preventing the silencing of others, in recognition of the idea that contexts are typically 
populated by differently situated voices with different epistemic agency. This is why 
movements like Black Lives Matter are of critical importance, and must be given 
exclusive agency over their counterparts, in responses like All Lives Matter. Because 
different groups are oppressed in different ways, under a multiplicity of frameworks and 
structures, basic humanist approaches to problems like racism are misdirected and 
problematic. While Fricker’s assessment does incorporate Wittgensteinian notions of the 
self defined by the other in very important ways, Medina gives more attention to the 
multidimensionality of language use and its many contexts, carefully avoiding a reliance 
on the unifying character of “simply being human.”  
 In order to avoid a humanist response to problems of epistemic injustice, we must 
understand the inherent limits to a Wittgensteinian integration of the self and the other. 
While others are critical of our own self-recognition and the ways in which we speak and 
act, we cannot take on the suffering of those our society systematically oppresses. This is 
because, as examined by the philosophies of Butler, Fricker, and Medina, the existence of 
oppression represents a distinct failure in an integration of us and them. While we can 
observe and even seek to understand aspects of the oppression of others, when evil is 
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accepted instead of eliminated we are clearly denying an ethical obligation to these 
victims. Therefore, fully experiencing the lived realities of marginalized individuals is a 
solution to the dismantling of oppression and not something that can occur while 
oppression still exists on an individual scale. For example, reframing Cavell’s 
applications of Wittgenstein to acts of systematic racism, when we notice “aspects of 
similarity” between ourselves and our Arab neighbor, we recognize that he or she is 
human and we see our own dependence on this other person. While we maintain 
observational differences (She wears a hijab and speaks Arabic, I wear my hair in a 
pony-tail and speak English) there is a level of ethical obligation that results from our 
understanding of of the shared character of our humanity. Yet, importantly, within this 
“shared character” is an acknowledgment of the multiplicity of forms and meanings 
because, as maintained by Wittgensteinian conceptions of language, there are limitless 
ways to be human. 
 Seeking to understand the lived realities of others illuminates these different ways 
of expressing humanity. In her analysis of the epistemological value of suffering, Lynne 
Arnault argues that the pitfalls of our discourse about redemptive suffering “provide a 
rather frugal response to lives shattered by cruelty — so frugal that they ‘disappear’ the 
victims.”  By placing suffering in the context of an agenda for “improving the future,” 92
we are consequently blinded to the realities of the suffering of others and to the central 
moral importance of the victim’s suffering. Here, Arnault pinpoints another pitfall of 
 Arnault, Lynne S. "Cruelty, horror, and the will to redemption." Hypatia 18, no. 2 (2003). P 179.92
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humanist solutions to suffering by which acts of evil and oppression are made abstract 
and are universally applied within our discourse. We must be careful to not view the 
suffering of others as a character of our own experiences as fellow humans because this 
promotes “the possibility of letting bystanders think that what the tragedies are really 
about are themselves, not the victims.”  Although as argued by Fleming, silence does 93
have distinct contextual meaning, reflecting the bystander’s acceptance of the witnessed 
evil, the real consequences of this silence must be central to the ways in which it is 
presented within our discourse. By speaking of events such as the Rwandan genocide or 
South African apartheid as universal occurrences of evil, the voices of the bystanders are 
centralized, leaving marginalizing the lived realities of the victims and as Arnault argues, 
“effacing the suffering of victims in this way is surely a high form of moral indifference, 
if not moral and epistemological arrogance.”   94
 Through her counter-realist explanation of how the politics of compassion is 
possible and necessary in order to address human security needs, Elisabeth Porter gives 
particular attention to the experience of marginalized realities and a recognition of their 
relativist quality. She argues that politics can practice compassion with attentiveness to 
the needs of vulnerable people who are suffering, an active listening to the voices of the 
vulnerable, and an open, compassionate, and appropriate response to these particular 
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needs.  Porter uses feminist perspectives on emotions, breaking the gender dichotomy 95
between male reason and female emotion, in order to argue that connection, compassion, 
and affectivity must be recognized as important sources of moral reasoning in the 
political sphere.  Emotions are particularly important because contrary to patriarchal 96
conceptions, they are inherently based on ethical values and are “suppressed and released 
in private, as well as directed toward others.”  To this extent, compassion is not too 97
personal for politics, especially when politics today is centered on the manipulation of 
things like selfhood, national identity, and inter-group biases. Porter also asserts that 
“ethical politics is about trying to cultivate decent polities that affirm human dignity. 
Such politics acknowledges the uniqueness of citizens, and affirms our humanity in 
making others part of our lives while recognizing their right to be different.”  As an 98
ability to understand and share the feelings of another, without fully taking them on as 
one’s own, empathy effectively resolves the tension between the need to see the 
integration of the self in the other and the need to recognize the relativist status of lived 
realities. Porter’s argument therefore has applicability in connecting with others through 
this understanding of empathy and by actively listening to the voices of those victimized 
or marginalized. 
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 As exemplified by Wittgenstein’s analysis of the duck-rabbit, the facial recognition 
that leads us to conclude Its a rabbit! or Oh, its a duck! is reliant on “noticing an aspect” 
and seeing the connections between images, words, and their associated meanings. 
However, there are cases where human recognition is not made, as exemplified by acts of 
racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice. In such cases, as argued by Cavell, the 
burden of our prejudice falls on the other, when in reality the racist hasn’t missed 
anything about others but has instead missed something in themselves — the reliance of 
the self on the other. Because we sometimes do not fully understand this paradox and the 
ways in which it shapes us, we often approach injustice with silence, either through our 
own voicelessness or through the suppression of others’ voices. This failure in granting 
epistemic recognition to others represents a lack in understanding our ethical obligations 
to others by affirming the multiplicity of lived realities within humanity. 
  The very idea that one image can produce two completely different conclusions, 
through the identification of either a duck or a rabbit, perfectly coincides with an 
exploration of dueling narratives. Particularly in the case of Israel and Palestine, the same 
intertwined history has produced two completely different stories, with conflicting 
interpretations within the narrative binaries themselves. Fricker, Butler, and Medina 
frame the Wittgensteinian paradox in a way that prevents his approach from becoming 
blurred by purely humanistic values. Although the forms of life and the conditions of 
being human are meaningful to understanding the nature of language, the relativist 
aspects of humanity are represented by the Wittgensteinian multiplicity inherent to 
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language usage. The reliance of conflict narratives on forms of linguistic deception 
represent a failure to properly understand the nature of our language. Both empathy and 
language, through parallel epistemic processes, require a recognition of the 
Wittgensteinian notion of the self defined by the other by collapsing the separations 
inherent to the we vs. they mentality. This process of otherization through linguistic 
chicanery is most visible in the Israeli-Palestinian case through the use of naming 
practices and the strategic layering of “truths” to bolster conflicting narratives. In this 
manner, many myths used by forms of political Zionism have allowed the unlawful 
Israeli occupation of Palestine to continue for decades by manipulating language and 
preventing prospects for peace. Before we can understand the ways in which these myths 
function, we must first examine the historical development of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict itself.  
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Chapter II 
 Israel and Palestine: A Brief History 
“The very concept of objective truth is fading out of the world. Lies will pass into history.” 
— George Orwell 
 Due to its convenient malleability, finding a starting point for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is an exceedingly difficult task, requiring a series of challenging and 
often contentious judgements. The theories that prefer to trace the origins of this conflict 
to ancient times are usually attempting to use ancient history as a tool to justify their 
claim on the territory involved. A certain rhetoric often accompanies this history, 
narratives that fixate on religious values and a right to the land. The greatest challenge to 
constructing a historical timeline of this conflict is presented by the omnipresent Israeli 
voice, which is systematically favored by the West, often suffocating the Palestinian 
perspective. We see such discrepancies especially in the use of language, such as when a 
Palestinian revolt is named by the Israelis as a riot. The story of Palestine is lost among 
many dueling narratives surrounding the conflict, not only the disparity between the 
Israeli and the Palestinian narrative, but also between the many narratives within these 
larger frameworks, including those used by Zionists and Palestinian groups. In this 
chapter, I seek to provide a brief, factual outline of this conflict, beginning in 1915 with 
the Hussein-McMahon Letters and ending with the Obama Administration’s 2016 
promise to provide Israel with $38 billion in military assistance. In an attempt to reveal 
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the reality of Palestine, finding a balanced history instead of another layered narrative, I 
feature both Israeli and Palestinian historical accounts. 
 An understanding of Zionism is critical to approaching the complexities of Israeli 
narrative. The Zionist movement was founded and developed beginning in 1880 in 
response to the worsening persecution of European Jews. During this period, fueled by 
the growth of a community of modern European nation-states, Jews began immigrating to 
Palestine, which was then a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Palestinian historical 
narrative, arguably the true legislative beginning of this conflict begins with an exchange 
of ten letters between Sir Henry McMahon, Britain’s high commissioner in Egypt, and 
Sharif Hussein bin Ali, Emir of Mecca and King of the Arabs. In these letters, written in 
1915, Britain pledged to support Arab independence if Hussein’s forces revolted against 
the Ottomans. Hussein, the great, great grandfather of modern-day Jordan’s King 
Abdullah, envisioned a unified Arab state, extending from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden 
(Yemen). However, while many Zionist accounts begin with religious foundations, the 
official Israeli perspective, as provided by the government’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
begins in November of 1917 with the Balfour Declaration.  This declaration, drafted in 99
part with US President Woodrow Wilson, states its support for “the establishment in 
Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people.”  The letter addresses a leading 100
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British Zionist, Lord Rothschild, and was motivated in part by the British desire to rally 
Jews on the side of the Allies. 
 In 1918, as a result of World War I, Britain obtains control over Palestine from the 
Ottoman Empire and the area becomes known as British-Mandate Palestine. Although 
Britain maintains control over this area until 1948, the mandate gives the land east of the 
Jordan River to Emir Abdullah and this area becomes the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
The first major incident of inter-communal violence occurs on May Day in 1921 along 
the Jaffa-Tel Aviv border. While the Jews describe the violence as “pogrom” or “riots,” 
Palestinians conceive of it as a “revolt.” The second major incident of inter-communal 
violence erupts in Jerusalem in 1929, spreading to Hebron and resulting in the death of 
sixty-seven Jews. In April of 1936, in response to the killing of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-
Qassam by the British, Arab residents of Palestine begin the “Great Arab Revolt,” which 
continues until 1939, when the British, seeking to obtain Arab support for the recently 
erupted war with Germany, ban most land sales to Jews. From 1941- 1945 Nazi Germany 
systematically murders six million Jews in Europe, making it the deadliest genocide in 
history.  In November of 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations 101
recommends the partition of the British-mandate into two separate states — one for the 
Jews and one for the Arabs. While Zionist leaders accept this proposal, Palestinians 
consider it unrepresentative of the demographic distribution of Jews and Arabs living in 
Palestine at that time, rejecting it. 
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 In May of 1948, Zionist leaders proclaim the state of Israel, and as British troops 
leave the country fighting breaks out between the newly declared Israelis and the Arabs. 
The war is known by the Israelis as the Milhemet Hatzana’ut, the War of 
Independence.  Over 700,000 Palestinians leave the territory and Israel gains control 102
over roughly five hundred Palestinian villages, systematically destroying them. Arabs 
know this war as al-Nakbah, the Catastrophe. Jordan establishes control over the West 
Bank, with the implicit agreement of Israel, and Egypt controls the Gaza Strip. Jordan 
and Israel divide their control over the city of Jerusalem. On December 11, 1948, the UN 
General Assembly passes Resolution 194, stating that Palestinian refugees who wish to 
return to their homes should be permitted to do so and that those who do not wish to 
return should be compensated by the state of Israel.  There remains ongoing violence 103
from 1948-1967, but in May of 1964, following an Arab League decision, 422 Palestinian 
national figures meet under Ahmad Shuqeiri, founder of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and formulate the Palestine National Council (PNC), the PLO 
Executive Committee, the National Fund, and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).   104
 On June 5, 1967, Israel conducts a pre-emptive attack against Egypt, gaining 
control of the territory previously controlled by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, including the 
Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. In six days, Israel 
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triples the size of its territory and begins establishing settlements, referring to them by 
biblical names Judea and Samaria. While Israel calls this the “Six Days War,” it is 
remembered by Palestinians as al-Naksah — the setback. Palestinians view Israel’s 
developing settlements as a violation of international law, regarding territory seized 
during war, and the PLO moves its operations from the West Bank to Jordan. In response, 
the UN Security Council passes Resolution 242, calling for: 
 The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent  
 conflict, termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and  
 acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political   
 independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within  
 secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.  105
This resolution, particularly its formula of “land for peace,” becomes the basis for all 
subsequent peace negotiations between Israel, Palestine, and the neighboring Arab states. 
The next major conflict occurs on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria organize a 
surprise attack on Yom Kippur and during the Muslim month of Ramadan against Israeli 
forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Israelis refer to this war as “the Yom 
Kippur War” and see it as a military victory, maintaining physical and political possession 
of the attacked territories. Arabs, calling this conflict “the Ramadan War,” also see this 
battle as a victory because it revealed the weaknesses of the Israeli military. From the 
Arab perspective, without a large, US air-lifted supply of weapons, Israel would have not 
been as successful in defending its territory.  
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 In October of 1973, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 338, calling for an 
immediate cease-fire and the commencement of UNSCR 242 with the goal of 
“establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.”  Within the period of 106
1978-1981, the Camp David Accords were signed by Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat; 
Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin; and US President, Jimmy Carter. Under this 
agreement, Israel agreed to return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in return for peace and 
normalization. This was the first time an Arab country signed a peace treaty with Israel, 
thereby accepting the state’s existence and initiating great criticism of Sadat from 
Egyptians and other Arabs in the region. As a result, Egypt was expelled from the Arab 
League. Yet, in 1980, Egypt and Israel establish diplomatic relations, leading directly to 
Sadat’s assassination by his own soldiers on October 6, 1981. On June 6, 1982, Israel 
invades Lebanon and established a “security zone” in order to block Hezbollah forces. 
Hezbollah was actually weak and undeveloped at this time, yet there are two reasons for 
this invasion: to force PLO to move out of Lebanon, and to gain control of water 
resources. The Israeli Army reaches Beirut and successfully drives out Yasser Arafat’s 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which moves to Tunisia. In September 1982, 
Israel-allied Christian militias enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut and 
massacre 2,000 unarmed Palestinians. An Israeli official inquiry finds Defense Minister 
Ariel Sharon indirectly responsible. From 1983-1985, Israel makes a phased withdrawal 
from most of Lebanon, excluding the “security zone” on the southern border. 
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 On December 9, 1987, a Palestinian Intifada, “uprising” in Arabic, begins in the 
West Bank and Gaza. In the Palestinian narrative, the Intifada is in protest of continued 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and involves demonstrations, strikes, riots, 
and acts of violence. The most symbolically important act involves the stoning of Israeli 
security forces, often by young men and boys, which becomes the image of Palestinian 
resistance for Palestinians and Arabs, but a representation of Palestinian violence for 
Israelis. This uprising marked the first time Palestinians living within the occupied 
territories became the driving forces of the opposition, which until then was organized 
mainly by the PLO neighboring Arab countries. Israel addresses the Intifada as a series of 
“riots,” and suppressed the movement with police, armed forces, curfews, the closing of 
universities, arrests, and deportations, but the protests continued for six years, leaving 
1,284 Palestinians killed between 1987-1993 by the Israeli army, including 332 children. 
From 1988-1993, in the Gaza Strip alone, approximately 60,706 Palestinians were injured 
from shootings, beatings, or tear gas. In the same six-year period, B’Tselem, an Israeli 
human rights organization, calculates that 179 Israelis were killed. However, on 
December 14, 1988, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat condemns all forms of terrorism and 
recognizes the state of Israel. US President Ronald Reagan authorizes the US to enter into 
a “substantive dialogue” with the PLO, which Israel remains hostile towards. The next 
day, the UN shows clear support for the PLO, with the General Assembly passing 
Resolution 53/ 196, which “reaffirmed the inalienable rights of Palestinians and Syrians 
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in the Golan,” calling on Israel to not exploit natural resources in the occupied 
territories.   107
 In October of 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference, including delegations from 
Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and Palestine, marked the first time since Israel’s 
creation in 1948 that most of the Arab parties agreed to bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations with Israel. From January- September 1993, Israel and the PLO engaged in a 
series of secret talks in Oslo, Norway, culminating with Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister, 
Yitzhak Rabin, signing a Declaration of Principles in Washington. With this agreement, 
Israel recognized the PLO, giving them limited autonomy in West Bank and Gaza and in 
return the PLO gives up its claims to Israel’s other territory and agrees to end the Intifada. 
The process by which the two sides would gradually exchange land for peace becomes 
known as the “Oslo Peace Process.” Oslo effectively ended the politically existential 
conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the two sides no longer claimed that 
the other did not have the right to exist as a state. In 1994, Israel and the PLO reach the 
“Cairo Agreement,” including an Israeli withdrawal from 60% of the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho, allowing Arafat to make a triumphant return to Gaza to become the head of the 
new Palestinian Self-Rule Authority (PA) after twelve years of running the PLO from 
Tunisia. In 1995, Arafat and Rabin sign the Taba Agreement (“Oslo II”) to expand 
Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the West Bank, allowing democratic Palestinian 
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elections. However, shortly after this agreement, Rabin is assassinated by an orthodox 
Jew opposed to the withdrawals, and Shimon Peres assumes Israeli leadership.  
 In 1997, Netanyahu gives over 80% of the West Bank town of Hebron to 
Palestinian rule and in 1998, he signs the Wye River Memorandum outlining further 
withdrawals from the West Bank. In July of 2000, after fourteen straight days of 
negotiations at the Camp David II presidential retreat, President Bill Clinton, newly 
elected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Arafat were unable to reach a 
reconciliatory conclusion. The Israeli narrative frames  the agreement as overly generous, 
handing over 95% of the West Bank and Gaza for the formation of a Palestinian state. 
However, the Palestinians believe they should not have to accept less than 100% of Gaza 
and the West Bank because the total of both of the territories compromises only 22% of 
what was originally Palestine. In terms of the proposed territorial arrangement, Israel 
believes their maintaining control over settlements and security zones in these regions is 
necessary for their national security, while Palestine views the divided Palestinian state 
negatively, with the West Bank and Gaza completely isolated and separated by over thirty 
miles of Israeli territory. 
 Amid this stalemate, on September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, the leader of Israel’s 
right wing party visits a holy Muslim sanctuary with 1,000 Israeli soldiers, sparking 
violent Palestinian demonstrations. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs terms these 
demonstrations as the “Terror Intifada.” Israeli narratives point to Palestinian attacks on 
Joseph’s tomb in Nablus and Rachel’s tomb in Bethlehem in order to argue that 
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Palestinians do not respect Jewish holy sites and therefore should not be granted 
sovereignty over the Muslim sanctuary, the Temple Mount. Sharon and his supporters 
argue that the Palestinian violence was planned before his visit to the Temple Mount; 
however, because Jews do not normally visit this temple except as tourists, Sharon has 
been accused of provoking a reaction that would undermine the peace process. 
Palestinians term these demonstrations and attacks the “al-Aqsa Intifada,” in the name of 
the mosque. This intifada is particularly significant because it marks the first time 
Palestinian citizens of Israel have participated in demonstrations and protests against 
Israel, in solidarity with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Israelis then cited 
the participation of Arab Israelis in this intifada as a reason for not allowing Palestinian 
refugees to return to live in Israel. Arab Israelis argue that their protests are targeted not 
only toward the continued occupation, but toward the treatment of Arab Israelis within 
Israel. For example, the Nazareth-based Arab Association for Human Rights claims there 
is a massive disparity in local government budgets between Jewish and Arab towns and 
municipalities.  
 In February 2001, one week after Ariel Sharon is elected Prime Minister of Israel, 
a Palestinian bus driver ploughs his vehicle into a waiting line of passengers, killing eight 
Israeli soldiers and civilians. In response, Israel implements a total blockade on the 
occupied territories. Palestinians claim that the blockades are preventing the delivery of 
humanitarian and medical supplies, as well preventing Palestinians from attending their 
jobs in Israel and traveling between towns in the territories. A month later, Israel seizes 
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territory controlled by the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip for the first time since the Oslo 
process. 
 In May 2001, the Mitchell Commission, an international fact-finding committee, 
calls for an immediate ceasefire and renewed peace negotiations, including a freeze on 
the expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. In addition, the European 
Union accuses Israel of using disproportionate force in the occupied territory, also calling 
for the dismantling of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In June, a 
suicide bomber kills nineteen Israelis at a night club in Tel Aviv, and Arafat orders his 
forces to enforce a ceasefire. A month later, the Israeli security cabinet votes to give the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) a broader license to target Palestinian terrorists. These new 
guidelines allow the IDF to act against known terrorists, even if they are not on the verge 
of committing an attack. Israeli narratives state that this preventative action against 
imminent terrorist threats is necessary, citing international law in that it “recognizes that 
individuals who directly take part in hostilities cannot claim immunity from attack or 
protection as innocent civilians.”  In contrast, the Palestinian narrative takes issue with 108
this policy of “targeted assassinations,” arguing that these killings constitute extra-
judicial executions where the victims have been killed without trial or opportunity for a 
fair legal process. They cite the Fourth Geneva Convention, in that as the occupying 
power, Israel “has the right to arrest and bring to trial those suspected of violent hostile 
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activities.” However, in this same convention, extra-judicial executions are considered 
willful killings, which constitute war crimes and are subject to universal jurisdiction.  109
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalates once more after the assassination of 
Israeli hard-line Tourism Minister Rehavam Zeevi on October 17, 2001. It is important to 
note that in addition to his role in the tourism sector, Zeevi also has a distinct political 
agenda that is based on “transferring” the Israeli-Palestinians from Israel to the West 
Bank. In response, in January 2002, Israel seizes a ship carrying fifty tons of military 
equipment from the Palestinian Authority. On March 13, 2002, the US sponsors a UN 
Security Council Resolution calling for a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel. A 
few days later, the Arab League adopts the Pan-Arab Initiative for Peace in the Middle 
East, offering Israel security and “normal relations” in exchange for withdrawal from 
Arab territories. On March 27, a Hamas suicide attack kills thirty Israeli civilians in 
Netanya, and Israeli sources claim that this is the “final catalyst for action.”  Sharon 110
green-lights operation “Defensive Shield,” issuing an emergency call-up for over 20,000 
Israeli reserve soldiers, the largest action since the 1982 Lebanon War. Israeli narratives 
justify these actions by stating that between September 2000 and February 2002, around 
300 Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists. The Operation begins on March 29 with 
an incursion into Ramallah. Within weeks, Israeli seizes control of six of the West Bank’s 
largest cities, occupying their surrounding towns and refugee camps. According to local 
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human rights groups, over 8,500 Palestinians were arrested during this operation, 6,000 
of them being held for weeks without outside contact.  A total of 497 Palestinians were 111
killed and 1,447 wounded in this IDF reoccupation.  112
 On July 22, 2002, Israel assassinates the military leader of Hamas, Sheikh Salah 
Shehadeh, using F-16 warplanes to bomb his home in Gaza City. The explosion killed 
eleven other Palestinian civilians, including seven children, and wounded 120 others. On 
August 1, 2002, the UN issues a report disputing the Palestinian claim of the Jenin 
“massacre.”  The Palestinian Authority and human rights organizations claim that in the 113
conduct of their operations in the refugee camp, Jenin, the IDF used human shields, 
disproportionate use of force, arbitrary arrest, and torture. In contrast, the Israelis point to 
breaches of international humanitarian law on the part of Palestinian combatants within 
the camp for basing themselves in a civilian area. Interviews with witnesses conducted by 
human rights organizations suggest that tanks, helicopters, and troops were used for two 
days before armored bulldozers were used to demolish houses and other structures. The 
UN report details “that the Israeli Defense Forces encountered heavy Palestinian 
resistance is not in question. Nor is the fact that Palestinian militants in the camp, as 
elsewhere, adopted methods which constitute breaches of international law that have been 
and continue to be condemned by the United Nations. Clarity and certainty remain 
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elusive, however, on the policy and facts of the IDF response to that resistance.”  The 114
UN report ultimately rejects Palestinian claims of a massacre, but blames both sides for 
endangering civilians. However, it is critical to note that UN investigators were not 
permitted to visit Jenin and did not have Israel’s cooperation. In fact, the Israeli 
government blocked a fact-finding mission after the UN refused to meet its conditions.  115
 In 2003, notably the beginning of the US invasion of Iraq, Arafat names 
Mahmoud Abbas the Prime Minister of the PA.  Hours later, the US released its long-116
awaited “road map” of a Middle East peace settlement, with the aim of creating an 
independent, viable Palestine by 2005. Two months later, the Mideast Peace Summit 
convenes in Jordan, with President Bush and Prime Ministers Sharon and Abbas. Sharon 
promises an immediate dismantling of the unauthorized Jewish outposts on the West 
Bank, while Abbas asserts that the armed Intafada, a 32-month Palestinian uprising, must 
end. However, on June 19, Israel begins the construction of a West Bank security wall, 
continuing for 200 miles and coinciding with Israel’s 1967 border with the West Bank. 
The wall takes several convenient detours to ensure that major Jewish settlement 
communities, including Ariel and Immanuel, are on the Israeli side of the wall. The wall’s 
eventual cost rounds to an estimated $220 million, justified by Israeli narratives as 
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necessary for protection against Palestinian terrorists, most of which they claim come 
from the West Bank. Shortly after the 2003 Geneva Accords, establishing a symbolic 
peace agreement between Israeli and Palestinian politicians, the EU formally condemns 
the Israeli West Bank Wall. The EU claims that the wall prevents the creation of a viable 
Palestinian state, urging Israel to refrain from extra-judicial killing and civilian deaths.  117
 On March 22, 2004, Hamas founder and spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, is 
killed by Israeli rockets, which also wound sixteen and killing an additional seven 
civilians. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlights that Yassin, as the head of 
“the Hamas terror organization” was responsible for numerous terror attacks. A month 
later, the military leader of Hamas is also killed by an Israeli missile strike. June 28, 2004 
marked the first Israeli fatalities from Hamas rockets, killing two Israelis in June and 
another two Israeli children in September. In response, the IDF launches a three week 
operation, killing 130 Palestinians, 68 Hamas militants and 62 civilians.  On July 9, 118
2004 the International Court of Justice rules that the separation wall in the West Bank is 
in breach of international law. The court’s non-binding advisory on the legality of the 
fence calls on the UN Security Council to consider “further action” to stop the wall’s 
construction.  Three months later, Israel’s parliament votes 67 to 45 to dismantle all 119
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Jewish settlements in Gaza, evacuating 8,100 residents and withdrawing thousands of 
Israeli troops.   120
 Yasser Arafat dies “due to his failing health” towards the close of 2005 and 
Mahmoud Abbas is elected President of the PA in January 2005. Later that year, Talia 
Sasson, an Israeli Attorney commissioned by Sharon, issues a report revealing illegal 
Israeli outposts in the West Bank and Gaza. The findings criminalized the international 
body the World Zionist Organization, describing it as a pivotal player in the scheme, in 
which “midlevel officials in various government ministries secretly channeled funds and 
resources to the illegal West Bank outposts.”  The report created a sensation by 121
documenting the fact that outposts had been formed in contravention of the laws both 
before and after the March 2001 cutoff date. The Palestinian narrative held the report as 
further evidence for the international community to call on Israel to remove the illegal 
outposts. Israeli settler leader Shaul Goldstein claims that Sharon should face 
questioning, stating that his administration “sent settlers in order to protect the roads and 
land.”  The blame is then diverted to Effi Eitam, an Israeli military commander, who in 122
turn claims that the illegal outposts he had approved during his time in office were 
approved in coordination with Prime Minister Sharon, sometimes even initiated by him. 
Eitam also holds that Talia Sasson was not an objective surveyor, arguing that the reports 
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were politically motivated.  The Sasson report represents legal confirmation of Prime 123
Minister Sharon’s controversial political decision to dismantle the outposts constructed 
during his time in office. However, despite substantial evidence provided by the report 
alongside a written commitment by the Israeli government to the Bush administration to 
do so, no settlements were dismantled.  By highlighting the disparities between Israeli 124
law and the actions of Zionist political organizations, the Sasson report and its 
surrounding responses reveal the tensions within the Israeli narrative itself.  
 On January 5, 2006 Israeli Prime Minister Sharon is replaced after a stroke, and 
his powers are transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Olmert’s new Israeli 
Centrist Party also wins the election in March, bringing the Kadima party to power, 
which is committed to a further pull-out from the occupied West Bank. Later that month, 
Hamas wins the Palestinian Parliamentary Election, defeating the governing Fatah party. 
From July to August 2006, Israel engages in war with Lebanon, sparked after Hezbollah 
fires rockets into northern Israel. The IDF claims that over 4,000 rockets were fired into 
northern Israel during the 34 days of fighting, which resulted in the death of 159 Israelis 
and over 908 Lebanese.  In June 2007, Hamas takes over Gaza as Palestinian Authority 125
President Abbas swears in an emergency government, reasserting his authority over the 
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West Bank. Israel responds by ordering a blockade of all cargo shipments to the now 
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Under this blockade, Israel controls Gaza’s airspace, 
territorial waters, and land borders, cutting off civilian access to electricity used for water 
availability and sewage treatment. The blockade also prevents Palestinians from leaving 
Gaza, with Israelis seizing control of telecommunications, the population registry, and the 
customs and tax revenues.  126
 On November 27, 2007, the Annapolis Peace conference results in US President 
Bush announcing an agreement by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to work towards a peace 
pact by the end of 2008, perceives as essentially a ‘road map’ to a permanent two-state 
solution.  Over a year later, in December 2008, Israel begins a bombardment and 127
occupation of Gaza. US and Israeli news sources claim that the seven day Israeli aerial 
bombardment was designed to detonate buried explosives and mines in an attempt to take 
control of areas used by Palestinian militants to fire rockets into southern Israel.  Israeli 128
officials stress that the objective was to deal “punishing blows” to Hamas in order to 
deter future rocket fire. The six-day air strike campaign kills over 450 Palestinian 
civilians, and fails to prevent Hamas from launching more missiles. On January 21, 2009 
Israel announces a unilateral ceasefire and Israeli troops leave Gaza. The UN urges Israel 
to fully open all of Gaza’s borders to allow reconstruction work to begin, a move not 
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included in the ceasefire agreement. During the entire three-week conflict, Palestinian 
medical sources claim that over 1,300 Gazan civilians were killed. The Israeli army states 
that thirteen Israeli soldiers were killed, including three civilians.   129
 In March, Benjamin Netanyahu becomes Israel’s prime minister. Following 
President Obama’s 2009 Cairo Speech affirming US support of a two-state solution, on 
June 14, 2009, Netanyahu endorses a Palestinian state to exist beside Israel for the first 
time. This is a reversal of his previous stance due to US pressure, but he attaches 
conditions such as the prevention of the formation of a Palestinian army and the 
Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, preventing Palestinian refugees from 
returning to Israel.  While Israeli narratives claim that Palestinians rejected these 130
conditions, leaked documents show that Palestinians are actually willing to make major 
concession to cut a peace deal. Al Jazeera television begins leaking hundreds of pages of 
documents belonging to the Palestinian negotiating team in January 2011. In contrast 
with the Israelis portrayal of Palestinian leaders as rejectionists, the documents reveal a 
series of detailed maps, charts, and compromises, even broaching controversial trade-offs 
that went beyond what their own people were ready to accept. For example, PA President 
Abbas was quoted in March 2009 recognizing that deep concessions would have to be 
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made because “it is illogical to ask Israel to take 5 million refugees or indeed 1 million,” 
referencing the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes in Israel.  131
 In May 2011, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas sign a landmark 
reconciliation pact aimed at ending their four-year rift. The pact provides the creation of a 
joint caretaker Palestinian government before national elections in 2012 involving an 
interim government to run the occupied Abbas- based West Bank and the Hamas-
controlled Gaza Strip.  This leads Abbas to seek full UN membership for a Palestinian 132
state, which the US and Israel claim could spurn hope for resuming peace talks. 
Washington threatens to veto any Security Council vote attempting to grant this 
membership. Obama’s deputy national security advisor, Ben Rhodes, is quoted stating 
that “we have made our position clear, which is that we oppose actions to achieve a 
Palestinian state through the United Nations.”  In October, 2011, Palestine becomes the 133
195th full member of UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization), causing the US to pull its annual $70 million contribution. The Palestinian 
foreign minister Riad al-Malki described the acceptance as “the best step toward peace 
and stability,” insisting that the membership in UNESCO is “linked in no way to our 
request to join the United Nations.”  In November 2012, the Palestinian Authority seeks 134
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non-member state status from the UN and the Israeli Foreign Ministry responds by 
stating that a successful Palestinian bid for enhanced status at the UN could lead Israel to 
cancel the Oslo peace accords and to possibly dismantle the PA, ousting President 
Abbas.   135
 In addition, the IDF announces the beginning of “Operation Pillar of Defense,” 
which they claim is intended to protect Israeli civilians from rockets being continually 
fired from Hamas’ Gaza. The IDF also claimed that it is doing its best to avoid civilian 
casualties, although over half of those killed in Gaza have been women and children 
according to Hamas officials. Although Hamas is the elected political party of the Gaza 
Strip, Israel, the US, and the EU refer to Hamas as a terrorist organization. Shortly after 
the start of this Israeli operation, the UN accepts Palestine as a non-member observer, 
voting by an overwhelming majority.  In April 2014, Hamas and Fatah announce an 136
agreement to form a unity government after previous attempts had failed, causing 
Netanyahu to accuse Abbas of sabotaging peace efforts by seeking rapprochement with 
Hamas.  Several months later, Palestinians in Gaza begin a series of rocket attacks 137
against Israel, and Israel launches ‘Operation Protective Edge’ against Hamas militants. 
This Israeli operation represents the rising tensions between Israelis and Palestinians after 
the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teenagers in the occupied West Bank. 
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According to the UN, the violence following the Israeli operation led to the death of over 
2,189 Palestinians, 1,486 of which were civilians. On the Israeli side, 67 soldiers were 
kills alongside six civilians. 
 The months of September and October 2015 are characterized by escalating 
violence, including violent riots surrounding the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. The 
Palestinian Red Crescent reports that nearly 2,000 Palestinians were injured in the span 
of one month alongside the death of 41 Palestinians and nine Israelis. On September 14, 
2016, the US commits $38 billion over a period of ten years to military assistance for 
Israel. This security agreement is unprecedented, as the largest military aid deal the US 
has ever had with any country.  However, three months later, the US abstains from 138
signing a UN Resolution condemning Israeli settlements, allowing the motion to pass. 
Described as an unprecedented diplomatic rebuke of Israel, the resolution calls for Israel 
to “immediately and completely cease all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian 
territory, including East Jerusalem.”  It declares the establishment of settlements by 139
Israel has “no legal validity and constitutes a flagrant violation under international 
law.”  US Ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, urges that the US position on Israel 140
has remain unchanged, quoting a 1982 statement by then-President Ronald Reagan that 
the US “will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements.” 
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However, she also states that “our vote does not in any way diminish our steadfast and 
unparalleled commitment to the security of Israel.”   141
 Most recently, on February 6 2017, Israel passes the law retroactively legalizing 
approximately 4,000 settler homes built on Palestinian land. Settlements are viewed by 
Palestinians and the international community as an crippling obstacle to peace, with the 
Israeli newspaper Haaretz describing the measure as an extremely controversial “land-
grab bill.”  Although the status of Israeli settlements and the legality of certain 142
territorial measures remain central to this conflict today, it is critical to note that the real 
issues lie in the sustaining human rights abuses that characterize everyday life for those 
living in Gaza and the West Bank. 
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Chapter III 
The Philosophy of Occupation: Politics and Terror 
“If the olive trees knew who planted them, their oil would become tears.” 
— Mahmoud Darwish 
 As demonstrated by a synopsis of the historical context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, many of the events and statistics have been skewed within their respective 
narratives, using different words and names, such as independence vs. catastrophe and 
terrorists vs. revolutionaries. Palestinian terrorism, especially in the instance of Hamas 
suicide bombings, has been political Zionism’s most effective tool in defending 
everything from the extensive West Bank “security barrier” to the “targeted killings” of 
Palestinians. The use of the name “terrorist” and its corresponding moral implications is 
especially important to an analysis of this conflict because it dominates the rhetorical 
lexicon used by outside political forces, including the United States. In analyzing the use 
of the language surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is critical to look at the acts 
of violence committed by all actors and how this violence exists in a suspension 
surrounding both politics and terror. Terrorism presents a particularly dynamic 
phenomenon because it is both a cause and an effect of the perpetual cycle of US-Middle 
East relations, used as both a justification tool for US intervention in the War on Terror 
and as a source of Arab resistance to these forms of imperialism. In this chapter, I will 
analyze the ways in which select Zionist discourse has effectively used a combination of 
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politics and terror to sustain the occupation of Palestine, namely through its alliance with 
the US.  
“A Land without a People for a People without a Land” And Other Zionist Myths 
 The birth of modern Israel sixty-nine years ago and its resulting occupation of 
Palestine took place against a backdrop of terror, including the shocking horror of Nazi 
Germany’s Holocaust. The atrocities of the Holocaust, by which Jews in Europe were 
systematically eradicated in order to pursue the political agenda of Adolf Hitler, are 
indisputable. In this thesis, though I reference the relationship between the Holocaust and 
the formation of Israel, I make no attempt to discredit a recognition of this genocide or 
the impact it had on shaping Jewish and Israeli identity. However, there exists a direct 
lineage between the disturbing bystander role played by great political powers, including 
the US and Britain, during WWII, and the actions of US foreign policy today, with 
respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his analysis of the culture of memorialization 
surrounding the Nazi Holocaust, Brian Klug argues that memory can play tricks, not in 
the accuracy of our recollection of the past, but in our perception of the present. Klug 
refers to this phenomenon, the “Auschwitz mindset,” as an awareness of the present 
structured by a sense of the past.  This mindset becomes problematic when it is used “to 143
view the affairs of Israel in the Middle East though the lens of the catastrophic Jewish 
experience in Nazi-occupied Europe.”     144
Klug, Brian, “Terror” in Law, Stephen. Israel, Palestine and Terror. Continuum Intl Pub Group, 2008. P 143
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 Norman Finkelstein expands upon Klug’s conception of the politicized use of 
Holocaust memorialization, arguing that after 1967, Zionism and WWII became 
inextricably linked. Finkelstein notes significant changes in the US in relation to the Nazi 
Holocaust post-1967, by which the Holocaust became an “indispensable ideological 
weapon” for the justification of the formation of an Israeli state.  Klug connects the US 145
use of the Holocaust as a justification tool for the condemnation of Palestinian resistance 
through the use of acts named as ‘terrorist activities’: “viewed through this prism, 
Palestinian terrorism (by which I mean terrorist acts aimed against Israel and carried out 
by groups of individuals who are Palestinian Arabs) tends to be seen as a form of 
persecution of Jews and thus an expression of anti-semitism.”  As a result of the 146
parallels drawn between the Holocaust and the creation of Israel, Palestinian political 
acts, as diametrically opposed to this occupation, have become morally tainted. In this 
manner, the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, which is denoted in Israeli 
policy, is understood as representing the interest of the Jewish people as a whole. While 
this dominant mindset does have a tangible effect on Israeli policy, it is important to note 
that Israeli society is characterized by multiple opinions, many of which object to the use 
of Holocaust rhetoric to justify the occupation. 
 This internal dispute over the use of the Holocaust to justify the occupation of 
Palestine, while not the focus of this chapter, points to larger sources of fragmentation 
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within the different forms of Zionist narrative. Within the broader category of Zionism, 
there are three relatively distinct tendencies: political Zionism, labor Zionism, and 
cultural Zionism. Although they are all tied to the demand for a Jewish majority, their 
base arguments are constructed for different reasons particular to the strategic goals of 
each subgroup.  Political Zionism presents itself as the most problematic in the context 147
of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, as a result of its reliance on political frameworks to 
achieve its state status. It is critical to note that a Jew is not necessarily a Zionist and 
political Zionism differs from other Zionist ideologies. A Zionist also does not need to be 
a practicing Jew. In fact, there was significant conflict historically between Zionists and 
assimilationist Jews in the Diaspora, who insisted that their loyalty was to their individual 
nationality, alongside their separate Jewish faith.  The basic aims of political Zionism 148
were precisely defined by its founder, Theodor Herzl over fifty years ago. As a catalyst of 
the Zionist movement, Herzl’s pamphlet, The Jews’ State, outlines its principal objectives 
as the promotion of an organized, large-scale colonization of Palestine, the acquisition of 
an internationally recognized legal right to colonize Palestine, and the formation of a 
permanent organization to unite all Jews in the cause of Zionism.   Herzl’s political 149
movement organized the first World Zionist Congress in 1897, in order to discuss the 
homeland options. States were proposed in places including Alaska and Uganda, yet 
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Jerusalem held the most religious meaning for Jews and was therefore held as the highest 
priority option.  Today, the World Zionist Organization works alongside the Israeli 150
government with its main purpose to encourage Jewish immigration to Israel.   151
 In his analysis of various Zionist texts, including the scripture references in 
religious works and the original proclamations of Theodor Herzl, Walid Khalidi explains 
the origins of Zionist thought as being at its very core reliant on a ‘religious right’ to the 
land.  One aspect of Zionist claims, the claim to fulfill scripture by the establishment of 152
a Jewish state in Palestine, cites the first explicit promise of Palestine to the descendants 
of Abraham at Shechem, now Neblus, in Genesis XII.  This concept of Zionism’s 153
religious core is replicated by the analysis of  Yosef Gorny, by which he seeks to identify 
the ‘ideological consensus’ within which most of Zionist thinking unfolded. He argues 
that “at the core of the Zionist belief is the principal obstacle to any reconciliation with 
the Arabs, that Palestine should one day contain a Jewish majority.”  This theory is 154
directly relevant to Herzl’s original proclamations for the creation of the state of Israel 
and also represents one of the sources of fuel for the intractability of this conflict.  
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 This desire for a state comprised of one singular ethnic group seems at odds with 
Western democratic values, particularly under the contextual lens of post-WWII politics. 
However, political Zionism presents the creation of Israel differently, highlighting the 
importance of the nation-state as a consensual relationship and the citizen as its 
irreducible unit, a concept that theoretically anchors democratic values, particularly those 
of the United States. Herzl’s blueprint is importantly reliant on nation-building 
frameworks approved by the Western powers, layering the myth of Palestine as a 
unpopulated abyss with the idea of the creation of a highly democratic state in the Middle 
East. In addition to his theories regarding the impact of the Holocaust in Zionist 
narratives, Norman Finkelstein also argues that the Zionist analysis of the Jewish 
Question, through this process of nation-building, effectively duplicates the very 
reasoning of anti-Semitism. He draws parallels between political Zionism’s logical 
constructions and those of the arguments used the justify the hatred of the Jews, by which 
this ideology “proposed that the Jewish nation resolve the Jewish Question by 
(re-)establishing itself in a state that ‘belonged’ to it.”  In his historical mapping of the 155
development of Zionism prior to 1948, Dina Porat argues that the “the origins of Zionist 
identity are based in the need to draw a clear distinction between Zionism and earlier 
forms of diasporic existence.”   The Zionist movement was created as a way to solve 156
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the miseries of the Jewish situation in the Diaspora, as essentially a negation of the 
Diaspora itself. In this manner, political Zionism was not constructed to combat anti-
Semitism but to achieve a modus vivendi, coexisting with it.  In order to achieve this, 157
Jews had to constitute themselves as a majority somewhere because in every place they 
attempted to immigrate to during the Diaspora, due to their statelessness, they formed a 
numerical minority.  Therefore, Jews were historically always othered by nation-states 158
in Europe and the Middle East. Yet, instead of dismantling the we vs. they structure, 
internalized by the institutional, state-run process of otherization, the political Zionists 
maintained this framework by transferring the Jewish status from the minority to the 
majority, from them to us. 
 While the theories provided by Finkelstein, Gorny, and Khalidi, concerning the 
central ideological basis of political Zionism do reflect its role in the formation of Israel, 
it is also important to note that Zionism, although dominated by this discourse, also had 
inner fragmentation along the fault lines of Arab consent. For example, the cultural 
Zionist Ahad Ha’am believed that both peoples in Palestine should be treated justly 
despite the fact that he viewed Jewish historical rights to the land as stronger than those 
of Palestinians.  The Brit-Shalomist, Ernst Simon, calling for a peaceful coexistence 159
between Arabs and Jews, held that Zionism’s reliance on a historical right to Palestine 
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was “a metaphorical rather than political category, binding to us rather than to the Arabs 
as it relates to the inner depths of Judaism.”  Scholars and Zionist figures therefore 160
cannot be prescribed as monolithically dedicated to the religious core of political Zionism 
and many argued instead that Jews don’t have a religious right to land without the consent 
of the Arabs. 
 In recognition of the many forms of Zionism and the secular lines of reasoning 
used by some pro-Israeli scholars, perhaps the most dynamic argument in favor of Israel’s 
statehood is that of American lawyer Alan Dershowitz. Dershowitz’s argument in The 
Case for Israel is extremely compelling because he directly rejects radical Zionist claims, 
which are rooted in the intangible religious ideologies that serve as the central platform of 
the criticisms of Finkelstein, Gorny, and Khalidi. When addressing the accusation that 
Israel is an imperialist state, Dershowitz claims that unlike colonial settlers serving the 
expansionist commercial and military goals, the Jewish refugees were escaping from the 
countries that had oppressed them for centuries. In this manner, he constructs the Jewish 
settlers in Palestine as “far more comparable to the American colonists who had left 
England because of religious oppression than they were to 18th and 19th century English 
imperialists who colonized India, the French settlers who colonized North Africa, and the 
Dutch expansionists who colonized Indonesia.”  This comparison is linked to 161
Dershowitz’s analysis of the term yishuv, meaning “return.” He argues that the use of this 
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term in fundamental aspects of his pro-Israeli argument refers more to “an immigration of 
refugees than a determined political or nationalistic movement.”  Yet this 162
reinterpretation of the meaning of ‘return’ neglects to address the use of yishuv in 
political Zionism. While it is true that not every Jew entering Palestine was a political 
Zionist or had the specific motivations of achieving Herzl’s original platforms, their 
actions perfectly correlated and responded to the agenda of political Zionism. Even if 
yishuv is used to refer to the fleeing of refugees, its political consequences, in displacing 
a pre-existing population and occupying that territory, remain at odds with the 
humanitarian principles Dershowitz attempts to appeal to. 
 Dershowitz’s appeal to the approval of Western democratic frameworks is most 
apparent in his defense of the occupation itself and the high disproportionality in Israeli 
and Palestinian death tolls. He argues, in response to disproportionality in death toll, that 
this comparison is misleading because “these include the fact that Palestinians count the 
suicide bombers themselves as victims and ignore the large number of foiled and 
prevented terrorist attacks against Israelis.”  The inclusion of ‘suicide bombers,’ 163
perceived as ‘freedom fighters’ by Palestinians does not account for the massive 
Palestinian death tolls in the face of comparatively minimal loss of Israeli civilian life. 
According to a study conducted by Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, the 
number of Palestinians killed compared to Israelis was 6,792: 1,102 since September 
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2000, and 3,457:125 since the 2005 Gaza pullout.  Much of this disproportionality can 164
be attributed to Israel’s Iron Dome, an air defense system developed by Rafael Advanced 
Defense Systems and Israel Aircraft Industries. The “foiled attacks” Dershowitz refers to 
are thus made possible by the military advancement and wealth accumulation of Israel, 
largely resulting from billions of dollars in US funding annually. In addition, Dershowitz 
bases his debunking of this disproportionality argument on the concept that most of the 
Palestinians killed don’t qualify as “innocent civilians.” This is because Dershowitz, 
following suit to many American and Zionist perspectives, thinks of any Palestinian 
military or political activity not as resistance, but as terrorism. In many Israeli death tolls, 
similar to the statistics relied upon by justifications of Afghanistan drone operations, any 
male between the ages of sixteen and forty-five is referred to as a militant.  Here, the 165
use of select rhetorical labels also warps the reality of the exponentially higher 
Palestinian death rate by dictating what constitutes a ‘non-combatant.’ Israel refers to its 
settler populations, individuals in violation of international law by illegally living within 
Palestinian territory, as simply Israeli civilians, while it refers to targeted refugee camps 
as terrorist headquarters.  166
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 Perhaps most telling is the fact that Dershowitz’s weakest point is his defense of 
Israel against claims that it is the prime human rights violator in the world by stating that 
“Israel is the only nation in the Middle East that operates under the rule of law.”  This 167
statement is stunningly inaccurate and represents a complete lapse in the use of skewed, 
yet sound rationality that Dershowitz uses in responses to other condemnations of Israel.  
In this statement, Dershowitz attempts to monolithically collapse and discredit over 
twenty distinct, internationally recognized, and functional states. He supports this 
assertion by noting that Israel’s pragmatic Supreme Court and judiciary system has an 
80% approval rating among Israelis, while the Palestinian Authority, the governing body 
of a proportion of the West Bank, has a mere 20% approval rate. This, along with the 
acknowledgement that “Israel has among the best records in the world with regard to the 
rights of women, gays, the physically and mentally challenged, and so on,”  represents 168
elements of Dershowitz’s argument that lie outside the basic realities of the political 
ramifications of occupation. The low PA approval rating can be directly attributed to the 
internal fracturing of Palestinian political parties, including Hamas, Fatah, and their 
narratives, in response to its cooperation with the two-state solution. While Israel does 
have high functioning democratic institutions that cater to its marginalized populations, 
this simply reflects Israel’s human rights in terms of its treatment of its own Jewish 
citizens, completely excluding its treatment of Arab Israelis and Palestinians living in the 
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occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In conclusion, Dershowitz’s defense of Israel 
involves his comparison of a single, unified, internationally recognized state to the 
occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank, separated by Israel, contained by massive 
barriers, and subject to complete control by Israeli government with no access to the 
resources to make the human rights of its citizens attainable. 
 Dershowitz’s attempt to defend Israel’s statehood represents the groundless use of 
context manipulation in order to justify the Israeli narrative by assessing individual 
‘truths’ outside the larger reality of the occupation. In his analysis of the systematic inner-
workings of the Zionist myth, Ted Honderich discusses the importance of strategically 
layering several ‘truths’ in order to provide one, comprehensive proposition. Honderich 
provides a specific exploration of the myth of Palestine as a depopulated place, by which 
“Palestinians had not formed themselves into a state, they had not separated themselves 
from other Arabs, the place was most recently defined by way of  the British protectorate, 
they did not have the culture and past that is exactly a national state.”  The separate 169
statements forming the coherent proposition together conclude that the Palestinians were 
not fully a people. Honderich argues that the persistence and logical palpability of this 
construction is a result of Palestine being held to imperialistic, Western standards of 
statehood, reflective of Dershowitz’s belief that no state in the Middle East “operates 
under the rule of law.”  In this manner, the complexity of the Zionist myth, as a direct 170
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result of its basis on layered, wrongly perceived yet rational ‘truths,’ resulted in the 
concept that the Palestinians were not a ‘people’ in a way that warranted statehood. The 
fallacy of these ‘truths’ was not realized until their actual circumstances became blatantly 
observable. In this manner, all of these Zionist myths regarding the peoplehood of 
Palestinians were proved to be inaccurate because the Palestinians did suffer an 
overwhelming kind of catastrophe. As Honderich describes, “by their sacrifices, they 
have proved that they must have been fully a people. They did not come out of a hat later. 
They were not created as a people by Neo-Zionism.”  This realization of a mistake 171
made regarding the statehood of Palestinians demonstrates the power of strategically 
layering truths in order to construct a larger myth. 
 This larger myth coincides with the Israeli narrative itself, which has visible 
linkages to political and cultural Zionism. Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon argue that 
the ethos of the Israeli conflict narrative consists of eight themes of societal belief that  
have changed according to sociopolitical context in the decades between the 1940’s and 
1970’s, evolving different functions for each time period.  Providing an an epistemic 172
basis for present direction of a society, its images, and beliefs, the Israeli ethos consists 
of: the justness of Israeli goals, security, positive collective in-group images, one’s own 
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victimization, delegitimizing the opponent, patriotism, unity, and peace.  Peace, as the 173
final stage of this ethos, represents Israel’s dominant image in resolutions and ‘peace 
talks’ aimed at finding a two-state solution. Peace acts as the ultimate goal of Israel, 
causing Israeli Jews to be stereotyped as a peace-loving people forced by circumstances 
beyond control to engage in a violent, intractable conflict with the Arabs. They are 
viewed as eager to pursue peace negotiations, while the Arabs represent the only obstacle 
to this achievement, unwilling to negotiate. As Bar-Tal and Salomon argue, “such beliefs 
inspired hope and optimism, strengthened the Israeli Jew’s positive self-image, and 
contributed to an empathetic self-image in the outside world.”  The evolution of these 174
eight themes demonstrates the complementing of collective memory and the ethos of a 
conflict, together constituting a holistic narrative that society members share.  The 175
themes shared across these two narratives, the ethos changing to accommodate new 
political events, provide the focal points that contribute to the continuation and 
intractability of the conflict itself.  
Americanizing Zionism 
 The Zionist myth is heavily reliant on the use of altered perceptions via Western 
frameworks and imperialistic mindsets. This has been consistently demonstrated by the 
geopolitical strategic alliance between Israel and the United States, by which American 
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acquiescence has enabled the Zionist myth to gain traction through parallels in the 
imperialist tendencies in the Middle East, namely the use of terror to justify occupation. 
The use of Western frameworks includes the range of linguistic to legal interpretations in 
the fields of policy work, human rights, and international law, and has often been used to 
justify the Israeli narrative to serve American political interests. In her article involving 
the relationship between Israel and America, Avishai Margalit argues that the perception 
that the states’ relationship is one of ‘pure love’ is collapsed by a history of characterized 
ambivalence, namely that “helping is not a recipe for being loved.”   176
 The period of Jewish immigration to America from 1881-1914, resulting in a 
permanent migration and the formation of a stable community, occurred directly 
alongside the creation of the Zionist movement, with 2 million Jews emigrating from 
Europe before the start of WWI. In comparison, during this time period, 85,000 
emigrated from Europe to Palestine.  This enormous quantifiable difference provides 177
context to Margalit’s argument that initially, it appeared that the promised land for the 
Jews was not Palestine, but America. This seeming reality was a fear of the Zionist 
movement, whose distinct goal was the creation of a purely Israeli state, resulting in 
heightened tensions between the Zionist movement and the reality of Jewish life in 
America. Margalit describes the phenomenon by which “Jews outside the United States 
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and especially the Zionists in Palestine had a strong feeling that Jews in America did not 
lead authentic Jewish lives: they were bound to be assimilated into the American way of 
life, which was perceived culturally and religiously as the negation of Jewish life.”  178
This resulted in an experience of mutual alienation between American and Israeli Jews, 
the ambivalent attitude of repulsion and attraction toward America.  
 This ambivalence is directly translated into the US foreign policy initiatives that 
reflect American domestic politics and in turn influence Israel’s own political parties, 
creating a dipole between the Israeli political left and right. While the left hopes for 
America to impose a solution, the right fears that the American solution will drive Israel 
from its territories, especially if the anti-Semitic elements in American life joined forces 
with oil interests in the Middle East.  This dangerous tension and the resulting 179
connectivity between American and Israeli domestic political currents demonstrates what 
Margalit refers to as the most unstable aspect of an American solution for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict: the fact that it is “hinged to the delicate black and white area 
between who Americans choose to hate more, the Jews or the Arabs.”  In this manner, 180
Margalit’s ethnographic analysis shows that the belief in a strong, unbreakable bond 
between Israel and America —one of shared values, customs, and beliefs— is fictitious 
and consequently disproven by an analysis of the history between American and political 
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forms of Zionism. The relationship between the two states is one of political and 
economic convenience, based in deeply rooted geopolitical interests. An idea of mutual 
‘pure love’ is simply a component of a larger network of narratives used to justify 
American imperialist initiatives in the Middle East, a tool enhanced by the 
Americanization of Zionism.  
 These imperialist initiatives have materialized within US foreign policy to the 
extent that this form of Americanized Zionism has been constructed to perfectly align 
with the ideological backing of the War on Terror. In his analysis, George Kateb argues 
that there is an inherent logical fallacy in the reality by which Americans fear only the 
terrorists and not their own government as it fights the terrorists. Kateb doesn't call for a 
redirection of fear away from terrorists, but rather the expansion of the scope of this fear 
to include the American government and its collaborator, Israel.  He argues that 181
“Muslim terrorism is an enemy, but it is an enemy that these two administrations find it 
immensely useful to have. This realization should affect the way in which Western 
analysts conceive of the enemy.”  This concept of extending suspicion toward the 182
American and Israeli administrations of Bush and Sharon when Kateb constructed his 
analysis, and of Trump and Netanyahu today, is a response to the politicized narratives 
innate to the relationship between the two states and their corresponding defense of the 
Israeli occupation. In this manner, terrorism is used to further the project of imperialism 
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in the Middle East, and is made sustainable, rhetorically and publicly, by falsely 
associating terrorism with exclusively Muslims and Arabs — a form of xenophobia 
principally driven by fear. 
 Fear often has an abstract quality by which there may not be a visceral fear or 
psychological dread, but rather a vague sense that there is something big to be afraid of, 
making people comply because they accept the pattern of conduct initiated by leaders.  183
This form of abstraction creates a response by which “direct experience doesn't 
circumscribe the play of imagination or the flow of media representations,” meaning that 
American acquiescence confirms sets of stereotypes that link Palestinian resistance 
exclusively and absolutely to the notions of terrorist activity.  This form of stereotyping 184
is increased because the US administration and media platforms yoke Palestinian 
terrorism to that of 9/11, despite the fact that there is no actual link. Yet Sharon’s and now 
Netanyahu’s policies help to spread a pervasive anger among Arabs and Muslims, 
creating a deepened reservoir of sympathy for terrorism directed at either the US or 
Israel.  As a result, the US and Israel are intertwined, and their status as victims of 185
terror, confirmed by Arab and Muslim frustration and anger that provides evidence for 
many stereotypes involving these identities, perfectly matches the political initiatives of 
their respective administrations. 
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 The abstract character of fear and its ability to be politically manipulated mimics 
the ambivalence surrounding the term “evil” in the context of the American and Zionist 
usage of terrorism to justify the War on Terror. Through her philosophical analysis of the 
use of evil in the rhetoric surrounding terrorism, Bat-Ami Bar On concludes that 
terrorism can and should be regarded as an evil, but only when considered among a 
multiplicity of evils comparable to it— for example, war crimes, repression, and human 
rights violations. When evil is secularized without reference to religious morality, it 
becomes abstract, like fear, but there remains a distinguishing factor in that it “disregards 
one of the most important constraints on the violence of war — the distinction between 
‘civilians’ and ‘combatants’”  This is arguably the most contentious aspect of terrorism186
— its explicit targeting of civilian populations, often through attacks involving public 
transportation and highly populated public spheres, making terrorism a buzzword with 
strong associations with the abstraction of evil. Yet Bar On provides an interesting 
analysis in the distinguishing between Palestinian terrorism, such as the suicide bombings 
performed by Hamas, and the violence perpetrated by Israeli forces: 
 There are always rules of engagement that, though not necessarily and lately not  
 even frequently complied with, do restrict Israeli military personnel from   
 terrorizing one and all Palestinians. The presence of such rules of engagement,  
 probably admixed with self-interested or indifferent bad faith, prevents Jewish  
 Israelis and others from appreciating the parity between the “evil” of Israeli  
 repression of the Palestinians and the “evil” of Palestinian terrorism.  187
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The concept that as a recognized state, Israel is held to certain institutional mechanisms 
that prevent it from engaging in acts of terror, creates an artificial separation between the 
acts of violence committed by Israel and those committed by Palestine, even when Israel 
does not comply with its obligations to international law. The terrorist label is therefore 
applied exclusively to political parties that work outside the traditional, Western 
conception of statehood, including the existence of Palestinian political structures within 
the Israeli occupation. 
 This assertion reflects the tangible importance of language in creating forces of 
justification from the abstract notions of fear, evil, and security. For example, in 2002, the 
Bush Administration referred to the Al-Qaeda network as the Axis of Evil, a referential 
nod to the Axis Powers of WWII. This allusion is two-fold in its rationalization: it 
equates terrorism with the ultimate bipolarity of WWII politics, and, by carefully 
providing a metaphor associating the Axis Powers and terrorism, it aligns the subjects of 
this label with Nazi Germany and broader contexts of anti-Semitism. This is particularly 
useful in America’s alliance with political Zionism and the Israeli administration because 
it allows Palestinians to be conceived of as anti-Semitic, generating further justification 
for the creation of a Jewish state. In order to understand the ways in which phenomenons 
including the layering of ‘truths’ within political Zionism and the selective distribution of 
the naming practices effectively delegitimize Palestine, it is critical to understand the 
depth of American support for the Israeli occupation. 
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A Factual Account of US support of Israel 
 For over half a century, Israel has been accused by both Western and Arab states 
of violating international law in its treatment of Palestinians. Perhaps one of the most 
contentious points of legality concerns a barrier wall constructed by Israel along the 
border of the West Bank, roughly following the 1949 Armistice Line. The wall is 
currently 280 miles long and 26 feet high. While Palestinians argue that the wall has 
directly impacted their access to medical care, economic activity, and the transportation 
of goods and people, Israel claims that it acts as a ‘security barrier’ in response to 
Palestinian suicide bombers. Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer is quoted in 
2003 arguing that “this fence has one single goal — to defend the lives of Israeli 
citizens.”  Because Palestine is a semi-recognized territory, it does not hold full 188
statehood, and is therefore limited in its ability to represent itself on the international 
stage. In response, the United Nations has made repeated attempts at condemning Israel 
on behalf of Palestine, even declaring the wall illegal under international law in 2004.  189
By a majority of fourteen to one, the ICJ found that the barrier’s construction violates 
principles outlined in the UN Charter and long-standing global conventions “that prohibit 
the threat or use of force and the acquisition of territory that way, as well as principles 
upholding the right of peoples to self-determination.”  In addition to the illegality of the 190
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wall itself, its construction does not correlate with the exact 1949 Armistice boundaries, 
often dubbed the “Green Line.” Observing that 80% of Israeli settlers in the occupied 
Palestinian territory lived between the barrier and the so-called Green Line, the ICJ also 
ruled in 2004 that the structure’s route could “prejudge the future frontier between Israel 
and Palestine.”  191
 The construction of this wall and the 2004 settlements between it and the agreed 
upon Green Line, which have since expanded tremendously, represent a larger problem in 
the illegality of Israel’s actions. The wall is tantamount to de facto annexation by which it 
creates potentially permanent ‘fait accompli’ on the ground.  Specifically, the illegal 192
Israeli settler populations are in direct violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s 
Article 49, which states that “the Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its 
own civilian population into the territory it occupies.”  This means that alongside illegal 193
Israeli settlements, the wall alters the demographic composition of the occupied 
Palestinian territory, directly impeding the Palestinian’s right to self-determination. It is 
also detrimental to the lives of the Israelis living in these illegal settlements, because it 
creates a form of Israeli attachment to land that legally belongs to the Palestinians, 
making the likelihood of peace via the ‘two-state solution’ much more unlikely. In 
response, Israel has dismissed the advisory opinion of the court and no binding resolution 
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has been enacted. The construction of the wall is not the only abuse committed by the 
Israeli government, but it is the only concern of the Palestinians, alongside the illegality 
of settlements, to be brought to court through the UN’s principal judicial organ. 
 In the past thirty years, the US has vetoed every UN Resolution attempting to 
condemn Israel for its treatment of Palestine, up until Resolution 2334, calling for an end 
to Israeli settlement building, in which the US abstained from voting.  In addition to 194
using its geopolitical power and Security Council status to support Israel, the US also 
provides an economic sponsorship of the state. In the Fiscal Year 2015 foreign assistance 
request, Israel has maintained its position as America’s top recipient of aid, followed by 
Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Nigeria. The 2015 report calculates US aid to Israel to 
be approximately $3.1 billion, compared to, for example, Nigeria’s $720,892,00.  195
However, this data is somewhat understated, given that countries like Nigeria are much 
more populous than Israel. In per capita terms, Israel’s lead is staggering, with $378.33 in 
foreign aid compared to Nigeria’s $4.04 and the #2 recipient, Afghanistan’s $62.74. It is 
also critical to note that most of these top aid recipients have low per capita GDPs.  For 196
example, Afghanistan’s per capita GDP is $1,150, compared to Israel’s $34,770.  197
Compared to the other countries on this recipient list, Israel is extremely wealthy. 
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However, American foreign aid is not mostly economic assistance to countries in need. 
Even Egypt and Pakistan are not particularly poor countries, and if this were the case, 
Haiti and India would surpass all of these states as aid recipients. Rather, the majority of 
this foreign aid is spent on buying American military equipment and thus serves as an 
indirect subsidy to the military-industrial complex.  198
 Given the spectrum of blatant human rights abuses and a disregard for 
international law, why does the US support Israel? While virtually all Western countries 
share the US’s strong support for Israel’s ‘legitimate right’ to exist in peace and security, 
these same nations have refused to provide arms and aid while the occupation of lands 
seized in the 1967 war continues.  US foreign policy in Israel can be understood as 199
motivated not by objective needs or even strong moral commitments to the country itself, 
but rather as a means to advance its own perceived strategic interests. The US began 
sending billions of dollars in aid to Israel annually as a direct response to the Cold War 
tensions that prompted the USSR to began courting Arab nations after the generally anti-
Western Arab Nationalist Movement.  It is critical to note that the US didn’t always 200
support Israel; America sent some humanitarian aid after WWII, but this was relatively 
common among Western nations and wasn't perceived as a form of preferential 
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treatment.  However, during the Cold War, with the USSR and the US actively 201
competing for ideological influence in almost every region in the world, the US sought to 
maintain relevance in the Middle East through an alliance with the anti-Communist 
Israeli state.  
 The strategic reasons for the US alliance to Israel in the context of Soviet 
opposition are clear: Israel's air force has become predominant throughout the region; its 
frequent wars have provided battlefield testing for American arms, often against Soviet 
weapons; its intelligence service has assisted the US in intelligence gathering and covert 
operations; the state has missiles capable of reaching as far as the former USSR that 
includes a nuclear arsenal of hundreds of weapons; and it has cooperated with the US 
military-industrial complex with research and development for new jet fighters and anti-
missile defense systems.  The pattern of US aid to Israel is also extremely revealing, in 202
that it increases in response to Israeli victories. Had the aid actually been intended for 
Israeli security, it would have been proportionally at its highest during the formation of 
the state in 1948, and not today when the nation has become economically and militarily 
stabilized. Immediately following Israel’s victory in the 1967 war, US aid increased by 
450%, perfectly coinciding with the nation’s demonstrated military superiority in the 
region.  Periodic increases like this one can be traced to Israeli victories following the 203
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1971 civil war in Jordan, the fall of Iran’s Shah in 1979, the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, as well as during and immediately after the Gulf War. Even when Israel 
dramatically increased its repression in the occupied territories, including incursions into 
Palestinian territory provided in treaties guaranteed by the US, American aid continued to 
increase, shooting up again following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The correlation is obvious 
— the stronger and more cooperative with US interests Israel becomes, the stronger the 
support and foreign aid it receives.  
 This correlation is not exclusive to US support of Israel, but rather is mirrored 
elsewhere in foreign imperatives including US support of Indonesia’s twenty-four year 
occupation and repression in East Timor. It appears that as long as the amoral imperatives 
of realpolitik continue to remain unchallenged, US foreign policy in the Middle East and 
elsewhere will not reflect the American public’s conception that US foreign policies are 
being guided by the ethical standards of humanitarianism. With US support, in the form 
of an strong political alliance, extensive funding, and the vetoing of UN Resolutions 
intended to condemn the state’s illegal practices, Israel has been able to act with impunity 
when violating international law.  
Naming Terrorism  
 The strategically important application of the terrorist label is grounded by the 
historical process of delegitimizing Palestine through the use of language to create moral 
barriers that effectively isolate and separate Palestinian groups from other political actors. 
The vastly unequal power relations between Palestine, Israel, and the US can be traced to 
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the ethnographic and linguistic applications of colonist mindsets. As argued by 
anthropologist Julie Peteet, colonialism generates a set of terms to describe conquered 
lands as uninhabited, terra nullius, regardless of any existing population — a practice 
demonstrated by the Zionist myth of Palestine as a land without a people for a people 
without a land.  Peteet expands upon this theory, noting that “inhabitants of these 204
colonized lands have been historically referred to as savages, barbarians, and most 
recently, ‘terrorists.’”  The terrorist characterization is especially adept because it fits 205
perfectly into a justification narrative that portrays an occupation as simply the 
containment of the radical opposition of the colonized people. In this manner, any social, 
political, or military-based retaliations become “terrorist attacks” that perfectly conform 
to the image of the violent, barbaric Arab.  The process of naming itself is defined by 206
Yasir Suleiman as “a linguistic phenomenon in which the decision-making process, the 
product and its reception interact in a complex manner involving psychology, aesthetics, 
ideology, politics, history, culture, and instrumentality.”  Suleiman argues that naming 207
processes are of particular importance in intractable conflicts because the symbolic 
meaning of a name is derived from cultural and ideological values associated with it at 
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the points of production and reception, meaning that names assume greater value when 
narratives conflict with one another.  208
 The terrorist label is especially effective in Israeli and American narratives of the 
occupation because it creates a moral barrier that makes Palestinians distinct in their 
values, a process of moral distancing combined with systematic otherization. The term 
‘terrorism’ is understood differently within different narratives, perspectives, and 
normative frameworks because it is a term that is, in its very definition, morally 
charged.  In her examination of the practice of naming events, actions, places, and 209
people in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Peteet argues that names, as a “part of cultural 
systems that structure and nuance the way we imagine and understand the world,” 
embody ideological meaning and moral attributes that can be mobilized in order to 
achieve various projects of power.  This is because the analytical approaches to lexicons 210
are embedded in historical, political, and cultural frameworks, through which they 
reference a moral grammar that backs and reproduces power.  Due to the fact that Israel 211
and Palestine are vastly disparate in terms of weapon possession, support from the US, 
institutional infrastructure, and the prevalence and circulation of narrative in the West, 
contests over names in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are an example of this political 
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dynamic, by which changes in naming practices must be traced along the lines of 
power.   212
 Concerning historical dates and collective memories of these events, Peteet states 
that “sustained attempts have been made to deny Palestinian memories and narratives of 
what transpired in 1948. That 15 May is annually celebrated as Independence Day in 
Israel is a sign of the Israelis power to define the historical events of the time ‘cleansed of 
traces of power.’”  The Israeli Independence Day, known as Al Nakba, the Catastrophe, 213
by Palestinians, is intended to grant Israel victim status by alluding to colonial narratives, 
a mirror-image of the actualities of its occupation. This name carries enormous moral 
weight, reframing the context of the events of 1948. Likewise, the Israeli assigning of 
Hebrew names to replace the Arabic titles of places, mountains, roads, and towns 
demonstrates an effective linguistic takeover that gives the occupation a rhetorical 
groundwork. The biblical names given to areas in Palestine, such as the use of Judea and 
Samaria to refer to the occupied West Bank, complements the political and religious 
Zionist angle of a ‘religious right to the land.’ Suleiman argues that “by removing most of 
the Arabic place names from the map, Israel did not just create a new map, it also 
inscribed a new reality in which Hebrew won the battle over Arabic, just as the early 
Zionists hoped it would in the cartographic domain.”  In this manner, Israeli naming 214
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practices are not limited to the politicized use of the terrorist label and attempt to rupture 
the connection of the Palestinians to the land and delegitimize their claims to statehood. 
 These forms of Israeli naming practices are easily incorporated into the US’s 
restructured global role post-9/11, in a world order of “absolute dualities,” allies of the 
West vs. forces of evil, with links to the vast global terror network. Peteet states that this 
duality has concrete moral implications in that “the term ‘terrorist’ is often applied to any 
act of resistance and constructs a subject that is a legitimate target of military intervention 
and the violation of human rights.”  In this manner, an application of the terrorist name 215
implicates whole populations and becomes the rationale for collective punishment. The 
terrorist name has this power because it places the terrorist as beyond the pale of civilized 
society, as an ‘evil.’ For example, Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) noted in 
its 2002 advisory that CNN, The New York Times, and National Public Radio’s reporting 
on suicide bombings failed to mention that they occurred in areas of Jerusalem such as 
French Hill and Gilo, that have been occupied territories since 1967.  This in no way 216
excuses or justifies these attacks, but this kind of reporting, through the use of naming 
practices, neglects the context provided by international law. In this manner, the 
Palestinians are classified as violent terrorists bombing civilian neighborhoods instead of 
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an occupied people denied basic civil and human rights, who resist Israeli illegal 
settlements.  
 Definitions that explicitly mark terrorism as illegitimate are contentious 
classifications because it is much more informative to base moral assessment on a case-
by-case basis rather than through a priori conditions. In his philosophical examination of 
the definitional uses of terrorism, Tomis Kapitan provides a succinct breakdown of the 
term’s usage, defining terrorism as having three central components: 
 i) a deliberate use or threat of violence 
 ii) politically motivated 
 iii) directed against non-military personnel  217
By contrast, Ted Honderich describes terrorism as “small-scale violence, driven by 
political aim, that violates national and international law and is prima facie morally 
wrong.”  Honderich’s definition adds the component of conditional morality, with 218
moral error accepted as correct upon first impression until proved otherwise. Its 
framework therefore also includes resistance activity and guerrilla warfare, which seems 
to ignore the common currency and the negative connotations of the word. Both 
Honderich and Kapitan avoid the use of “terrorism” to describe exclusively non-state 
actors, Kapitan stating that “exempting states from being agents of terrorism yields an 
unfair rhetorical advantage to established governments in any political struggle, 
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especially since the weaponry and organization that states use in pursuing their ends 
through violence against civilians consistently dwarfs any amount of hard achieved by 
non-state actors.”  This form of linguistic inclusivity ideally captures the disparity in 219
naming terrorists within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Because Israel has been granted 
internationally-recognized state status, it holds an enormous rhetorical advantage over 
Palestinian political actors, so that the same violent acts are called ‘political maneuvers’ 
when committed by Israel, but ‘terrorist attacks’ when committed by parties including the 
PA, Hamas, and Fatah.  
 The essence of the definitions of terrorism provided by Kapitan and Honderich 
alludes to the importance of exacting the set of circumstances required to permit a 
terrorist categorization, namely the use or threat of violence, the targeting of civilian 
populations, and the character of political motivation. Therefore, as argued by Kapitan, 
“the moral concerns with terrorism have to do with the nature of its victims, the methods 
employed, or the intentions with which it is done, not the identity of its agents.”  This 220
shift in focus away from the nature of its agents and towards the nature of its victims is 
dramatically contrasted by terrorism’s image in popular society and its functional usage 
in Israeli and American narratives. The way Americans perceive terrorism is tied to the 
conceptual understanding of events like 9/11, the Boston bombing, and the Orlando 
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nightclub shooting.  Here the lines are clear— these attacks were all politically 221
motivated, and resulted exclusively in civilian death. Their means were horrific, 
intentional, and deadly. The problem rests in this definitional understanding is being 
applied seamlessly to other uses of the label in other places in the world, particularly in 
the middle of state-sponsored conflicts.  222
 The actions of Israel in its occupation of Palestine reflect a sovereignty-based 
definition of terror based on Hobbesian notions of terror.  For example, in Leviathan, 
Hobbes describes the tension between state sovereignty and peace: “For by his authority, 
given him by every particular in the commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power 
and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to conform the wills of 
them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad.”  Campaigns 223
of terror traditionally sponsored by states, such as Hitler’s Third Reich or Stalin’s Soviet 
Union, are often justified using narratives that capitalize upon us vs. them mentalities 
with an end goal of ‘peace at home.’ This form of state-perpetuated violence is inherent 
to Hobbes’ philosophical argument, which attempts to justify terror as an instrument used 
in the name of reason, nation, and humanity. He does this by claiming that the existence 
of a sovereign powerful enough to control the wills of the people was in the interest of 
everyone who desired peace.  Hobbes recognizes the implicit limitations of his 224
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argument, noting that no one is obligated to submit to their own execution.  Yet if all 225
attempts at justification are based in the interests of the individual, the needs of the 
collective collapse and allow for a manipulation of Hobbesian notions of peace through 
terror to become central components of occupation narratives.  
 In contrast, Locke’s rhetoric is very different, situated alongside a place in 
Western liberal democracy for armed resistance against oppressive regimes and a reliance 
on the assertion of the rights of individuals as distinct agents of the collective.  Lockean 226
philosophy, as demonstrated by the Second Treatise of Government, has a component of 
consent in order to address the disparity in the power of a state over its citizens: “Men 
being, as has been said, by nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out 
of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own 
consent.”  This consent is often seen in narratives that diverge from the religious core of 227
political Zionism, including those of the Brit-Shalom political organization, the Jewish–
Palestinian Peace Alliance, arguing that Jews don’t have a religious right to land without 
the consent of the Arabs. Locke’s political philosophy defends the resistance to 
occupation, parallel to the concept the infringement of human rights by states is seen 
today as explaining and typically justifying the armed resistance to the state.  As noted 228
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by Kapitan and Honderich, the state can be dialectically viewed as a human rights 
offender without being classified as a terrorist organization, as a result of the common 
conception that terrorists must be non-state actors. In this manner, even when states like 
Israel use deliberate force that is politically motivated to kill Palestinian civilians, it is not 
classified as terrorist activity and is instead justified using a series of carefully crafted and 
morally charged ‘truths.’ Both Hobbes and Locke have attempted to provide arguments 
that support the type of regimes they favored within their respective philosophical 
perspectives — such arguments are justifications in themselves. In this manner, terrorism 
philosophically becomes the other side, with moral implications that filter the actions of 
the other to those which are morally condemnable. 
 This form of moral condemnation provides a monolithic understanding of the 
operational purposes of Palestinian political groups, including the ethical frameworks of 
groups like Hamas. As a Sunni-Islamist organization, Hamas has been internationally 
denounced for its violation of human rights: committing suicide attacks against Israeli 
civilians, firing rockets into heavily populated areas, and even torturing and endangering 
its own citizens in the Gaza Strip.  Although its actions are impermissible, Hamas is 229
often depicted as nothing but a terrorist organization, with a social sector that serves only 
to recruit new supporters to enforce its violent agenda.  In her analysis, which includes 230
extensive fieldwork in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank during the Oslo Peace Process, 
 Allen, Lori. The rise and fall of human rights: Cynicism and politics in occupied Palestine. Stanford 229
University Press, 2013.
 Ibid.230
!112
Sara Roy argues that Hamas’ social service activities do not emphasize political violence, 
but rather community development and civic restoration.  She notes that “the denial of 231
society, of any collective and communal sense of being — something Hamas understood 
and once worked hard to provide— is the greatest threat facing Palestinians.”  Through 232
her examination of Hamas’ engagement with the Islamist social sector, Roy concludes 
that it reflects a deep commitment to stimulate a social, cultural, and moral renewal of the 
Palestinian community.  A denial of Hamas’ legitimacy as a political party results in the 233
delegitimization of not only Palestine’s political structures, but of its civic and social 
institutions as well. Although Hamas has in instances violated the standards of 
international human rights, the American and Israeli narratives surrounding its character 
are resoundingly inaccurate. In the next chapter, I will provide a closer analysis of Hamas 
as a response to these collective narratives that are driven by the limitations set by its 
classification as a terrorist organization.  
 As a specific and rational political form, terrorism should be understood as the use 
of violence to achieve a multiplier of fear through a civilian population in order to 
achieve a political initiative of some kind. Israeli and American narratives limit this 
definition to only be applicable to non-state actors and groups and individuals of Muslim 
or Arab identity. In this manner, deeming popularly elected Palestinian political groups, 
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like Hamas, terrorist organizations explicitly delegitimizes their influence as political 
actors within the international system, including in the communal institutions that they 
sustain within Palestinian society. The following chapter will expand upon the theoretical 
underpinnings of US foreign intervention and the concept of international human rights; 
however, it is critical to first further explore the tension between the American public’s 
perception of its government’s international relations and the realities of US foreign 
policy. 
Alternatives for Americans: The BDS Movement 
 A report published by Human Rights Watch in January 2016 details the 
involvement of private and international businesses in Israel’s ongoing occupation of the 
West Bank, as they help to build, finance, service, and market settlement communities.  234
In many cases, businesses themselves, like many Israeli citizens, are drawn to settlements 
by low rents, favorable tax rates, government subsidies, and access to cheap Palestinian 
labor.  The HRW report regarding the legality of settlement businesses’ practices reads: 235
 Settlement businesses depend on and benefit from Israel’s unlawful confiscation  
 of Palestinian land and other resources, and facilitate the functioning and growth  
 of settlements. Settlement-related activities also directly benefit from Israel’s  
 discriminatory policies in planning and zoning, the allocation of land, natural  
 resources, financial incentives, and access to utilities and infrastructure. These  
 policies result in the forced displacement of Palestinians and place Palestinians at  
 an enormous disadvantage in  comparison with settlers.   236
 “Occupation, Inc.” Human Rights Watch. March 10, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2017. 234
 Lein, Yehezkel, and Alon Cohen-Lifshitz. Under the guise of security: routing the separation barrier to 235
enable the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. B'Tselem, 2005.
 “Occupation, Inc.” Human Rights Watch. March 10, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2017. 236
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Businesses that provide goods and services to the illegal Israeli settlements have become 
an essential backbone to the enterprise, compromising a physical footprint even larger 
than that of the residential settlements themselves. There are approximately twenty 
Israeli-administered industrial zones in the West Bank covering 1,365 hectares, in 
addition to the 9,300 hectares of land seized for agricultural cultivation. In comparison, 
housing areas cover 6,000 hectares of land, although their municipal borders in reality 
encompass a larger area.  For example, Remax, a global real-estate firm, sells and rents 237
properties in the settlements. Its website advertises homes and apartments in Ariel, a 
settlement community in the West Bank, as properties in “Ariel, Israel,” promoting the 
narrative that Ariel is a city inside of Israel, when it is in fact illegal under international 
law.  A German cement company, Heidelberg Beton, operates a quarry in the West 238
Bank, exporting its natural resources for profit.  Under international law, it is illegal to 239
export these natural resources from an occupied territory to its occupier, Israel.  Israel 240
also effectively prevents the Palestinian operation of these quarries through an 
exceedingly complicated permit process, that exhibits discriminatory practices towards 
the Palestinians. 
 "Israel/Palestine." Human Rights Watch. January 12, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2017.237
 "Find the perfect property." Israel real estate | RE/MAX Israel. Accessed March 22, 2017. 238
 "Welcome to HeidelbergCement Group." Welcome to HeidelbergCement Group | HeidelbergCement 239
Group. Accessed March 22, 2017. 
 "Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, 240
Security Council Reaffirms | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." United Nations. 
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 In response to the use of settler communities and businesses to further oppress 
Palestinians under the Israeli occupation, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions) 
movement developed as a “Palestinian-led movement for freedom, justice, and 
equality.”  The movement argues that Israel is occupying and colonizing Palestinian 241
land, discriminating against Palestinian citizens of Israel, and denying Palestinian 
refugees the right to return to their homes. However, BDS is unique to other Palestinian 
resistance movements because, inspired by the South African anti-apartheid movement, 
BDS urges initiative from international actors, namely individuals, to pressure Israel to 
comply with international law.  The boycott aspect involves withdrawing support for 242
Israel and Israeli and international companies involved in the violation of Palestinian 
human rights, as well as complicit Israeli sporting, cultural, and academic institutions. 
Divestment involves withdrawing investments from these companies via banks, pension 
funds, etc. Sanctions campaigns apply pressure to governments to end military trade and 
free-trade agreements with Israel, in addition to expelling the state from international 
forums, such as the UN and FIFA.  In this way, the BDS movement directly targets the 243
underlying source of the sustained occupation of Palestine — the US sponsorship of 
Israel economically and politically. Because this movement is uniquely reliant on 
individual advocacy, in undermining the frameworks of the international state system, it 
 BDS Movement. March 18, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2017. https://bdsmovement.net/.241
 Barghouti, Omar. "BDS: A Global Movement for Freedom and Justice." Civil Society, May 5 (2010).242
 BDS Movement. March 18, 2017. Accessed March 22, 2017. https://bdsmovement.net/.243
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has the potential to limit the linguistic power of naming certain groups as exclusively 
terroristically inclined by recognizing the actions of Israel as also within the definitional 
scope of terrorism.  
 The right to resist an occupation, inherent to Locke’s political philosophy, is 
heavily guarded by liberal conceptions of human rights theory. If we have human rights, 
we must also have the right to resist, through even violent means, those who attempt to 
eradicate our human rights. Therefore, the morally loaded and isolating use of the 
terrorist indicator to refer to Palestinian acts but not Israeli acts of the same, if not greater, 
devastation and magnitude is inherently unjust. As a result of the US’s strategic economic 
and political support of the Israeli occupation, reliant on the embracing of aspects of the 
Zionist myth within its own narrative, the use of the terrorist label has created a 
phenomenon of moral distancing between Palestinians and other political agents within 
the conflict. International actors, particularly the US, have used intervention to support 
one side of the conflict, compartmentalizing the Palestinian narrative and selectively 
ignoring Israeli breaches of international law and the human rights abuses in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. The fact that there is no standard definition of terrorism is 
precisely why, complicated by ambiguity and subjectivity, the word has such potency, 
creating divisive lines between politics and terror in order to justify the morality of 
occupation.  
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Chapter IV 
The Philosophy of Intervention:  
Human Rights Cynicism and the Narrative Paradigm 
“The power of accurate observation is commonly called cynicism by those who have not got it.” 
— George Bernard Shaw 
The problems inherent in the international application of human rights are 
seemingly intractable, ranging as they do from disparities in language use to a lack of 
universal accountability. These difficulties are materialized in part through the selective 
application of foreign intervention in instances of human rights abuse. Humanitarian 
intervention is a tool for the regulation and prevention of human rights violations, yet it 
has been inconsistently applied, sometimes fulfilling the moral duty to protect, and other 
times subject to misuse as a justification for imperialism. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
presents a dynamic example of an uneven application of humanitarian intervention, as 
demonstrated by the many unaddressed human rights violations in Gaza and the West 
Bank. As a result of the systematic favoring of Israel over Palestine by many Western 
governments, including the United States, Palestinian cynicism towards human rights 
applications has led to the formation of two distinct responses in the models of Al-Haq, a 
Palestinian human rights organization, and Hamas, a Palestinian political party that 
governs the Gaza Strip. In the following chapter, I explore the causal relationship 
between selective humanitarian intervention and human rights cynicism by synthesizing 
Noam Chomsky’s theory of reflective democracy, Harold Koh’s international law 
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analysis, and philosophical frameworks of cynicism and intervention. I argue that the 
many contrived narratives surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have resulted from 
and relied upon the vagueness of universal human rights mechanisms. The key to 
resolving this problem in the implementation of both domestic and international law rests 
in the tension between external enforcement and internal obedience. In order to eliminate 
the selective applications of humanitarian intervention, we must understand the 
Wittgensteinian notion that our own human rights are reliant on the human rights of 
others.
Human Rights Cynicism and its Theoretical Underpinnings
In order to understand the cynical response to the phenomenon of uneven, 
selective humanitarian intervention, a clear distinction must be drawn between ‘human 
rights’ and the ‘human rights industry.’ Human rights invokes a set of principles with 
origins tracing back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a declaration of 
fundamental human rights to be universally accepted that was adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948.  In contrast, the ‘human rights industry’ refers to the material and 244
financial infrastructure that buttresses human rights work, such as “the complex of 
activities and institutions that function under the label human rights, including the 
professionals who work within those organizations, the formulas they have learned in 
order to write reports and grant applications, and the funding streams that this industry 
 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." United Nations. Accessed March 31, 2017. http://244
www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
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generates and depends upon.”  Human rights cynicism is a perspective on the ‘human 245
rights industry,’ its parts, the relations among them, and how the system interacts with 
people. Victims of human rights violations often develop this cynical perspective on the 
‘human rights industry,’ evidenced by their mistrust of all human rights mechanisms, 
including foreign aid. The cynics themselves, victims of this selective application, uphold 
the standards of human rights, and use this to highlight the disparity between ‘human 
rights’ and the ‘human rights industry,’ which often parallels the inconsistencies between 
theory and practice. In order to understand human rights cynicism as a direct result of 
selective humanitarian intervention, foreign intervention, as a mechanism of the human 
rights industry, must be analyzed in terms of its applications along the lines of states’ 
political, social, and economic interests. 
In his article “Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?,” John 
Tasioulas provides a philosophical perspective on the evolution of human rights into a 
systematic industry. In his analysis, Tasioulas frames an orthodox conception of human 
rights as one based on the notion that human rights are moral rights possessed by all 
human beings simply by virtue of their humanity. In discussing this orthodox conception, 
Tasioulas evaluates the critical perspectives of John Rawls and Joseph Raz, both of whom 
consider human rights as political entities intertwined with intervention politics. Tasioulas 
points to a key tension between the ‘orthodox’ and ‘political’ conceptions of human 
rights. They share two similarities that soften their contrast: both can reject the idea that 
the condition of existence for human rights is their institutional recognition and both 
 Allen, Lori. 2013. The Rise and Fall of Human Rights: Cynicism and Politics in Occupied Palestine. 245
Stanford: Stanford UP. P 4.
!120
recognize the significant political implications of these rights. These similarities point to 
the philosophical space between human rights and human rights industrial complex — 
their applicability to intervention and whether or not that practice should be a political 
tool.
Tasioulas characterizes Rawls’ conception of human rights as follows: “what it is 
for a right to be a human right is that its violation can act as a defensible trigger for 
military intervention against the society that perpetuates the violations.”  In this 246
manner, the political conception of human rights argues that these rights are defined by 
whether or not they could justify intervention. This raises the question, if a conflict is not 
met with international intervention, does that mean that there are no violations of human 
rights taking place? The case study of Palestine will provide a more factual account, but 
the implications of Rawls’ perspective would suggest that the people living in Gaza and 
the West Bank, with limited access to food, clean water, healthcare, and education, let 
alone little in terms to the right to life, in fact do have human rights. Tasioulas’ analysis 
would therefore correlate Rawls’ political conception of human rights with the human 
rights industry. Tasioulas also provides a less radical political perspective of human rights 
by paralleling Rawls with the theories of Raz, who “preserves what he considers to be 
Rawls’ core insight, the conceptual yoking together of human rights and state sovereignty 
by means of the notion of pro tanto grounds for intervention.”  247
 Tasioulas, John. "Are Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?." Philosophy Compass 4, no. 246
6 (2009). P 940.
 Ibid. P 943.247
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Raz’s proposed link between human rights and sovereignty points to a key 
weakness in ‘orthodox’ human rights, as well as universalism-based notions of these 
rights in IR theory. The institutions that govern and frame international law, including 
human rights legislation, are dominated by Western perspectives and therefore threaten 
non-Western nations, known as the North-South divide in political theory. In this manner, 
Western nations, like the United States, could perceive cultural norms in another nation as 
a violation of human rights and use this understanding as justification to intervene 
militarily. Tasioulas acknowledges the weaknesses of both conceptions, but concludes 
that the importance of rights guaranteed by the orthodox conception outweighs the 
political fixation on interest and sovereignty instead of morality. When placed in the 
context of human rights v. human rights industry, this philosophical debate reveals that 
these tensions are based in the implications of human rights and whether they are created 
to serve the purposes of the state or the protections of the individual. Providing these 
philosophical perspectives before the analysis of international relations theory highlights 
the discrepancies between different conceptions of human rights and their definitional 
purposes.
Humanitarian Intervention: Terminology, Usage, and Failed Applications
Humanitarian intervention has a controversial place in the theory and practice of 
international relations as a result of coercive interference in the name of humanitarianism 
and the tension between a state’s sovereignty and the universal standards advocated by 
international human rights legislation. Through her work Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations, Jennifer Welsh succinctly defines humanitarian intervention as: 
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“the coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed 
force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing 
widespread human suffering.”  However, Welsh’s corresponding analysis shows that 248
even though this definition frames humanitarian intervention functionally, in terms of 
confronting human rights violations as the purpose of said intervention, the post-Cold 
War period is evidence that states remain reluctant to address these abuses without the 
consent of the offending state. This is exemplified in both Bosnia and East Timor. 
Intervention in both cases required the regimes’ consent before an international mission 
could proceed.  This indicates that the rationale for intervention can in fact shift during 249
the course of military action. This is also evident in Kosovo and Somalia, where 
unintended consequences led to changed objectives among the intervening states. Welsh’s 
definition of humanitarian intervention is severely limited in practice because she 
conceives of coercive interference in terms of consent. Catherine Lu’s analysis of the 
ways in which the purpose and inner mechanisms of intervention work presents an active 
critique to the inconsistency between Welsh’s offered definition and her corresponding 
analysis. 
In her essay entitled “Whose Principles? Whose Institutions? Legitimacy 
Challenges for ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’” Lu describes the beginning of the use of 
‘humanitarian’ to describe certain interventions in the post-Cold War era. She notes that 
 Welsh, Jennifer M. Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations. 2004. Oxford: Oxford 248
University Press. 
 Nardin, Terry, Melissa S. Williams, and American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. 2006. 249
Humanitarian Intervention; Nomos, 47. New York: New York University Press.
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“the term ‘humanitarian’ referred to [the intervening states’] claim that the military action 
proposed was prompted by humanitarian concerns rather than geopolitical or self-
aggrandizing aims.”  Lu further maintains that this humanitarian terminology was not 250
only a strong indicator of the expressed intentions, but also a form of evaluative 
judgement. In this manner, labelling a military action ‘humanitarian’ amounted to 
declaring it to be morally legitimate or justified. Consequently, selective failure to 
identify a crisis as humanitarian seems to perpetuate a lack of legitimacy in the larger 
framework of the international system. Lu points to one of the greatest failures of 
selective intervention— the Rwandan genocide. As the result of multiple failures at all 
levels of governance, including the weakness of international institutions such as the 
United Nations, and the indifference of capable international agents such as the US, the 
Rwandan genocide claimed the lives of over 800,000 people before it was even labelled a 
humanitarian crisis within the international framework of intervention. 
In his collection of articles entitled Interventions, Noam Chomsky further 
examines this dynamic. To Chomsky, the humanitarian intervention failures in Rwanda 
represent a larger, global phenomenon by which abstract notions of human rights are 
selectively applied, inconsistent with the idea that human rights are universal. Chomsky 
argues that the mechanisms of international intervention are particularly interesting 
because they rely on the moral and intellectual values of the intervening state. He notes 
that when we speak of abstract principles or discuss cultures we do not comprehend “we 
are speaking of ourselves, and the moral and intellectual values of the privileged 
 Nardin, Terry, Melissa S. Williams, and American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. 2006. 250
Humanitarian Intervention; Nomos, 47. New York: New York University Press.
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communities in which we live.”  Therefore, the critiques presented by cultural 251
relativism do not apply to instances of humanitarian intervention because they are a direct 
reflection of the internal principles of the state that is choosing whether or not to end 
human rights abuses abroad. As a result of the terminologies that define and regulate 
human rights legislation, what we determine to be a violation of international standards 
depends on our own cultural values and perceptions of democracy. The failure to 
intervene in response to humanitarian crises constitutes what Wittgenstein refers to as a 
misunderstanding of our shared language. While there are variations in conventions of 
language and its usage— the multiplicity— our language remains shared, as a part of ‘us 
being human.’ Just as racism is a reflection of the racist’s failure to see her resemblance to 
the other, failure to act in response to human rights violations abroad is our failure to 
recognize these acts as abuses and to see ourselves reflected in these abuses. Therefore, to 
not intervene in the case of a known genocide doesn't say something about Rwanda or 
East Timor, it says something about the US or Australia— the international forces that 
refuse to act in a meaningful way. I will further refine his principle as a potential solution 
to acts of politicized intervention through Chomsky’s the theory of reflective democracy. 
When conceptually aligned, the theories of Lu, Welsh, and Chomsky argue for a 
dynamic depiction of humanitarian intervention by which a network of interests— for 
example, economic incentives, political alliances, and public opinion— determine 
whether or not a state will intervene. Similarly, humanitarian intervention presents a 
justification that can be used to disguise motives or ends that require intervention, but are 
 Chomsky, Noam. Interventions. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2007. Print. Open media series; 251
Open Media book. P 123.
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not themselves justifications for it. In instances where states are unlikely to intervene as a 
result of misaligned interests, strong domestic pressure and media attention play a critical 
role in convincing governments to act. The theories of Lu, Welsh, and Chomsky all 
suggest multiple, politicized responses to foreign human rights abuses that depend on an 
alignment of the intervening states’ interests. Therefore, the lack of uniformity in the 
application of human rights legislation causes the subjects of intervention, often those 
suffering from these abuses, to mistrust of the human rights industry. Human rights 
cynicism arguably presents a binary of potential responses to human rights violations: 
those that work within the human rights industry, appealing to universalist notions of 
human rights, and those that work outside or even against this framework. These two 
kinds of responses are represented throughout the formation of organizations and political 
groups involved in various ways with Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestine.
The Israeli-Palestinian Case Study and The Theory of Dueling Narratives
The human rights abuses in Palestine committed by its occupier, Israel, are 
staggering. The occupation, beginning in 1967, allowed Israel to successfully pursue its 
expansionist strategies by confiscating Palestinian land, building Jewish-only settlements, 
controlling the Palestinian economy, and denying Palestinian people basic civil and 
political rights. These strategies remain in effect today, as Human Rights Watch has 
effectively named and factually supported a spectrum of human rights abuses, including 
but not limited to the discriminatory restrictions on Palestinians’ access to food and water, 
the use of excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators, limitations on movement 
that confine most Palestinians to narrowing territories, and the practice of punitive home 
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demolitions.  Israel’s blocking of all regular movements of goods and people has had 252
perhaps the most severe consequences for the civilian population, as it blocks access to 
food, medicine, and clean water. Palestinians are also unable to access building materials 
necessary to repair infrastructure damage inflicted almost daily by Israeli forces. As a 
result, more than 70% of Gaza’s 1.8 million people are forced to rely solely on 
humanitarian assistance.253
In this conflict, US foreign policy maintains a close alliance and economic 
sponsorship of Israel, which is an example of selective intervention. US support of Israel 
is justified to the American people through a carefully constructed network of narratives. 
These multiple narratives often compete with one another, in ways that affect popular 
conceptions and understandings, or lack thereof, of current events. Narratives are the 
product of human factors such as behavior, culture, communication, and perception that 
play meaningful roles in the ideas surrounding a political conflict.  Philosophical theory 254
involving the use of narrative often creates a marked distinction between the narrative 
paradigm and the rational world paradigm. Twentieth-century philosopher Walter Fisher 
uses his narrative paradigm to argue that all meaningful communication is a form of 
storytelling and that people are more persuaded by an engaging story than by a rational 
argument. Fisher’s philosophy is an essential companion to the IR theory of dueling 
 Human Rights Watch.World Report 2016: Israel/ Palestine. N.p., 27 Jan. 2016. Web. 14 Sept. 2016.252
 "Israel/Gaza Conflict: Questions and Answers | Amnesty ..." Amnesty International. Accessed October 253
24, 2016. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/israelgaza-conflict-questions-and-answers/.
 O'Malley, Padraig. “Dueling Narratives and Addiction to Narratives." The Two-state Delusion: Israel 254
and Palestine -- a Tale of Two Narratives. Print.
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narratives because it provides an analysis of how narratives are constructed and nestled in 
ways that warp reality-based facts in order to achieve a political agenda. 
Fisher’s narrative paradigm is designed to have a broader than theoretical 
application. His Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public 
Moral Argument presents a paradigm shift in the way people think about the world. He 
argues that:
Thus, when I use the term “narration,” I do not mean a fictive composition whose 
propositions may be true or false and have no necessary relationship to the 
message of that composition. By “narration,” I refer to a theory of symbolic 
actions— words and/or deeds — that have sequence and meaning for those who 
live, create, or interpret them. The narrative perspective, therefore, has relevance 
to real as well as fictive worlds, to stories of living and to stories of the 
imagination.255
This shift constitutes a move away from the rational world paradigm, according to which 
people are persuaded by a logical argument. A simplified version of the distinction 
between narrative and the rational world paradigm is based in the understanding of 
humans as storytellers instead of rational beings who are dependent on logical form. The 
rational world paradigm holds that the world can be reduced to a series of logical 
relationships uncovered through reasoning, where arguments follow specific criteria for 
soundness and logic. However, the narrative paradigm concludes that the world is 
experienced by people as a set of stories told in a process of continual recreation, where 
rationality is based in people’s awareness of how internally consistent stories appear to 
lived experience. 
 Fisher, Walter R. "Narration as a human communication paradigm: The case of public moral argument." 255
Communications Monographs 51, no. 1 (1984): 1-22.
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Fischer’s philosophy has profound connections to the thesis of this chapter in 
explaining the role and power of narrative in allowing the politicized humanitarian 
intervention that results in human rights cynicism. This is because Fischer’s narrative 
paradigm is based in the understanding that the ‘good reasons’ that direct decision 
making are determined by matters of history, culture, and character. In our earlier 
discussion of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was clear that narratives 
shaped the facts and events used to form the distinct Israeli and Palestinian perspectives. 
This conflict is incredibly complex because its history has been constantly filtered by 
historical narratives — as a set of stories told by storytellers. Although all histories are 
filtered through a prism of stories told from different perspectives, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict has become seemingly intractable due to the depth of difference among its 
narratives. Palestinians and Israelis don’t only have different names for certain facts and 
events, they sometimes use altogether different events and facts. The idea that the 
narrative paradigm uses an assessment of personal awareness that is not necessarily based 
in logic suggests that these narratives are often constructed according to gradations of 
empathy. Empathy, which relies on one’s perspective of another’s subjective experience 
and one’s own internal emotional life, plays an important role in the justification of 
humanitarian intervention. Later, we will see the importance of empathy in the peace 
process, but first let’s examine its philosophical role in acts of international 
humanitarianism. 
In their essay “Humanitarian Narratives and the Mobilization of Empathy.” 
Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown examine the philosophical roots of 
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humanitarian intervention. Wilson and Brown address the ways in which 
humanitarianism, while clearly political, is also an ethos embedded in civil society, 
driving social and cultural movements in addition to constructing legal and political 
institutions. To maintain its driving force as an ethos, humanitarianism employs strong 
narratives and represents complex situations that create humanitarian elements for a 
cause to be perceived. Consider how and why some narratives of suffering inspire 
solidarity movements while others do not. Wilson and Brown explore “how narratives of 
suffering are vulnerable to appropriation and misrepresentation by political 
institutions,”  occupying a middle ground between two positions that they refer to as 256
Schmitt’s cynicism and Rorty’s credulity. Schmitt’s cynicism is effectively illustrated by 
his famous maxim, “he who invokes humanity wants to cheat.”  He has a realist and 257
Marxist approach to international intervention, by which states are never altruistic and 
only act in self-interested ways. Rorty’s credulity refers to his theory that people have a 
tendency to too readily believe that something is real or true and therefore are easily 
manipulated by narratives. Wilson and Brown combine these two conceptions, noting that 
states, as a result of their self-interest, take advantage of peoples’ credulity by using 
narratives that evoke empathy. In this manner, Wilson and Brown analyze the role of 
Fischer’s narrative paradigm based on the implications of political vs. orthodox 
conceptions of human rights: human rights and the human rights industry. 
 Davis, Dona . 2011. "Humanitarianism and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy - Edited by Richard 256
Ashby Wilson & Richard D. Brown." Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 17 (3). P 25.
 Ibid. P 47.257
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Norman Finkelstein shares Wilson and Brown’s understanding of states’ 
exploitation of the narrative paradigm and its appeal to ethos. He challenges the dominant 
images of the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli wars by revealing inconsistencies 
within Zionist theory and the practice of Jewish nationalism. Finkelstein’s work, although 
not directly classified as narrative theory, is centered on the idea that factually-
contradicting ‘images’ of history and politics contribute to the lack of Palestinian 
representation in popular and scholarly works. He references Joan Peters’ study entitled 
From Time Immemorial, and considers it to be “among the most spectacular frauds ever 
published on the Arab-Israeli conflict.”  Peters claims that a significant proportion of 258
the 700,000 Arabs living in the part of Palestine that became Israel in 1949 only recently 
settled there, meaning that they emigrated to Palestine only because of the economic 
opportunities generated by Zionist settlement. Her story is based on falsified evidence of 
illegal Arab immigration, which Finkelstein carefully disproves in his analysis. Ironically, 
Peters provides her own interpretation of dueling narrative theory, defining it as 
“turnspeak— the cynical inverting or distorting of facts, which, for example, make the 
victim appear as culprit.”  Here, Peters appears to describe general, Palestinian 259
cynicism as the cause of  the ‘distortion of facts’ that places the blame on the Israelis. In 
reality, as further explained using international relations theory, the reverse is true. The 
cynicism portrayed by some Palestinians and political groups is the product of the Israeli 
narrative and its American-backed international preferential treatment.
 Finkelstein, Norman G. Image and reality of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Verso, 2003. P 22.258
 Peters, Joan. From time immemorial: the origins of the Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine. JKAP 259
Pubns, 1985. P 173.
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Political theorist Amy Zalman applies narrative international relations theory to 
modern day warfare: “The idea of narrative opens up another possibility of military 
operations. Instead of being geared to eliminating the assets of the enemy, they might 
need to be focused on undermining those narratives on which that enemy bases its appeal 
and which animates and guides its activists.”  In this manner, narratives allow facts, 260
such as human rights reports and fatality statistics, to be distorted by political groups and 
the media in order to justify selective humanitarian intervention. From a theoretical 
standpoint, human rights cynicism is caused by selective intervention, which is also 
directly related to the existence of multiple competing narratives. These narratives are 
able to be manipulated strategically when met by an abstract and wide-reaching human 
rights discourse with limited practice in addressing or preventing real-world instances of 
human rights abuse. This limited practice by, for example, treaty bodies or principles of 
international law refers to the practical disparity between ‘human rights’ and the ‘human 
rights industry’ by which more general human rights legislation is politicized. 
In the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there are two distinct, dueling narratives. 
Padraig O’Malley, a political reconciliation scholar, argues that the binary of national 
narratives within this conflict is irreconcilable because both parties view themselves as 
victims, as a minority, and as dispossessed. O’Malley expands upon the basic 
construction of narratives as stories in order to reveal their historical relevance to current 
political events. As mentioned, narratives reflect on a people’s past — the trials they 
weathered, the enemies they confronted, the places they inhabited, the culture they 
 Zalman, Amy. "The Global War on Terror A Narrative in Need of a Rewrite." Carnegie Council Journal: 260
Ethics in International Affairs (2009): n. pag. Print.
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developed, and the values they formed. However, narratives are most critically subjective 
and selective. O’Malley argues that narratives “frame and filter concepts, images, and 
information according to desirable beliefs, values, symbols, traditions, and preferences. 
They are motivational tools that reinforce existing social identities and uniqueness. They 
arouse deep passions and allegiance.”  As Zionist philosophy exemplifies, narratives, 261
facts entertained within mythologies, are the linchpin of emerging nationalism. The 
reason is precisely what O’Malley pinpoints as the ‘arousal of deep passions.’ 
As explained through philosophical theory, narratives define us by binding our 
past and our present, while defining and filtering the future. Narratives are most effective 
in their ability to use this historical intersection to logically distort reality. An interesting 
example of this phenomenon is the January 2017 Executive Order, facilitated by the 
Trump Administration, banning the immigration of people from seven majority Muslim 
nations. Trump justifies this ban, which also completely bars the entrance of Syrian 
refugees for 120 days, through a network of Islamophobic narratives, congealed through 
repetition coupled with fear-mongering. One fact — that the recent terrorist attacks and 
9/11 were committed by Muslim extremists— is contorted to fit a political agenda, 
painting the picture that all foreign Muslims (and even American Muslims) present a 
direct security threat to our nation.  In reality, an American citizen has a higher likelihood 
of being killed by their clothing their clothing catching fire than from an attack by a 
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refugee— that’s 1 in 3.6 million.   When the layers of racist and xenophobic rhetoric are 262
peeled away and the factual backbone of this policy is exposed, one question arises: If 
this policy was enacted to prevent attacks like 9/11 why are nations like Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt not included, when they are the origin nations of the 9/11 terrorists? The use of 
such distorting narratives in American foreign policy occurs particularly in instances of 
humanitarian intervention or even to set the stage for future intervention. The current 
Syrian refugee crisis and America’s barring of refugees is another specific application of 
the theory I seek to explore: the effect of these contrived narratives on the policies that 
have directed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The Israelis and the Palestinians have intersecting histories that have clashed as a 
result of their claims on the same land; the Palestinians claim the land by virtue of 
historical presence and the Jews, by divine ordinance. Briefly, the Jewish Israeli narrative 
begins with the expulsion of Jews from their ‘homeland’ in Judea circa 70 CE, after 
which they migrated throughout Europe, facing mass discrimination and persecution. As 
the implementation of anti-Semitic measures became official policy throughout Eastern 
Europe, worsening conditions inspired the rise of Zionism, which evolved among 
Russian Jews from the mid-1850s. The following migration and the relentless political 
engagement of Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 
1917.  This gave a green light to the creation of a national ‘homeland’ for Europe’s 263
Jews under the protective umbrella of Great Britain. This myth, capitalized upon by the 
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international community, fixated on the idea of “a land without a people for a people 
without a land” — referring to an area already home to 700,000 Palestinians in 1919.  264
In contrast, the Palestinian narrative speaks of an indigenous population without 
interruption for 1,500 years. The gradual migration of Jews into Palestine quickly became 
a mass takeover that transformed into decades of violence and internal conflict. This 
territorial pursuit became a full-fledged occupation when Israel became the focus of US 
aid, with a possible linkage to post- 9/11 Islamaphobia. 
The US-Israel Narrative and its Political Implications
Although through these years of violence, both Israeli and Palestinian political 
groups have committed human rights violations, there are vast differences in civilian 
death tolls. For example, in the 2014 Israel-Gaza war, 1,462 Palestinian civilians were 
killed, including 551 children, compared to the six Israeli civilian deaths during the 2014 
fighting.  This disproportionality is directly related to the funding the US provides to 265
Israel. Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of direct US economic and 
military assistance, receiving approximately $3 billion in US foreign assistance each year. 
This aid is especially striking given that as a wealthy, industrial state, even without this 
foreign aid, Israel has a per capita income roughly equivalent to that of Spain and South 
Korea.  Therefore, the impact of US foreign intervention, justified by construed 266
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narratives, has highly tangible economic and political effects on the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
 Israel’s violations are not widely acknowledged in the West, causing most 
Palestinians to believe that the rest of the world does not care or even care to know about 
their situation, taking as truth Israel’s claim to be “the only democracy in the Middle 
East.”  The US, as a clear leader in the West’s unyielding support for Israel, has 267
contributed politically and socially to distorting the reality of Israeli human rights 
violations with its media sources, like The New York Times, labelling Israel “a symbol of 
human decency,” as late as the mid-1980’s.  Many theorists argue that the US’s support 268
of Israel is not only rooted in post-WWII history, but in the modern day War on Terror 
and the post- 9/11 desire for a “white ally in the Middle East.” These arguments are 
supported by the constant reference of Israel as a symbol of democracy amid a war-torn 
and radicalized region. In his analysis, Hatem Bazian notes that there is a “particular 
segment of Islamophobia Industry that is linked directly to the pro-Israel agenda, that is, 
the groups and organizations entangled in promoting the otherization of Muslims but 
whose central concern is to undermine the possibilities of Palestinian advocacy.”  This 269
contextualization is pivotal to an understanding of America’s role in this conflict because 
it explains a key function of the US-Israel narrative as one that is inherently based in 
 Finkelstein, Norman G. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. London: Verso, 2003. Print.267
 Chomsky, Noam. Middle East Illusions: Including Peace in the Middle East?: Reflections on Justice 268
and Nationhood. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. Print.
 Bazian, Hatem. "The Islamophobia Industry and the Demonization of Palestine: Implications for 269
American Studies." American Quarterly 67.4 (2015): 1057-066. Web.
!136
Islamophobic tendencies.  Islamophobic narratives, through which the US vilifies 270
Muslims and Arabs, recasts political groups like Hamas and the PLO as “terrorist 
organizations” in order to impede international support for the Palestinian cause. While 
Bazian’s reference to the pro-Israel agenda is correct, the cyclical importance of this 
narrative rests in the notion that the US-Israel relationship is both founded upon and 
sustained by anti-Muslim rhetoric and its corresponding policy initiatives and practices. 
 In addition, the global positioning of the US blocks the progress of institutions 
that seek to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and restrict the violations committed 
within Gaza and the West Bank. For example, in his analysis of US-Israel relations, 
Chomsky notes that “Washington’s commitment to enhancing terror was illustrated in 
December 2001, when it vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for implementation 
of the Mitchell Plan and dispatch of international monitors to oversee the reduction of 
violence, the most effective means as generally recognized, but opposed by Israel and 
regularly blocked by Washington.”  Ten days before this veto, the United States 271
boycotted and effectively undermined an international conference in Geneva that 
concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the occupied territories. This 
conclusion essentially declared that the US-funded Israeli settlements are illegal and 
should be considered war crimes, using the core principles of international humanitarian 
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law that originally and ironically were enacted to formally criminalize Nazi atrocities 
after the Holocaust.  
Palestinian Responses: Al-Haq and Hamas 
 It was this frustration and the corresponding contradiction between Israel’s self-
representation and the lived realities of Palestinians— and the proliferation of these 
dueling narratives—that inspired the creation of the first Palestinian human rights 
organization, Al-Haq, in 1979. Al-Haq is based on the belief that law can expose the 
inconsistencies and present a critique of the image of Israel as a law-abiding democracy. 
This organization demonstrates a core faith in the rule of law and the correct 
documentation of Israeli violations as things that resonate with the international 
community. Al-Haq uses a collection of data illustrating the deleterious effects of Israeli 
settlements on Palestinians human rights, compiling affidavits of Palestinians exposed to 
violence by settlers and soldiers, denied freedom of movement, denied their right to 
education, and victimized by arrests and house demolitions. Al-Haq self-describes its 
attention to accurate, detailed reports as an “objective and dispassionate appeal to 
internationally recognized principles.”  This organization effectively navigates the 272
tensions between nationalist and humanist values by assessing the interrelated standards 
of local and international credibility, enabling a situation where it seemed “Palestinians 
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‘discovered’ human rights as the ideal language with which to make their voices heard 
internationally.”  273
Hamas is another example of a response to selective intervention and the human 
rights cynicism that results in Palestine. Hamas is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic 
fundamentalist organization that has maintained its status as the governing authority of 
the Gaza Strip since the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. Tensions with 
the political party, Fatah, over control of this territory culminated in the 2007 Battle of 
Gaza, resulting in the ousting of Hamas’ government officials from their positions in the 
West Bank. Hamas highlights the abuses committed by Israel in its appeal for the 
liberation of Palestine, completely rejecting the legitimacy of the ‘Zionist state.’  Yet 274
Hamas, presenting a response completely distinct from that of Al-Haq, has itself 
committed various human rights offenses. The UN Commission of Inquiry Report, 
released in June 2014 found that Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, have 
committed serious violations, including the use of torture in interrogations, the firing of 
rockets into populated areas of Israel, and the firing from within or near civilians in Gaza. 
In 2015, Hamas was accused of launching twenty rockets into Israel from Gaza, causing 
no casualties but demonstrating a willingness to attack civilian populations.  Interaction 275
between Hamas and the human rights industry highlights their reliance on the nationalist 
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inflection in its discourse, as opposed to its political opponent, Fatah’s technocratic tone, 
and the universalist appeals of Al-Haq as an organization rather than a political party. 
In this manner, cynicism serves a political function in the formation and 
endurance of Hamas as a what Lori Allen defines a “critical stance by which those who 
are displeased with choices available in the present hold on to the belief that such limited 
options are not all there should be.”  Hamas responds to the selective application of 276
human rights and its corresponding cynicism by aligning human rights with the 
Palestinian history of claim-making as a system of shared values that reflect moral polity. 
In this manner, Hamas’ depiction of human rights encompasses certain political and 
social ideas related to sincerity and national solidarity. As Allen argues in her theoretical 
discussion of human rights cynicism, “in its insistence on Palestinians’ right to be 
nationalist, on their right to demand rights that will be guaranteed by a political rather 
than a technocratic solution, Hamas presents an alternative to the cynical human rights 
system and to the limbo status quo in politics.”   Thus, for this political party, human 277
rights is a way to find points of political intersection with the international community, 
while maintaining a bureaucratic form rooted in nationalism.
Both Al-Haq and Hamas rely on the recognizable disparity between ‘human 
rights,’ as they exist in theory, and the reality of humanitarian efforts produced by the 
‘human rights industry.’ However, there is a key difference in that Al-Haq responds to 
selective intervention by working within the pre-existing Western framework of human 
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rights, while Hamas rejects this framework due to its basis in contrived Israeli narratives. 
Both responses, rooted in forms of human rights cynicism, present effective alternatives 
to recognizing human rights abuses, but their inability to produce long-term solutions is 
limitated in practice. Al-Haq’s response to the faults of the human rights industry 
represents the ways in which human rights documentation became a type of historical 
writing where the Palestinian national narrative was only a post-script to that of other 
nations, namely the United States and Israel. Consequently, Al-Haq is often viewed by 
Palestinians as an ‘American’ organization working on behalf of the West, as “an effort to 
make the struggle against the occupation peaceful and not violent, which is what the 
Americans and Israelis wanted.”  The outward criticism directed towards Al-Haq 278
reflects a larger theoretical debate on the ability to express the perspectives of 
marginalized groups within a Western framework. 
This debate is rooted in the theories of Edward Said and Samuel Huntington in 
their respective works Orientalism and The Clash of Civilizations. In his 1978 
Orientalism, Edward Said frames the “Orient” as a man-made conception based on the 
Western perspective. He argues that rather than being based on a lived reality within 
Middle Eastern culture, the “Orient” is a construct that serves as a representation of the 
West’s complementary opposite for the purpose of creating a colonial hegemony.  For 279
example, themes such as unbridled sexuality, violence, and savagery, condemned in the 
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West, were impressed upon the Middle East as fundamental characteristics of the Orient. 
Said’s focus therefore is not on the relationship between Orientalism and “the Orient” but 
rather on the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient. 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations uses these Oriental images and constructions to 
argue that global conflict is inevitable, as a result of the intractability of opposing cultural 
differences. While Huntington’s assessment of the failures of universalism are correct, his 
argument relies on stereotypes of cultures and ‘historical accounts’ of conflict. As Said 
notes, Huntington systematically ignores the impact of imperialism on the hierarchal 
world order, leading him to conclude that culture is to blame.  
 In contrast, Said argues the opposite — that conflict is in fact the cause of cultural 
difference, with these differences serving the political interests of the parties involved. 
Said combines Michael Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge and Antonio Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony to develop his framework in understanding this process. As 
Foucault argues, knowledge is formed and spread by those in power— a power dictated 
by Gramsci’s understanding of the dominance of certain groups or states (the hegemon) 
over others. Due to his reliance on hegemonic discourse, Said argues that truth is a 
function of learned judgment, not of reality itself and that this truth is determined by 
those in power. This, however, concludes with the contradictory sentiment that perhaps 
there exists a “place of truth” beyond the hegemonic discourse, and no knowledge pure of 
political poisoning. In this manner, Said’s work presents no real alternative to the 
Orient.The ambivalence and contradictions within his work reflect a change in the voice 
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of the intellectual as well as the political discourse surrounding West-East 
characterizations. The problem remains that the growing ambivalence about nationalism 
combined with a shift from blaming and rejecting “the West” to seeing “the West” as the 
only source of authentic work presents a reality where accurate representations must have 
Third World origins with a metropolitan location. This problem is also addressed in the 
work of post-colonial scholar Gayatri Spivak, which when applied to Said, offers a 
compelling criticism of his work.
 Spivak relies on an inclined focus on the subaltern, referring to the populations 
that exist outside of the hegemonic power structure of the colony socially, politically, and 
geographically. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Spivak focuses on the notion of 
representation in the works of Foucault and Deleuze. She notes that despite their attempt 
to demonstrate how historical subjects are constructed through discourse and 
representation, these French critical theorists neglect to accurately represent these groups, 
instead providing a Eurocentric perspective.  According to Spivak, by claiming to be 280
able to speak for the subaltern, these theorists are actually silencing them and 
constructing false realities about marginalized identities. When placed in the context of 
Spivak, Said’s Orientalism relates to the theory that representations can never be exactly 
realistic. Said argues that rather than being based on a lived reality within Middle Eastern 
culture, the ‘Orient’ is a construct that serves as a representation of the West’s 
complementary opposite for the purpose of creating a colonial hegemony. The Orient can 
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therefore be interpreted not as an actual representation, but rather as a reflection of the 
negative aspects of European society designed to enhance the dichotomy between the 
East and the West. The tension within the use of Western frameworks to represent the 
subaltern is also visible within the universalist conception of human rights and justified 
intervention, which rely on foreign, often Western nations, to successfully address social, 
political, and economic problems in marginalized nations. 
The inability of Said and Spivak to offer a concrete solution to the post-colonial 
identity and representation is therefore closely tied to the analysis of whether or not a 
Western-based system of international humanitarian law can effectively address human 
rights concerns abroad. Al-Haq’s limited effectiveness in addressing international concern 
was perceived internally in Palestine as actually resulting in the reinforcement of the 
occupation. Instead of outwardly challenging Israeli forces, the organization sought to 
soften the features of the occupation. From Al-Haq’s perspective, this was an attempt to 
gain international credibility as a human rights advocate. While attempting to outwardly 
terminate an occupation can damage traction with a universalist appeal to human rights, 
Al-Haq argues that “if, on the other hand, you advocate an end to, for example, house 
demolitions, you are potentially advocating policies that would merely turn a nasty 
occupation into a somewhat more benevolent one, if such a thing is possible.”   The 281
concept of advocating for a more benevolent occupation illustrates the stark contrast 
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between working within and working outside of the pre-existing narratives and 
frameworks of the international human rights industry.
 In contrast, Hamas confronts the opposite dilemma— a rejection of international 
human rights framework in favor of a nationalistic version. This itself is proven to be 
highly problematic in its ability to internally regulate human rights. As demonstrated by 
several reports by Human Rights Watch and the UN, Hamas itself is responsible for a 
series of human rights abuses, many against Palestinians. On May 26, 2015, Amnesty 
International released a report stating that Hamas had carried out extrajudicial killings, 
abductions, and arrests of Palestinians and has used Al-Shifa Hospital to detain, 
interrogate, and torture suspects during the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict. Many victims of 
torture were members of the rival Palestinian movement, Fatah.  Hamas’ systematic 282
engendering of human rights within a nationalist framework prevents a universal 
application, and in itself, paradoxically, fails to eliminate the abuses experienced by the 
Palestinian people. Hamas relies on its own narrative of the conflict, which lies in direct 
opposition to the Israeli narrative. These dueling narratives are both a product and a cause 
of uneven intervention, and in turn inspire a cynicism about the human rights industry. 
The tension between nationalist narratives and an appeal to universal notions of human 
rights limits the effectiveness of both Hamas and Al-Haq. In order to even begin to 
address the human rights abuses faced by Palestinians and Israelis, the dueling narratives 
must be reconciled and approached in a uniform manner, distinct from the interests of 
intervening states. 
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The disconnect between Al-Haq and Hamas is representative of the larger 
Palestinian struggle, one that faces the problem of a fractured internal narrative. Despite 
the fact that their are many internal narratives within the Israeli framework, including 
different variations of Zionism, the goals of these internal narratives align in ways that 
allow them to function together. For example, many Israeli citizens identify as cultural 
and not political Zionists, with little regard for the political operatives of the state’s 
government. Yet, due to subsidized housing and other cultural and economic incentives, 
many of these Israelis decide to live in settlements. Even when different perspectives 
within the Israeli narrative do not have the same overt objectives, they continue to serve 
the interests of the Zionists by occupying and living in Palestinian territory. While Israel 
and the US have together provided a singular, cohesive narrative, Palestinians, as 
exhibited by the tension between universalist and nationalist appeals, have failed to unify 
their many socio-political voices. Al-Haq resonates better with the international 
community because it seems to be a humanitarian organization willing to cooperate and 
function within a universal understanding of human rights. As a result of Palestinian 
cynicism towards this universal approach, Hamas presents a radical detachment from the 
international community. However, as a result of the geographic rift between Gaza and 
the West Bank, Hamas is faced with political contention from Fatah and the PLO. These 
fragmented political parties each operate using their own set of narratives. Although they 
all stem from the same opposition to Israeli occupation, their political tactics and goals 
fail to unify Palestinians to the extent of the cohesive Israeli-US narrative. 
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The lack of unity in Palestinian narratives also contributes to the international 
perception of the legitimacy and purpose of these distinct parties and groups. The 
international community, paralyzed by the strength of the Israeli-US dominance within 
the region, is unable to advocate for Palestine. This has in part stemmed from the 
American depiction of Hamas as a terrorist organization, incapable of and even not 
desiring to provide political, democratic stability within the region. The most compelling 
aspect of Hamas’ contextual use of human rights discourse is its response to the Israeli-
US narrative describing the party as a terrorist organization. Here, we can see a direct 
connection between a contrived narrative and human rights cynicism. In an article written 
by Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khalid Mish’ al, the party argues that “there were 
voices, locally and internationally, warning voters not to vote for an organization branded 
by the US and EU as terrorist because such a democratically exercised right would cost 
them the financial aid provided by foreign donors.”  The US-Israel definition of Hamas 283
as a terrorist organization has excluded this party from interacting within the international 
community and contending with the international community’s universal understanding 
of human rights. This notion is directly related to the language discrepancy featured in the 
previous chapter, by which the politics of occupation rely on labelling Palestinian groups 
terrorists. The impact of this distinction on stereotype formation will be explained in the 
following chapter using theories based in the us vs. them mentality. This Islamaphobic 
notion has disguised the fact that, in crucial respects, Hamas is not as extremist as the US 
and Israel. Although many of its actions are condemnable, Hamas states that “it will agree 
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to a long-term truce on the internationally recognized pre-June 1967 border, while 
pursuing negotiations on a political settlement.”  This idea is completely rejected by 284
Israel and the US, which refuse to negotiate and insist that any political outcome must 
involve an Israeli takeover of substantial parts of the West Bank. 
Selective Humanitarian Intervention: Inconsistency as a Cause of Cynicism 
Human rights cynicism is two-fold, caused in part by a perceived lack of popular 
support among the people of the intervening state and reproduced in the reactions of the 
recipients (or non-recipients) of such aid. Humanitarian intervention can be observed as 
‘selective’ in terms of who is receiving aid and how, determined by assessment of the 
donor through the lens of its own political, economic, and social self interest. This is 
particularly clear in instances where the public fears that intervention will be costly and, 
furthermore, not in national self interest. For example, in the case of the Libyan 
intervention by the US in 2011, a Pew opinion poll from March of that year concluded 
that 63% of Americans believed that the US had no responsibility to act. The same survey 
reported the level of support for intervention in previous conflicts: 30% in Bosnia, 47% in 
Kosovo, and 51% in Darfur.  Syria presents a modern example of this dynamic, where 285
Americans and Europeans have consistently refused involvement, despite the worsening 
level of this humanitarian crisis. As a result of this lack of popular support and pressure to 
intervene, Western democracies are often able to avoid humanitarian intervention, only 
choosing to do so as a tool of political engagement.
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As argued by Rajan Menon in The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention, “thanks 
to humanitarian intervention’s shallow political roots, leaders are not beset by public 
pressure to make the extent of suffering the criterion for intervention. And as we shall 
see, shaky popular support for humanitarian intervention affects not only whether it is 
pursued, but also how.”  This relates to the problems inherent in Wilson and Brown’s 286
conception of empathy, by which narratives of suffering are often manipulated by 
political agendas. The paradox of this process is that intervention is prohibited in the 
context of state sovereignty, except where the intervention is deemed humanitarian. 
However, even then, humanitarian reasons do not exist in isolation, and it is increasingly 
difficult to determine the real reason for intervention in the international arena. In her 
article, “Selective Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Reason and Collective Agents,” 
Jennifer Szende also shares this perception. Szende pinpoints a lack of transparency as 
one of the primary problems facing humanitarian intervention in that “the lack of 
transparency in deliberation surrounding humanitarian intervention makes it difficult to 
refute the objection that humanitarian reasons for intervention are merely a pretense.”  287
The decision-making procedures within international law make it difficult and often times 
impossible to conclusively determine the reasons for the intervention, largely because of 
the difficulty in striking a balance between universal standards and the need for case-by-
case, culturally sensitive assessment. In this manner, Szende concludes that the problems 
revealed by an examination of inconsistent humanitarian intervention are actually general 
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problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with 
collective agents.  Her claims to a need for transparency further parallel a need for both 288
external and internal mechanisms of regulating humanitarian intervention. 
The disparity of ‘applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions’ 
relates back to the original debate of logic and narrative — of a universal vs. politicized 
conception of human rights. The narrative paradigm proves to explain the inner workings 
of a politicized conception of human rights, one which allows selective humanitarian 
intervention to prevail. The problems produced by selective foreign involvement in the 
name of human rights are revealed by examining the ways inconsistency leads to 
overarching cynicism. These problems are arguably produced by applying the norms of 
practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents. The complexity of 
most humanitarian crises, as they occur at the intersection between political action, 
morality, and lived experience, provides intervening states an opportunity to warp and 
disguise their intentions. There is an overwhelming disparity between actual human rights 
practice in international relations and the theory of human rights critical to the formation 
of documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the 
United Nations.
Looking Ahead: The Theory of Reflective Democracy
Noam Chomsky’s “theory of reflective democracy” argues that our actions abroad 
reflect our nation’s values internally. In order for us to truly be a democracy, our 
international interventions must be democratic and consistently applied to human rights 
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_Journal of Global Ethics_ 8 (1). P 76.
!150
abuses on a global scale. Chomsky looks to environmental policy, government budgets, 
and the US military sponsorship of Colombia, the hemisphere’s leading human-rights 
violator, in order to argue for the clear discrepancy between the US’s policy initiatives 
and its domestic vision of democracy. He argues that “wealth and power have every 
reason to want the public largely removed from policy choices and implementation — 
also a matter of concern, quite apart from its relation to the universality of human 
rights.”  Both foreign and domestic policies are tied to a universal understanding of 289
human rights, a contradiction by which we must apply human rights mechanisms 
consistently without allowing them to be manipulated in order to pursue social, 
economic, or political agendas. Harold Koh provides a critical analysis of US foreign 
policy in How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced? He arrives at a conclusion 
paralleling Chomsky’s: “International human rights law is enforced not just by nation-
states, not just by government officials, not just by world historical figures, but by people 
like us, by people with the courage and commitment to bring international human rights 
law home through a transnational legal process of interaction, interpretation, and 
internalization.”  Humanitarian law must be consistently enforced externally and 290
internally, driven by public pressure through protests and demonstrations in order to 
regulate uneven applications of law. Chomsky argues that human rights law is perceived 
to not be enforced due to ignorance and confusion about the actual processes of 
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successful legal implementations. In reality, the key to the successful implementation of 
both domestic and international law rests in the tension between the external enforcement 
and the internal obedience of these legal rules.
 Koh argues that “true compliance is not so much the result of externally imposed 
sanctions so much as internally felt norms. In other words, as we move from external to 
internal factors, we also move from coercive to constitutive behavior.”  This implies 291
that the frameworks that drive international human rights legislation are problematic in 
their reliance on external, coercive efforts rather than an appeal to internalization of 
‘human rights norms.’ Koh argues that individuals have to activate transnational legal 
processes by becoming interactive citizens, interpreting the laws of their home country, 
and advocating for their even application. Most international legal theory suggests a 
vertical process by which national governments internalize norm-interpretations issued 
by the global interpretive community into their domestic political structures. For 
example, within national governments, in-house lawyers and legal advisers acquire 
institutional mandates to ensure that the government’s policies conform to the standards 
of international law.292
 This universalist conception is correct to an extent, but it fails to consider another 
process, tangential to the vertical acquisition of norms. When corporations, for example, 
develop standard operating procedures, they adopt internal mechanisms, such as health 
and safety features or sexual harassment policies, to maintain a ‘habitual compliance’ 
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with the internalized international norms. Therefore, over time, domestic decision-
making structures become entangled with international legal norms and, as Koh argues, 
“the institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international 
commitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political processes.”  This 293
interconnection of international and domestic legal obligations allows domestic policy to 
warp the perception of international policies as they occur ‘on the ground.’ This would 
require an internalization of international human rights norms separate from the interests 
of states. Although a universalist human rights approach does attempt to do this, it fails in 
respect to reconciling disparities between how states act towards their citizens and how 
they act towards the citizens of another state — particularly in cases of international 
humanitarian intervention. Thus, a disparity is conceived between the general ‘American 
citizen’ and the ‘non-white foreigner.’ Indeed, even American domestic policy only 
provides human rights to certain groups in society. Koh refers to the consequences of the 
meshing of international and domestic policy in that “these institutional habits soon lead 
nations into default patterns of compliance…when a nation deviates from that pattern of 
presumptive compliance, fictions are created.”  The ‘fictions’ Koh refers to are the 294
narratives explored earlier in this chapter created by policy discrepancies as justifications. 
In the case of Palestine, Koh’s theory applies to the use of naming Palestinian 
action terrorism in order to warp domestic policy to make it congruent with international 
human rights norms. When Palestinians are called terrorists, Americans are reminded of 
 Koh, Harold Hongju, “How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?” Addison C. Harris Lecture 293
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domestic security institutions and laws that protect the human rights of American’s 
citizens. This fiction overshadows the reality of American and Israeli policies towards the 
conflict, which very clearly violate international standards of human rights norms. By 
contextualizing Chomsky’s theory of reflective democracy, Koh’s international law 
analysis, and philosophical frameworks of cynicism and intervention within the larger 
case study provided by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is clear that the many contrived 
narratives, on both sides, have resulted from and relied upon the vagueness of universal 
human rights mechanisms. In order to even begin drafting a sustainable solution to this 
conflict, the dueling Israeli and Palestinian narratives must be reconciled. Doing so is 
required prior to dismantling the pro-Israeli framework that is preventing universal 
human rights legislation from addressing the abuses suffered by both Palestinian and 
Israeli citizens. American citizens, as the citizens of an intervening state, are uniquely 
positioned to pressure governmental policies to produce a reflection that adequately 
mimics the goals of domestic policies. In this manner, Americans can effectively unify 
dueling narratives, overcome an adherence to stereotypical assumptions, and challenge 
the dominant images of this conflict.
As a result of the many dueling narratives surrounding the events in Palestine and 
the theoretical incongruencies within the human rights system, international actors, 
particularly the US, have used intervention to support one side of the conflict, selectively 
ignoring human rights abuses by Israel on the other side, in Palestine. This in turn has 
spread a cynicism towards human rights among Palestinians, which brings about two 
distinct responses seen in an analysis of Hamas and Al-Haq. Noam Chomsky’s notion of 
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‘reflective democracy’ presents a dynamic solution to defeating the consequences of 
dueling narratives, politicized intervention, and human rights cynicism, by which the 
citizens of the intervening nation must advocate against unjust interventions that fail to 
uniformly address human rights abuses. Despite the fact that this potential solution has its 
own pitfalls, it stresses the importance of avoiding an uneven application of human rights 
legislation. 
When contextualizing humanitarian intervention uniformly, both the external and 
internal actors of the conflict must analyze the complex purpose of such intervention, 
before one can define it as humanitarian. Together, the philosophical and international 
relations-based underpinnings of humanitarian intervention reveal the highly political 
consequences of dueling narratives. Due to the fact that the Islamophobic narratives have 
the greatest traction in justifying US foreign policy in the Middle East, we must discuss 
the ways in which Arab and Muslim stereotypes contribute to selective humanitarian 
intervention by creating ‘moral distance’ between Americans and Palestinians.
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Chapter V 
 The Philosophy of Bias: Illusory Living, Breathing Stereotypes 
“Could a greater miracle take place than for us to look through each other’s eyes for an instant?” 
— Henry David Thoreau 
 The media plays an enormous role in the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes 
by triggering biases through the use of selective imagery resulting in their audience’s 
moral distancing from certain foreign policy initiatives and humanitarian crises. While 
governments often rely on rhetoric to fulfill a political agenda, for example the US’s use 
of Islamophobic narratives, the intent of the media cannot be interpreted in the same way. 
Because forms of popular media, including television, Hollywood cinema, and literature, 
are forms of mass art in capitalist states like the US, they are manufactured by industries 
that aim to make a profit. Conceptualizing popular media as mass art allows us to 
understand why our movies and television programs often consist of stereotypical 
depictions of social groups: in order to appeal to a mass audience, this art must be 
homogenous. In this chapter, I analyze the inner-workings of narratives within popular 
media and their connections to both implicit and explicit bias through the formation and 
dissemination of the stereotypes. I apply psychologically-grounded explanations of bias 
to the Arab and Muslim identities specifically in order to understand their implications in 
the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I also provide a quantitative data analysis 
from an original survey designed to test biases toward Arabs and Muslims. This 
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application of theory to real-world perceptions illuminates how I think it best to approach 
this conflict: through Palestinian lived realities.  
The Homogenization of Mass Art 
 We live in a world where people are constantly exposed to mass art—the cartoons 
in newspapers, our favorite Netflix programs, Hollywood classics, and so on. Together, 
these instances of mass art constitute our ‘popular media’ and have a role in shaping our 
understanding of events and people. Popular media is  a reflection of ‘popular culture,’ 
which can be described as the entirety of dominant attitudes, ideas, images, perspectives, 
and other phenomena within a culture’s mainstream that permeates the everyday lives of 
a society.  In his ‘massification argument,’ Noel Carroll provides a philosophical 295
analysis of the ways in which popular media, as mass art, influence ideologies. Carroll 
distinguishes between mass art and folk art in terms of the different type of 
expressiveness they utilize. While folk art illustrates a vision of a people from this 
particular people, their “distinctive mode of being,” mass art expresses nothing 
distinctive because it “blurs; it homogenizes.”  Similarly, through his ‘theory of mass 296
culture’ Dwight MacDonald argues that the problem with mass art is that it produces 
homogenized images as a result of its being intended for a mass audience.  297
 Curran, James P., and Michael Gurevitch. Mass Media and Society 4th edition. Arnold, 2005.295
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 Paying mind to the distinct purpose of mass art and mass media, MacDonald and 
Carroll  emphasize that because these forms are meant to appeal to the largest audience 
possible, they lack individualized and personalized means of expressiveness. In addition, 
Daniel Bell associates mass art’s emphasis on visuality with ‘the stimulation of 
emotions.’  For this reason, Bell has a deep suspicion of media in which visual elements 298
appeal directly to our compulsions for action and sensation.   Bell’s theory importantly 299
parallels Plato’s suspicion of representation, where Bell’s understanding of emotional 
possession is akin to Platonic fears that audiences will take on the emotions of the 
characters portrayed in a drama. While there is much to be said about the ways in which 
mass art is formed and the effect it has within society, I limit my discussion here to two 
key points: 1) mass art, by its very nature, seeks to create homogenized images of 
multifaceted and complex realities; and 2) that mass art appeals to cheap emotions that 
are shallowly exploited within it. While mass art may not have an intent to produce or 
reproduce stereotypes and bias, much mass art functions to reinforce common prejudices 
in society. 
Prejudice, In-group Preference, and Stereotypes 
 In this manner, driven by economic profit, American mass art capitalizes, quite 
literally, on the prejudices already present within our society. It does this by appealing to 
emotions like fear, which are manipulated and monolithically aroused by a set of 
 Bell, Daniel. The cultural contradictions of capitalism. Basic Books, 1976.298
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corresponding images. Prejudice was originally defined by Gordon Allport in 1954 as 
“feeling, favorable or unfavorable, toward a person or thing, prior to, or not based on, 
actual experience.”   While prejudice is used to describe the tendency, intentional or 300
unintentional, to prejudge others based on their perceived social group membership, bias 
implies an unreasoned distortion of judgement in favor or against a person or thing. In 
this manner, bias typically refers to an inclination or attitude that predisposes one to favor 
or disapprove of something or someone, and it can be differentiated from prejudice in 
terms of experience. Biases are often formed based on one’s experience— their social 
predispositions or the collection of images they have been exposed to.  Prejudice occurs 301
without reference to actual experience, often occurring when someone avoids or hates 
something without a specific line of reasoning.  The distinction between bias and 302
prejudice is important to understanding how each functions in the formation and 
perpetuation of stereotypes through in-group preferences. 
 In-group preference, or homophily, is closely related to the tendency people have 
to interact with others they perceive to be similar to them.  Taken in the context of 303
social attitudes, in-group preference occurs when someone is positively inclined towards 
 Katz, Irwin. "Gordon Allport's" The Nature of Prejudice"." Political Psychology (1991): 125-157.300
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those perceived to be in one’s own ‘group.’  These tendencies help explain the self-304
organization and self-segregation of people according to aspects of social identity, where 
feelings of commitment and loyalty are visibly more active among members of an ‘in-
group.’  Importantly, the connection between homophily, or in-group preference, and 
implicit bias appears to exist in a causal loop, a self-perpetuating cycle of how we select 
friends and how we perceive others. For example, when we select friends with similar 
social identifying factors to ourselves, we create homogenized friend groups.  If we are 305
constantly surrounded by friends who are like us, our friendships can increase implicit 
biases towards the out-group; as we grow more comfortable with us we also grow less 
comfortable with them.  Here, we see the foundational beginnings of the us vs. them 306
mentality critical to an assessment of how foreign policy relies on typical psychological 
patterns of behavior. 
 Stereotypes refer to the well-learned associations between social objects and 
attributes.  Lawrence Blum argues that stereotypes of people can be disrespectful in that 307
they lack  “a recognition of their full humanity and individuality.”  Blum argues that 308
stereotypes mask individuality and lead to moral distancing in which “the stereotyper 
 Lee, Carole J., and Christian D. Schunn. "Social Biases and Solutions for Procedural Objectivity." 304
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sees a stereotype as more ‘other’ than he or she really is, and this corrodes her sense of a 
common, shared humanity.”  In both prejudice and stereotyping, an orientating attitude 309
is routinized to the extent that it becomes automatic in the presence of the others.  Real-310
world consequences have been made concrete by Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson with 
the coining of the term ‘stereotype threat.’ Stereotype threat describes the phenomenon by 
which a stereotype can influence behavior, causing one to confirm a negative stereotype 
about their ‘group.’ In the original study, black students under-performed on tests they 
were told are designed to measure intellectual ability instead of problem solving under 
lab conditions.  The study’s conclusions suggest that stereotype threat increases 311
cognitive load and causes underperformance in part because it compromises the subject’s 
confidence levels and ability to concentrate.  
 Stereotype threat can be wrongly interpreted to provide the ‘evidence’ for justified 
bias. This evidence can be based in and/or created by systems of belief and 
representation. In his analysis of stereotype threat, Ron Mallon differentiates between 
threats that occur due to an activation of beliefs and those that occur due to different 
phenomena of representation. Using previous case studies, Mallon demonstrates that 
there is a significant difficultly in determining whether a person’s reaction is due to 
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genuine biases or other factors such as stress, exhaustion, anxiety, or emotions. Mallon 
thus construes stereotype threat as existing on both personalist and subpersonalist 
levels.  Personalist explanations are based in the concept that behaviors appeal to 312
mental states that rationally produce other mental states and behavior, while 
subpersonalist explanations appeal to processes ‘below the level of the person,’ referring 
to unconscious phenomena.  Mallon identifies the limits of our rational governance in 313
that stereotype is “plausibly triggered by beliefs and that one of the triggering beliefs in 
stereotype threat is belief in the truth of the stereotype itself.”  314
 In addition to confirming negative stereotypes about social groups, stereotype 
threat also affects our ‘epistemic lives,’ the ways in which we engage with the world as 
actual and potential knowers. Stacey Goguen explores some of these epistemic 
ramifications, namely impacts on self-doubt, ideals of rationality, and more widely, social 
identity threat. Goguen criticizes the common social psychology perspective, originally 
upheld by Allport, because it falsely limits the effects of stereotype threat to 
underperformance, preventing a better understanding of the connections to related 
psychological phenomena. She suggests that stereotype threat results in a hybrid 
emotional state of self-doubt related to a process with both physiological and reason-
 Mallon, Ron. “Stereotype Threat and Persons.” Brownstein, Michael, and Jennifer Saul Mather. Implicit 312
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based components.  The role of self-doubt is important because of its wider applications 315
in understanding the influence of social identity and the epistemic interactions between 
people. Because stereotype threat shapes how individuals perceive themselves, it 
influences their interactions with others, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of isolation or 
avoidance that perfectly mimics the most damaging aspects of the we vs. them mentality. 
Important factors that exacerbate self-doubt include social stigma and marginalization, 
which classify stereotype threat as a form of epistemic injustice. Goguen’s conception of 
stereotype threat relates to the work of Miranda Fricker. Fricker’s analysis of 
hermeneutical injustice and the dissonance between cultural knowledge and personal 
experience is especially relevant here.  
Implicit Bias: Formation, Implications, & Heterogeneity 
 Stereotypes, shaping our perception of ourselves and others, convey a single, 
simple evaluation of a group of people. While explicit attitudes and the process of 
stereotyping are usually in our conscious awareness, implicit attitudes, in contrast, are 
evaluations and beliefs that are automatically activated by the mere presence or 
representation of the attitude object.  An implicit bias can be described as “an automatic 316
tendency to think, feel, or act in biased ways, interacting and thinking about people with 
 Goguen, Stacy. “Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality.” Brownstein, Michael, and 315
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respect to their apparent social identities that align with commonly held stereotypes.”  317
Implicit biases are not readily available to introspection and are often not directly aligned 
with a person’s beliefs, feelings, or attitudes.   318
 These automatic tendencies can be measured through an implicit-association test 
(IAT), which is designed to reveal the strength of an individual’s automatic association 
between mental representations of objects and value-laden concepts.  As Laurie 319
Rudman states in her analysis of the nature of implicit bias, “priming and the IAT belong 
to a class of implicit measures known as response latency methods, in which orientations 
are inferred from people’s ability to complete reaction time tasks.”  The results of these 320
tests have generally revealed pervasive biases that are not reflected by self-reports, 
meaning that even biases that are unacknowledged persist, unchallenged, in our minds.  321
Even though one might consider themselves to be tolerant of all genders, in an implicit 
association test, one may nevertheless associate men with engineering and women with 
occupations such as nursing and teaching. However, implicit biases are not just internal 
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lapses in association — they have a very real impact on aspects of behavior and 
judgement. For example, as proven by a well known and frequently replicated resume 
study, implicit bias in hiring (when people are given identical resume samples with 
changed names) have shown that men are judged as more competent than women and 
white people more so than their black counterparts.   322
 Yet, there appears to be different kinds of implicit bias that operate within a 
system of ‘functional heterogeneity.’  A study conducted in 2006 by Amodio and 323
Devine attempted to isolate the operation of different associations of implicit bias by first 
testing associations of black/ white people along the dichotomy athletic/intelligent and 
then again in terms of negative/positive adjective association.  Their data demonstrates 324
a striking finding in that the scores on the two separate IAT tests were not correlated. The 
extent to which individuals expressed the mental/physical correlation was not correlated 
with negative implicit attitudes.  These findings are significant because they suggest 325
that the two associations were operating independently within individual test subjects and 
indicate that there may be variation across individuals in terms of which associations are 
operative in producing implicitly biased perceptions, judgements, and actions towards a 
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certain group. This same study also measured correlations between judgments about test-
performance and the behavior indicator of seating distance. Test subjects were asked to 
judge the competency of a fictive African-American testing partner and then asked to sit 
and wait for this partner to enter the room. Participants who displayed strong associations 
of race on the IAT mental/physical constructs made judgments consistent with these 
stereotypes but this kind of association did not predict greater seating distance. However, 
the manifestation of strong negative association on the affect-based IAT was a good 
indicator of seating distance, but not judgments of testing competence.  As argued by 326
Holroyd and Sweetman in their analysis of Amodio and Devine’s study, this 
understanding is critical to finding effective and sustainable strategies to combat implicit 
bias: 
 In relation to the particular associations at issue here, for example, if one is  
 involved in a task such as evaluation of an individuals’s competence or   
 intelligence, then mitigating the associations between race and mental or physical  
 constructs that may influence that judgment will be of particular importance. On  
 the other hand, if one is concerned with increasing the amount and quality of  
 intergroup contact, one might focus on limiting or changing negative affective  
 associations.  327
Therefore, different implicit associations have influence over different kinds of behavior 
and require combative strategies based in different operational understandings. 
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 Holroyd and Sweetman also present a dynamic analysis of the heterogeneity of 
implicit bias by drawing a distinction between semantic and affective associations. While 
the mental/ physical construct in the previous study is an example of a semantic 
association (salt/pepper, she/woman), the positive/negative construct, used in the study’s 
second IAT, is an example of an affective association.  This distinction identifies a 328
systemic difference in content, underpinned by a structural heterogeneity, that is 
important in identifying the impact of different social experiences, such as inter-group 
contact versus media imagery, on implicit bias formation. Rudman’s analysis coincides 
with that of Holroyd and Sweetman by also characterizing all forms of bias as 
heterogenous. Rudman argues that the use of the term ‘non-conscious’ to describe 
implicit bias has caused a debate on whether the definition is declarative (describing 
mental contents of implicit bias) or procedural (describing how implicit biases 
operate).  A declarative understanding applies to how media conditions people’s 329
implicit attitudes without their awareness, causing this bias to remain undetected in long-
term memory. Under the procedural perspective, the source of implicit bias is not 
consciously considered as a causal influence, thereby causing aspects of reason, 
judgment, and behavior to be influenced by implicit orientations without intention or 
even awareness.  This distinction has implications in understanding what causes 330
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implicit bias and whether it is the bias itself that is unconscious or the process of forming 
and referencing an internalized bias. 
The Relationship between Implicit and Explicit Biases 
 The relationship between implicit and explicit forms of prejudice and bias is 
largely based on their operational differences, and can be traced to motives of self-
preservation. For example, in a study conducted by Nosek and Banaji (2002), the data 
supported that racial attitudes are likely to be self-censored more than attitudes toward 
academic subjects because attitude objects elicit greater implicit-explicit 
correspondence.  In practical applications, this means that people are likely to think 331
more deeply about presidential candidates than about soft drinks, as objects high in self-
preservation concerns, and therefore access a greater level of connection between implicit 
and explicit biases within these behaviors and judgments. In this manner, implicit and 
explicit orientations are most distinguishable in their disparate causes. Compared to 
explicit opinions, implicit biases are more influenced by early experiences, affective 
experiences, cultural biases, and cognitive balance principles.  Implicit orientations 332
stem from past experiences, for example developmental experiences with maternal care 
givers, while explicit orientations reflect more recent events. Implicit biases are also more 
sensitive to affective experiences, such as the activation of the amygdala, which is the 
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area of the brain associated with emotional learning. For example, a study conducted by 
Phelps (2001) found that implicit and not explicit bias coincided with amygdala 
activation in white people exposed to images of black people. This means that implicit 
biases are based in and even triggered by aspects of emotional learning, such as fear 
conditioning and perceptions of anxiety or threat, while explicit biases are not. Therefore, 
in attempting to reduce implicit bias, changes at the automatic level will depend on 
emotional reconditioning, such as the formation of feelings of love or admiration for the 
target of an implicit bias. 
 Aspects of amygdala activation, such as fear conditioning, suggest that perhaps 
implicit biases are rational reactions. If most terrorist attacks are committed by Arabs, 
isn't this implicit and even explicit bias rational? In their analysis of racial cognition and 
the ethics of implicit bias, Daniel Kelly and Erica Roeddert approach this question 
through the lens of rationality. Kelly and Roeddert argue that a rational attitude may still 
be immoral because rationality and morality are different virtues.  They provide the 333
example of a student’s parents confronted with evidence that their son or daughter is 
unintelligent. Even if this student has shockingly low test scores, his or her parents 
remain morally obligated to think the best of their child. They may therefore have an 
unwarranted and irrational bias towards their daughter’s intelligence, but it is moral 
nonetheless. This is evidence that morality and rationality operate on different scales and 
that it can in fact be immortal to hold a belief that is rationally justified. This analysis 
 Kelly, Daniel, and Erica Roeddert. "Racial cognition and the ethics of implicit bias." Philosophy 333
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points to the tension between explicit and implicit bias on a personal level, supporting the 
idea that it is morally condemnable to harbor implicit racial bias and even stands as a 
reflection of one’s own self-conscious. Kelly and Roeddert’s assessment reveals the 
difficulty in applying normative philosophical frameworks, with labels such as 
‘intrinsically opposed to benevolence,’ to implicit forms of bias that are often 
undetectable and exceedingly difficult to combat. Yet, individuals seek to correct 
internalized forms of implicit bias, especially in cases of self-preservation, because they 
are seen as morally problematic. 
 Explicit and implicit biases differentially relate to pressures to promote tolerance 
towards certain groups. Social pressures, often regulated by popular media content, have 
an impact on shaping explicit bias without redefining coinciding implicit biases. Lai, 
Hoffman, and Nosek state that “the strength of the relationship between implicit and 
explicit attitudes varies across social categories, with age and disability attitudes eliciting 
particularly weak relationships (r’s <.15) for example, and sexual orientation and political 
attitudes eliciting particularly comparatively strong ones (r’s >.45).”  The authors’ study 334
demonstrates how variation may be explained by the social pressures against holding 
negative attitudes toward some groups. However, because the relationship between 
explicit and implicit prejudice is subject to distinct formative experiences operating via 
distinct psychological mechanisms, they have distinct routes for change that may 
translate into potential ways to reduce implicit prejudices. This revelation shaped the 
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same authors’ corresponding study in 2012, designed to determine what mechanisms 
reduce implicit bias and the real-world practicality of these measures.  
 This particular study examined the effect of evaluative conditioning in which 
individuals were ‘retrained’ to associate concepts together, such as positive affirmation 
words or traits with black faces. Exposure to these pairings reduced racial prejudice 
immediately, and this change persisted in a follow-up trial two-days later. Another form 
of evaluative conditioning involved a computer exercise that used 480 trials of initiating 
approach toward black faces and avoidance of white faces. Lai, Hoffman, and Nosek 
conclude that “this change may have been due to the self — a concept strongly associated 
with the good — becoming more associated with the approached faces.”  In a 2002 335
study conducted by Greenwald et al, people who liked themselves and identified with 
their in-group also revealed strong in-group bias, with self-report measures showing no 
indication of cognitive consistency. Rudman discusses this study, stating that “the 
dependence of in-group evaluation on the interaction of self-appraisal and group identity 
is the hallmark of the unified theory of implicit social cognition.”   336
 This theory can be paired down to the following pattern: ‘If I am good and I am 
X, then X is also good,’  revealing a pattern of linkages between self-concept, group 337
identity, and positive association. In other words, when an individual correlates his or her 
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sense of self with another person, they associate that person with how they view 
themselves. As we do not view ourselves impartially, appraisals of others may also be 
distorted. This particular conclusion, underscoring the self as an important component to 
implicit bias formation, is critical to my argument and will be revisited in the following 
chapter in order to support a philosophical notion of the self defined by the other.  
 Alex Madva explores how egalitarian goals often conflict with the realities of 
implicit social bias and considers how individuals and society at large can challenge the 
underlying issues that produce implicit biases. He begins by critiquing Gendler and 
Egan’s claim that “merely knowing certain social facts makes individuals more likely to 
act in biased ways.”  Madva argues that these theories ignore a fourth potential answer338
— regulation, as a combination of suppression and ignorance. In order to argue this 
conclusion, Madva states that “the problem is not mere social knowledge, but rather 
hyperactive social knowledge, agitating our minds in moments when it ought to keep 
silent.”  So what is needed to combat implicit social biases is not to maintain the status 339
quo, simply suppress our biased beliefs, or to ignore the problem, but instead to 
acknowledge our biases when activated and monitor our acceptance and use of them. To 
self-regulate in this way, we must utilize a ‘creative mindset’ for “being in a creative 
mindset prevents the stereotype from being the first thoughts to come to mind.”   Here, 340
 Madva, Alex. “Virture, Social Knowledge, and Implicit Bias. Brownstein, Michael, and Jennifer Saul 338
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 Ibid. P 200.339
 Ibid. P 205.340
!172
Madva presents a dynamic approach to both the formation of biases and their persistence 
suggesting that in order to mitigate the negative effects of bias, prejudice, and stereotype 
formation, it is critical to understand their heterogeneity, accept their existence, and use 
the connection between self-concept and group association to create positive bonds 
between ourselves and others. 
Interethnic Friendship 
 Interethnic friendship is one effective means of creating positive feelings of trust 
and ‘in-group’-like qualities among people of different social identities. In a study 
conducted by Aberson, Shoemaker, and Tomolillo, the role of interethnic friendship was 
examined using the results of an IAT, self-report bias measures, and friendship 
questionnaires in order to predict implicit and explicit biases involving African American 
and Latino identities. The results supported the importance of contact via interethnic 
friendship in improving intergroup attitudes: participants with close friends who were 
members of the target group exhibited less implicit prejudice than participants without.  341
This study, heavily replicated in social psychology, supports the findings of Allport’s 
contact hypothesis, providing a theoretical basis for understanding the role of contact in 
improving intergroup attitudes. This theory specifies that contact with out-group 
members is beneficial to attitudes regarding the out-group when individuals have equal 
 Aberson, Christopher, Shoemaker, Carl and Tomillo, Christina. 2004. “Implicit Bias and Contact: The 341
Role of Interethnic Friendships.” The Journal of Social Psychology 144 (3): 335-47.
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status, common goals, are in a cooperative or independent setting, and have support from 
authorities.   342
 However, a later study conducted by Aberson revealed the limitations to this 
effect, in terms of what type of implicit biases are changed through interethnic 
friendships. Aberson’s study examines the implicit biases of 94 undergraduate students at 
an American public university. After collecting data on how many African American 
friends each student had, he performed an IAT testing stereotypically black and white 
names with positive/negative adjective correlations. The results also supported the 
conclusion of Allport in that contact did reduce implicitly held biases toward racial 
minorities; however, in terms of ageism and prejudice towards obese people, contact did 
not help.  In addition, Aberson’s findings support the notion that interethnic friendship 343
has a large correlation with implicit bias but no strong correlation with most aspects of 
explicit bias. Similar to the functioning of prejudice formation, limitations of interethnic 
friendships are most likely linked to social expectations and standards of tolerance 
towards traditionally discriminated against groups.  
 Contact without friendship is susceptible to confirming negative biases. Consider 
a study in which the majority of college students paired with Asian roommates actually 
had increased levels of implicit bias towards Asians after living with them.  However, 344
 Pettigrew, Thomas F. "Intergroup contact theory." Annual review of psychology 49, no. 1 (1998): 65-85.342
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the positive correlations and bonds created within friendships as opposed to roommates 
eliminate this potential side effect because friends become a part of one’s larger self-
concept; we identify closely with our friend group. Sharing a similar perception, 
Pettigrew argues that the contact hypothesis is unnecessarily burdened with conditions, 
arguing that interethnic friendship is a key concept because friendships involve all of the 
conditions for optimal intergroup contact.  When applied to interethnic friendships, the 345
contact hypothesis presents an explanation for how token friendships with minority 
groups often produce positive associations and promote positive implicit associations 
toward those groups. 
 The inner workings of interethnic friendships also have considerable epistemic 
considerations. As Sheila Lintott explains, their function in society is more complex than 
simply providing personal relationships. Personal relationships play a role in maintaining 
‘mysterious inequalities’ in our society via ‘ethnic privileging,’ and while racism is not 
tolerated in the workplace in hiring decisions, it remains in our marriages and 
friendships.  In this manner, while interethnic friendships provide enormous potential 346
for breaking the barrier between us and them, they are also a place where in-group/out-
group preferencing is obvious. Citing feminist critiques on the distinction between private 
and public realms, Lintott argues that the personal is still political because “whom one 
 Aberson, Christopher, Shoemaker, Carl and Tomillo, Christina. 2004. “Implicit Bias and Contact: The 345
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marries or with whom one socializes with helps determine whom one benefits and 
supports privately and publicly.”  In this manner, the very nature of friendship demands 347
the use of biasing factors that determine who we become friends with, including most 
critically the use of implicit bias, in-group preference, and stereotype threat.  
 Interethnic friendships are especially applicable to this thesis as a result of the 
bias individuals have towards their friends — the in-group bias that leads to the 
formation of us in the us vs. them mentality. As Lintott and Blum argue, friendship 
grounds specific, special duties by using both rational and emotional considerations of to 
whom we ‘already feel a special concern.’  Because friendships are formed using the 348
same structural basis as in-groups, “because she’s my friend” has similar moral 
justification properties as “because she’s white” or “because she's Jewish.” Here, 
friendship, as a concentrated manifestation of in-group bias, has visible connections to 
the ways in which narratives are used to shape foreign policy by implicating a sense of 
moral duty. As Miranda Fricker argues in her work on epistemic injustice, we trust our 
friends and often extend this trust to other members of perceived in-groups. In this 
manner, narratives are justified by testimonial injustice because we often systematically 
favor the in-group as a reliable source, and their narrative becomes “truth,” distorting, 
concealing, and erasing facts and stories. As argued in Chapter II, the historical and 
 Lintott, Sheila. "Friendship and Bias: Ethical and Epistemic Considerations." Journal of Social 347
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political relationship between Israel and America is one in which the similarities between 
the two cultures are mirrored in the moral construction and justification tool of our 
friends in Israel— ‘the only democracy in the Middle East.’ The implications include a 
perceived moral duty to Israel and moral distance from their opponent, allowing the 
selective favoring of one narrative over another.  
 Fricker expands upon this ‘moment of epistemic injustice,’ describing 
hermeneutical injustice, which is when “the powerful have an unfair advantage in 
structuring collective social understandings.”  In this manner, friendships sustain a 349
reproduction of inequality by protecting and giving distributions of wealth and power to 
the in-group exclusively because, as Lintott and Aberson et al explain, friendship tends 
towards homogeneity and maintains the status quo. This process is further sustained in a 
cyclical relationship with phenomena like stereotype formation and implicit bias because 
it “keeps the power to structure collective social understandings in the hands of the same 
individuals and others like them.”  Therefore, the greatest counter to bias-based 350
friendship formation is the dismantling of these authority-based understandings of 
collective knowledge. This is the central goal of many attempts to dismantle bias through 
education programs that empower marginalized voices and in a Spivakian sense “let the 
subaltern speak.” Such theories are strongly supported by evidence in social psychology, 
 Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. New York: Oxford 349
University Press.
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!177
with a study conducted by Rudman, Ashmore, and Gary revealing that students taking 
diversity education courses evidenced less implicit bias than control group of students not 
enrolled in diversity education.  Similarly, a study by Gurin found in a large-scale study 351
of campus diversity, that students exposed to courses addressing issues of race, ethnicity, 
and interethnic friendships evidenced a greater ability to understand out-group 
perspectives.  These findings show that exposure to social understandings typically 352
marginalized within society and excluded through in-group bias has an active impact on 
implicit bias. This can be attributed to the concept that diversity education is similar to 
interethnic friendship in that it involves processes of discussing issues of race directly 
with friends or gaining an understanding of out-group perspectives and behaviors through 
exposure to each other’s opinions and experiences. 
 The operational processes of friendship are important in the formation of identity, 
trust, and other sources of social connection, often helping us discover more about 
ourselves as well as the other. However, like narratives, friendships can protect unequal 
power structures in our society and can be used to analyze phenomena such as the us vs. 
them mentality, stereotype perpetuation, and the systematic favoring of one ‘truth’ over 
another. These are the forces that underly a lack of uniformity in American foreign policy, 
particularly in the application of international human rights law. In order to better 
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understand the underlying connections between implicit bias, friendship, and stereotyping 
in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these theories will be applied to their 
specific reality in the case of Arab and Muslim identities.  
Media Imagery 
 While websites such as YouTube and Facebook provide new opportunities for 
individuals to share personal images and realities, with social media being the Arab 
Spring’s most critical tool, the influence of today’s top television shows, films, and news 
broadcasts is inescapable and often reproduced within these very platforms. To a certain 
extent, media has continued to disproportionally reproduce and distribute powerful 
images from the few who control major media conglomerates and their pocketbooks. This 
phenomenon has further bearings in Lintott’s conception of bias in friendship, by which 
the power to structure collective social understandings remains in the hands of the non-
marginalized few.  One aspect of the media’s role in the formation of stereotypes and 353
the corresponding activation of implicit biases is the construction of representational 
images. Therefore, understanding of the operational discourse surrounding implicit biases 
is critical because these biases are formed and often resurfaced through the use of this 
media imagery.  
 In their analysis of images and readers’ constructions of news narratives, Rick 
Busselle and Helena Bilandzic discuss certain images that are not iconic symbols, but are 
internalized by viewers and consequently serve as a source of information. Images play a 
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number of different roles in the use of narratives to construct our world. However, 
Busselle and Bilandzic depart from previous international relations-based narrative 
theories by focusing on images from a cognitive-processing, narrative comprehension 
perspective. They argue that we do not receive stories passively and that viewers often 
construct a story’s sense in their own mind, resulting in a phenomenon referred to as 
‘story realization’: “the audience member’s cognitive and emotional understanding of the 
events based on both the words and images available in the text and their own 
preexisting, relevant knowledge related to the topic.”  This parallels David Bordwell’s 354
definition of a story as “the imaginary construct we create progressively and 
retroactively, the developing result of picking up narrative cues, applying schemata, and 
framing and testing hypotheses.”  355
 The connections between stereotypical representations and implicit bias formation 
are made evident in much research in social psychology. A study conducted by Govan 
and Williams reveals that representing black and white social categories with counter 
stereotypical exemplars during implicit prejudice measurement reduces implicit 
prejudice.  A similar study by Turner and Crisp finds that reductions in implicit bias can 356
even occur by imagining counter-stereotypical examples or by considering negative and 
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positive events associated with the in-group and out-group.  Together, these studies 357
reveal the influence of shifting the representation of a target group by focusing on a 
subtype of the out-group or by reframing the identity of the out-group. For example, 
black ‘targets’ are evaluated more positively when the targets are placed in front of 
positive backgrounds, like a family barbecue rather than negative backgrounds, like a 
gang-related incident.  The results of these studies, proving strong linkages between 358
implicit bias formation and media content, allude to the similar structural potential as 
interethnic friendships. Although friendships are often reliant on an activation of bias, 
they also serve as a platform to combat bias by creating social bonds that defy out-group 
boundaries. Because media is used to fabricate the content of our collective social 
knowledge, correcting media stereotypes can be an extremely effective means of 
indirectly addressing implicit bias towards marginalized identities.  
Moral Distancing as a Product of Stereotyping and Naming Practices 
 The process of moral distancing, a lack of empathy towards the other, is a result 
of the stereotyping processes within the formation and perpetuation of dueling narratives. 
The ‘moral distance’ between ourselves and others is a bias-related manifestation of what 
Wittgenstein argues is a common failure to recognize our dependence on others. In their 
study of stereotypes and prejudice, Schwartz, Struch, and Bar-Tal argue that moral 
 Turner, Rhiannon N., Richard J. Crisp, and Emily Lambert. "Imagining intergroup contact can improve 357
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distancing results when we perceive value stereotypes.  In contrast to trait stereotypes, 359
value stereotypes evaluate one’s own and others’ behavior across situations by underlying 
norms and attitudes. Trait and value stereotypes can intersect, where wise is a trait but 
wisdom is a value. Yet traits reflect abilities and styles of behavior,  and not the ideals that 
the perceiver assumes to be the others’ basic guiding principles, which are portrayed in 
value stereotypes.  As hierarchies of goals involving what is important to group 360
members in what they aspire to do and be, value stereotypes are more likely to reveal 
perceptions of a group’s fundamental human nature. Therefore, Bar-Tal, Schwartz, and 
Struch argue that in order to understand the implications of intergroup behavior, we must 
investigate the stereotyped beliefs people hold about the hierarchy of personal values that 
characterize members of a particular group: 
 It is when people dehumanize others, viewing them as lacking the moral 
sensibilities that   distinguish human kind, that they can ignore the 
internalized and social norms that enjoin  compassion and oppose cruelty to others.  361
The perceived humanity of the out-group or the other, dictated by our stereotypes about 
their values, is connected to the role of empathy, as the negation of dehumanizing 
practices. Because empathy is rooted in our understanding of our shared human values 
and experiences, when we lack empathy due to moral distancing, we are able to ignore or 
underappreciate the suffering of others.  
 Bar-Tal, Daniel, Shalom H. Schwartz and Naomi Struch “Values, Stereotypes, and Intergroup 359
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 While value stereotypes are more closely linked to intergroup bias, it is important 
to note that trait stereotypes often lead to value stereotypes through their internalization. 
For example, stereotypes in American media often assign traits such as violent, 
oppressive to women, or radical to Arabs and Muslims. Yet when these stereotypes are 
internalized, they become values such as Arabs are un-American or Arabs seek to 
dismantle American democracy. This progression occurs through a process Bar-Tal refers 
to as delegitimization. Bar-Tal defines delegitimization as “a categorization of groups into 
extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are 
considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/ or values.”  In this 362
manner, this process represents the denial of a categorized group’s humanity,  an essential 
part of moral distancing. Delegitimization is different from stereotyping and prejudice 
because it involves “extremely negative, salient, and unique contents which serve as a 
basis for the categorization of terrorists, fascists, and enemies.”  In addition, the 363
delegitimized group is perceived not merely as an out-group, but as outside the 
boundaries of society. Bar-Tal also notes that unlike stereotyping in mass media, which 
may occur without political motive, delegitimization is regulated by social norms and 
“cannot easily flourish without institutionalized support, ”  meaning that it is most 364
frequently enforced by political institutions or legal code. 
 Bar-Tal, Daniel. "Delegitimization: The extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice." In Stereotyping 362
and prejudice, pp. 169-182. Springer New York, 1989. P 170.
 Ibid. P 175.363
 Ibid. P 170.364
!183
 Delegitimization, an extreme instance of moral distancing, is often used to 
support negative behavior and involves radical in-group favoritism. In order to examine 
ways of overcoming this processes of moral distancing, Alicke, Dunning, and Krueger 
appeal to the link between social categorization, in-group favoritism, and self-concept.  365
They use Sabine Otten’s concept of ‘the in-group as part of the self,’ where the self can 
be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction, with each level being associated with 
certain patters of behavior and social judgment. For example, we can conceptualize 
ourself as I vs. other, us vs. them, making the self a dynamic entity that is adaptive to the 
way the self is construed. This abstraction suggests that we can expand our group-
membership to include a broader range of people when we eliminate the moral distance 
between ourselves and others. Alicke, Dunning, and Krueger use Otten’s concept of self 
to define their understanding of ‘social identity’ as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together 
with the valence and emotional significance attached to that membership.”  This 366
definition depicts one’s social identity as based on characteristics shared with others and 
the process of identifying as a group member. Therefore, Alicke, Dunning, and Krueger’s 
concept of the self, as a psychological theory, directly parallels Wittgenstein’s conception 
of the self as defined by the other.  
 Alicke, Mark D., David Dunning, and Joachim I. Krueger. The Self in Social Judgment. New York: 365
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 In his psychological theory of social identity, Turner adds a dimension of 
‘depersonalization’ to the process in which we define ourselves according to our in-group 
membership. Turner argues that stereotyping causes group members to define themselves 
and act in terms of prototypical characteristics of the respective social group, causing a 
loss of individual identity.  He calls this process ‘depersonalization,’ “a cognitive 367
redefinition of the self from unique attributes and individual differences to shared group 
category memberships and association stereotypes.”  Turner notes that experiments in 368
social psychology indicate close links between the self as a unique individual and the self 
as a group member where the personal and the social self both constitute a person’s self-
concept. This relates to Wittgenstein’s fantasy of a private language, where we desire to 
be unique despite the fact that we are dependent on those around us for our own 
understanding of our intelligibility. In the process of self-stereotyping, Turner states that 
the we is used to define and conceptualize of the me.  This process involves 369
depersonalization and the situational dominance of the ‘collective self,’ both through 
intra-group assimilation and inter-group contrast. The out-group therefore remains 
extremely relevant to the process of self-stereotyping through out-group derogation. 
Therefore, the self-stereotyping is a misuse of the other because in it we use our 
perceptions of others as a vantage point from which to distance ourselves from them — a 
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psychology with reference to individualism, interactionism and social influence." British Journal of Social 
Psychology 25, no. 3 (1986): 237-252.
 Ibid. P 244.368
 Ibid. P 244.369
!185
failure to recognize the Wittgensteinian understanding of the self.  Although not 
mentioned by Turner explicitly, it seems as though self-stereotyping is more damaging 
towards the perception of the out-group. This relates to the role of the self in the 
perpetuation of common media stereotypes; we respond to these images with an intensity 
in which we see ourselves as fundamentally different, in value systems and even in 
aspects of humanity, from the stereotyped.  
Analytical Applications toward Arab and Muslim Identities 
 As a result of the multifaceted media portrayal of Arabs, ranging from news 
stories about the fall of Aleppo to the Iraqi backdrop of the popular television show 
Homeland, imagery plays an enormous role in stereotypes concerning this identity. 
Furthermore, the concept of providing a counter-stereotypical image is applicable to the 
representation of Arabs in popular media, including television and Hollywood films, 
because Arabs are often cast as villains and terrorists instead of superheroes and ordinary 
family members. As the main distributor of images, often reinforcing stereotypes through 
the activation of implicit biases, the media therefore plays an important role in the 
representation of Arabs and Muslims. In my analysis, the term ‘popular media’ includes 
images used in children’s literature, cartoons, television programs, news reports, and 
cinema. Although only select forms of popular media will be analyzed, the multifaceted 
and interrelated character of these images, through the usage of subliminal messaging, 
gives my analysis broader implications. For example, the illustrations in children’s books 
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and cartoons have applicability to the scenes and images in the news because they share 
common aspects of underlying political significance. 
  In his work Through the Hebrew Looking Glass, Fouzi El-Asmar analyses the use 
of common Arab caricatures in Israeli children’s literature. The Arab character has a 
continuous presence in media globally, and therefore can also be analyzed in the context 
of American children’s literature by upholding a careful perspective of socio-political 
contexts. According to El-Asmar, the stereotype is used to serve political objectives and 
is subject to extreme changes and fluctuations related to changes in the political 
context.  Consider, for example, America’s illustration of the Japanese in response to 370
World War II. When the political climate became hostile, the portrayal of Japanese 
identity sharply transitioned from that of intelligence and wisdom to slyness and betrayal. 
El-Asmar directly parallels this transition with that of the Arab image in Israeli Hebrew 
children’s literature after the 1973 war.  These stereotypical portrayals are therefore in 371
flux, shifting to represent intersections between imagined fears and lived realities.  
 In Home/Land/Security, Karin Gwinn Wilkins expands upon the socio-political 
connections made by El-Asmar in order to apply them to the narrative of terrorism and its 
roots in action movies and popular media. Both El-Asmar and Wilkins argue that the use 
of stereotypes in media platforms seeks to simplify and reduce conflicts by creating a 
black-and-white context with a monolithic depiction of main characters. Israeli children’s 
 Asmar, Fouzi. Through the Hebrew looking-glass: Arab stereotypes in children's literature. St. Martin's 370
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literature develops false perceptions based on a distorted sense of reality in which the 
question of peace is never thematically central because it would require a deeper 
discussion of Zionist ideology. In this manner, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
condensed into a ‘non-problem’ by which the socio-political aspects of the conflict are 
represented in a radically one-sided manner: the Arabs are guilty of everything and 
jealous of the Jews and the Israelis have a right to their ‘currently unpopulated’ 
homeland. In addition, the Arab character in Hebrew children’s literature is problematic 
as a single depiction of The Arab that neglects religion, culture, country of origin, or any 
other aspect of personal background. The only image of a positive Arab refers to an Arab 
who wittingly or unwittingly has come to accept the Zionist point of view on Palestine. 
The good Arab gives up his or her identity and defies his or her people, in fundamental 
contradiction to the good Israeli.  Wilkins reaches an identical conclusion to that of El-372
Asmar in that simplistic representations of conflicts activates students’ perceptions of  
problems as right vs. wrong or us vs. them by condensing many cultural nuances into one 
monolithic identity. In this manner, the diversity of Islam is eradicated in the mystical 
settings of many action-adventure films because they serve as narratives of homeland and 
security.  373
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 While the existence of these media-based Arab stereotypes is clear, their 
theoretical linkages to implicit biases towards Arab realities must be further examined. 
Wilkins applies the literature-based framework of El-Asmar to the education provided by 
popular media, interpreted in social and cultural contexts in order to prove that an 
empirical link exists between problematic media representations and the discrimination 
and oppression of Arab-Americans. Wilkins argues that understanding historic relations 
of power is key to eliminating false perceptions, stating that “collective memory of 
historical events, along with assumptions about the causes and consequences of these 
events build from authoritative perspectives projected through mediated narratives.”  374
The perception of stereotypes directly correlates with the types of images viewed, the 
viewers’ experience with the Arab world, and relationships with Arab friends or relatives. 
For Wilkins, security is a social construction, developed through the personal and social 
experience of fearing the other. In an action-adventure film, the villains are distant from 
the cultural center and dehumanized with caricatures that are insulting, monolithic, and 
morally inaccessible. Without a collection of positive personal experiences that contradict 
these stereotypical depictions, this depiction becomes the viewer’s understanding of the 
lived reality of the other. In this manner, “security becomes a central justification for 
transforming fear of the other into particular practices that harm those who are believed 
to be associated with groups responsible for terrorist acts.”  Wilkins application of El-375
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Asmar’s Arab character theory to a psychological analysis of how media constructions 
create false perceptions is easily confirmed through the data of the studies presented 
earlier, most notably theories involving in-group selection. 
 That the media is a source of monolithic Arab representations is also evident in 
the theory of Jack Shaheen in his analysis Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a 
People. Shaheen identifies Hollywood as “the authoritative creator of commonly shared 
attitudes and feelings and even the shared experiences of Americans.”  In this manner, 376
media induces a form of blindness among Americans by ‘manufacturing prejudice.’ 
Shaheen’s analysis includes over 1,100 films dating before 9/11, demonstrating clearly 
that Arab stereotypes were actively proliferated long before the horrific attack on the 
Twin Towers. However, there is a clear historical demarcation in the portrayal of Arab 
Palestinians beginning in the 1980’s. Shaheen notes that Palestinians appear almost 
exclusively as terrorists against Israel, never as innocents suffering under Israeli 
occupation. For example, in the film The Seventh Sign (1988), they kill thrity-four Israeli 
school children and in The Body (2001), a Palestinian fanatic purposefully destroys an 
ancient skeleton that the Israeli and American protagonists believed to be the body of 
Christ. Interestingly, two pre-9/11 films that project Palestinians in a positive light, 
Hanna K (1983) and The Little Drummer Girl (1984) are not available on Netflix or 
 Shaheen, Jack G. 2009. Reel Bad Arabs : How Hollywood Vilifies a People. Rev. and updated ed. 376
Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press. P 17.
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Blockbuster’s extensive online listings. They are also not available for purchase from 
major film distributors including Amazon and Movies Unlimited.   377
 Shaheen’s theory is consistent with the conclusions of studies focused on the use 
of Arab stereotypes in press coverage. For example, a study conducted by Suleiman in 
1988 addressed different aspects of Arab imagery in American media, presenting a 
longitude study of American press coverage of the 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli 
conflicts. Suleiman concludes that the negatively stereotyped Arab was used as a weapon 
in the American media in favor of Israel, resurfacing in order to coincide with instances 
of increased violence.  Similarly, a 1995 study by Zaharana analyzed the portrayal of 378
the Palestinians in Time magazine from 1948-1993. The research concludes that the 
Palestinian image underwent a full transformation from invisibility to high visibility after 
the signing of the Israeli-PLO Accord in 1993.  Hashem also performed a content 379
analysis in 1995 of news articles published by Time magazine and Newsweek between 
January 1990 and December 1993.  This study concludes that most portrayals of Arabs 380
involved a lack of democracy, unity, and modernity, including a culture of 
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fundamentalism. Yet Hashem also found select instances of coverage that included fewer 
stereotypes and a focus on different realities. 
 Interestingly, despite common assumptions, there was a marked increase in 
sympathetic portrayals of Arabs and Muslims after 9/11. President George W. Bush’s 
distinction between Arab and Muslim ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ was arguably the 
centerpiece of these sympathetic images. Bush stated that “the enemy of America is not 
our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical 
network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.”  Yet at this exact time 381
in the weeks, months, and even years after 9/11, hate crimes, acts of workplace 
discrimination, bias incidents, and airline discrimination increased exponentially. 
According to data provided by the FBI, hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims 
multiplied by 1,600% from 2000 to 2001.  Given that Arabs and Muslims have long 382
been stereotyped, with 9/11 seemingly an opportune moment for further stereotyping 
alongside the US domestic and foreign policies compromising the civil and human rights 
of Arabs and Muslims, why would sympathetic depictions of these identities appear at 
this particular moment?  
 In her analysis of Arabs and Muslims in American media, Evelyn Alsultany 
expands upon Shaheen’s depiction of pre-9/11 stereotypes by describing the 
 Bush, George W., “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September 20, 381
2001.
 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, “Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination against 382
Arab-Americans: The Post 9/11 Backlash.” 2003.
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representational strategies used after the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001. The 
Arab depiction described by Alsultany differs from that of El-Asmar and Shaheen in that 
it is not a monolithic representation, but rather a system of “simplified complex 
representations.”  This theory is similar that of Wilkins in his analysis of the Israeli 383
interpretation of a good Arab, manipulated in order to reframe the purposes of the Israeli 
occupation. In addition to demonizing the enemy, these media stereotypes also provide a 
balanced, positive representation of the US “in order to project [the United States] as an 
enlightened country that has entered a postrace era.”  Although pre-9/11 stereotypes 384
were repetitive in their negative caricatures of ruthless Sultans executing market thieves 
and orientalist harem maidens, post-9/11 marked a more complex set of characters 
designed to intensively justify US foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East. Alsultany 
argues that “positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped form a new kind 
of racism, one that projects antiracism and multiculturalism on the surface but 
simultaneously produces the logics and affects necessary to legitimize policies and 
practices.”    385
 In this manner, the Arab stereotype is immensely more complex than the turban-
wearing cartoon screaming “Allah akbar!” as he blows up a public transit station. The 
implications of Alsultany’s theory explains the purpose of the simplified complex 
 Alsultany, Evelyn. "Arabs and Muslims in the media after 9/11: Representational strategies for a" 383
postrace" era." American Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2013). P 163.
 Ibid. P 163.384
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representation of Arabs — as  a signal that the United States is a post-racial, multicultural 
society that no longer discriminates. This depiction is central to the formation of the US 
narrative, with imperialism justified by a need to ‘protect oppressed Arab women,’ further 
emphasizing America’s global role as an influential democracy. In addition, this narrative 
also serves to support US sponsorship of the Israeli occupation because “having 
sympathy for some of them [Arabs] reflects an enlightened culture that can distinguish 
between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ones.”   386
Multiculturalism and its Limitations 
In response to the proliferation of false perceptions, many proposed solutions to 
Arab discrimination are based in an understanding that exposing students to the lived 
realities of their peers will promote tolerance, as a platform central to the theories of 
multiculturalism and diversity. However, as Alana Lentin and Gavan Titley argue in The 
Crises of Multiculturalism, attempts to increase diversity have drawbacks rooted in 
problems with integration, referred to as bad diversity. Described by Stuart Hall as a 
“maddeningly spongy and imprecise discursive field,” multiculturalism is a “conceptual 
grab bag of issues relating to race, culture, and identity that seems to be defined simply 
by negation.”  In this manner, multiculturalism’s vague polysemy is a widespread 387
source of debate that only further muddies the areas involving race, belonging, and social 
futures in a globalized, neoliberal area. Lenin and Titley use the Danish Cartoon 
 Alsultany, Evelyn. "Arabs and Muslims in the media after 9/11: Representational strategies for a" 386
postrace" era." American Quarterly 65, no. 1 (2013). P 168.
 Lentin, Alana, and Gavin Titley. The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age. Zed Books 387
Ltd, 2011. P 11.
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Controversy to illustrate the problems associated with accepting all vantage points, a 
practice that actually results in upholding that one interpretation is the “correct 
perspective.” The legislative and governmental response to the cartoon, depicting 
Muhammad in a discriminatory way and directly violating the Islamic religion, was that 
the cartoon was and should be read in one way: as a self-evident act of inclusive liberal 
mockery. Here, we see the problems inherent to multiculturalism’s vague inclusivity in 
that it remains selective towards which groups are granted a sense of victimhood. This 
selectivity is regulated by the same social pressures that encouraged the regulation of test 
subjects’ bias towards certain racial groups and not others.  
The “multicultural fantasy” in Europe ascribed value to difference over 
commonality, cultural particularity over social cohesion, and an apologetic relativism, 
disadvantaging the platforms of shared values and a commitment to the liberty of 
expression.  Multiculturalism allows a society to ignore continuing and shifting societal 388
racism, and although it provides narrow pathways for the organization and mobilization 
of feminists and LGBTQ activists, its resulting influence allows unregulated power 
distribution. More often that not, multiculturalism has been seen as a “mode of 
management and control, securing the legitimacy of the status quo through a deflection of 
questions of power and inequality into the relatively more malleable economy of cultural 
 Weissberg, Robert. Pernicious tolerance: How teaching to accept differences undermines civil society. 388
Transaction Publishers, 2011.
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recognition.”  In his critique of multiculturalism, Weissburg argues that the 389
foundational problem with tolerance is that it does not allow a critique of aspects of a 
culture, eschewing boundaries altogether so that “the welcome mat is out for everyone, 
no questions asked.”  This argument counters that of Lentin and Titley by suggesting 390
that the problems with multiculturalism are rooted in notions of blind acceptance instead 
of concealed selectivity.  
Weissburg fails to analyze the institutional and systematic aspects of racism that 
exist within a capitalist framework, which exploit differences as both a diversion action 
and a tool to weaken the influence of the public. Though we cannot yet envision “good 
diversity,” the educational tolerance model proposed by Lentin and Titley is based in 
communal unity, cohesion, and shared realities and futures. Weissburg misinterprets the 
vision of tolerance upheld by diversity theorists and instead views it as a recognition that 
there are no “good or bad” character traits, just enviable differences. Character traits are 
not limited to a given race, and believing so is boldly defending the idea that race is 
genetically based in assigned realities. By arguing that diversity ignores negative 
character traits of certain social groups, Weissburg is advocating for the ideas that form 
the very core of stereotype formation. In contrast, Lentin and Titley’s theory correctly 
argues that institution-based cultural recognition and an inclined focus on outlying 
 Lentin, Alana, and Gavin Titley. The crises of multiculturalism: Racism in a neoliberal age. Zed Books 389
Ltd, 2011. P 15.
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differences allows a systematic form of racism inherently invisible to the public. The 
isolation of certain communities, like ghettos and slums, is defended in the name of 
diversity and as a result these segregated communities become extremely susceptible to 
racism.  
The racism directed towards these segregated communities, often governmentally 
institutionalized through property tax rates and other extortions, becomes recognized as 
truth within a larger narrative framework. Ron Eyerman’s theory of recited truths 
demonstrates how the pitfalls of multiculturalism, by which racist institutions are referred 
to as illustrations of diversity, leads to stereotype formation.  Eyerman’s argument is 391
based in the understanding that multiculturalism provides a spongy referent signaled by 
countless ideological maneuverings to a spectrum of political questions. Iconic events 
offer signposts and occurrences become events through recitation, forming a dialect of 
actions and interpretation. An event occurs and is molded to encompass the roles of the 
protagonists, interpreters, and audience. As meaning and “facts” are applied, several 
interpretations compete with one another and achieve a hegemony, constructing what 
Wilkins would refer to as a “false lived reality” by which the audience is fed inaccurate, 
assumed material to the point of its becoming an absolute truth in his or her perception. It 
becomes a part of his or her lived experiences, and influences their opinions, viewpoints, 
perceptions, and even actions. The theory of recited truths can therefore be understood as 
a foundational platform to the formation and extension of stereotypes.  
 Titley, Gavan. "Exclusion through Openness? A Tentative Anatomy of the Ritual of ‘Migration 391
Debates’." (2012).
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When applied to Arab identity, this theory explains the naturalization over the last 
decade of the immutable entity Muslim as the wedge that actively prevents national 
integration. This monolithic assigned identity is a contingent product of differing 
contextual histories and situated political anxieties. Repetitive media coverage and 
contorted realities have constructed the recited truth that Arabs are terrorists…Arabs hate 
America…Arabs are Muslims. In turn, these recited truths are used to justify media 
content otherwise seen as wildly racist, had they been depicting most other groups, as an 
“inclusive act of mockery.”  The problem with ideas like “inclusive mockery” is that it 392
is essentially impossible to offend or ridicule distinct groups equally, especially when 
some are defended over others. A cartoon with the stereotypical Hitler-era depiction of a 
Jew would be seen as unacceptable, just as a reference to lynching would be outlawed in 
common media content. This phenomenon is connected to the concept of tolerating 
racism towards some groups but not others, dictated by social psychology’s 
understanding of media-based social pressures. 
Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha centralizes this critique of multiculturalism 
by arguing that the construction of cultural diversity brings about the containment of 
cultural difference within a logic of tolerant universalism.  Difference, then, is merged 393
as a relation of power that demands a response in transformative, political terms. Similar 
 Titley, Gavan. "Exclusion through Openness? A Tentative Anatomy of the Ritual of ‘Migration 392
Debates’." (2012).
 Bhabha, Homi. "Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse." October 28 (1984): 393
125-133.
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to a universalist conception of human rights, selectivity plays an enormous role in how 
and where these normative frameworks are actually applied. There are prominent, racist 
hierarchies within the concept of ‘cultural diversity’ because multiculturalism itself is 
colored by Western understandings of what freedom looks like. In this manner, a woman 
wearing a hijab is often universally viewed as oppressed by non-Muslims even when her 
headwear represents her cultural difference and her fundamental right to express that 
difference. Here we see direct connections to media-based Arab stereotypes, notably the 
oppressed burqa-clad woman. Given the clear limitations to the mediating effects of 
multiculturalism and institutionalized diversity, a more compelling approach to 
eliminating Arab stereotypes lies in the foundations of the theory of recited truths — the 
lived realities of Arab people. Platforms such as diversity education and interethnic 
friendship are extremely compelling challenges to implicit bias because they provide 
insight towards these lived realities by challenging the hegemonic framework of 
collective social knowledge. 
      Quantitative Survey Analysis 
 In order to examine the potential for a relationship between educational 
background and stereotype formation, I developed an analytical based survey  to test 394
these correlations among a sample of undergraduate students at Bucknell University. The 
survey consists of twenty questions designed to ascertain the background of the 
participant as well as detect their response to several situations including an airport 
 See *Appendix for an exact copy of this survey as distributed394
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security check and a political cartoon published by Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical 
magazine that has been the target of multiple terrorist attacks. The background questions 
establish the participant’s gender, self-identified race, class year, socioeconomic 
background, work experience, residence location on campus, and ethnic composition of 
their home environment. The survey was distributed using an emailed Qualtrics link to a 
random assortment of current Bucknell students. Within the recorded responses, 37% 
identified as male and 59.3% identified as female, with the remaining 3.7% having not 
selected a binary gender. Eighty-five-point-two percent of participants identified as 
Caucasian, 3.7% as African American, 3.7% as Asian/ Pacific Islander, and 3.7% as Arab. 
77.8% of participants reported that they had not been raised in a neighborhood with an 
Arab population. When asked to describe his or her family’s socioeconomic status, 55.6% 
of participants described his or her family as middle class, 37% as above middle class, 
and 3.7% as below middle class. The background foundation data collected was cross-
analyzed with questions designed to test for stereotype recognition. It is important to note 
that due to the limited size of the survey, these statistics do not represent the Bucknell 
population as a whole, but rather can be used to identify trends based in patterned 
response behavior.  
The participants were asked, for example, to respond to an image taken from 
Disney’s animated classic Aladdin. The image depicted Arab women as belly dancers 
dressed in stereotypical garb while the men were drawn in caricature with dominant 
“Arab” traits, such as hooked noses, beards, and large, exaggerated turbans. Participants 
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were also given an image depicting a woman wearing a hijab being searched in an airport 
security portal. The participants were asked to select the statement they felt best fit their 
response to the image: “This image represents a justified safety precaution upheld by 
airports internationally as a response to recent correlations between acts of terrorism and 
the Muslim culture” or “This image represents a violation of the equal rights of all 
individuals, regardless of race, ethnicity, culture, or religion and their right to not be 
discriminated against by airport personnel.” This question is designed to determine the 
participant’s perception of the gravity of stereotyped realities and characterizations. If the 
participant recognizes the image as a “justified security threat,” it is an indication that the 
participant perceives reality within this recited truth to an extent that it affects his or her 
perception and judgment. However, when a participant perceives the image as a human 
rights violation, it is an indication that the participant is not influenced by popular 
stereotypes surrounding Arab women and the religion of Islam.  
Although the results of the survey are limited by sample size, several strong 
correlations between identity indicators and bias traps can be used to produce trends that 
indicate a potential relationship between factors like interethnic friendship and increased 
stereotype recognition. Eighty-three-point-three percent of students who identified as 
having studied Arabic language and/or culture found the airport scene to be a violation of 
equal rights. In contrast, only 57.33% of students who did not study Arabic identified the 
scene as a violation of equal rights, the remaining 43.75% labelling the image as a 
justified safety precaution. Eighty-seven-point-five percent of students raised in a 
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neighborhood with an Arab population also identified the scene as a violation of equal 
rights and the same percentage also noted that they would not look for the Aladdin-based 
‘attractions’ abroad. Only 64.5% of students who were not raised in a neighborhood with 
an Arab population identified the airport scene as a violation of human rights. These 
survey results support the conclusion that students who have studied Arabic or who have 
been raised in a community with Arabs are more likely to recognize stereotype-based 
biases in the media. This trend can be interpreted as further support that the lived realities 
of Arab people, whether by learning the geography of the Middle East or the Arabic 
alphabet, or interacting with Arab neighbors is a critical component of eliminating 
students’ susceptibility to stereotype related biases.  
 It is clear from the foundational background of the recorded survey responses that 
the distribution of participants coincides with the demographic of the Bucknell student 
population. Within an undergraduate class of 5,763 students, 52.2% are female and 47.8% 
are male. Excluding the 5.2% International Student population, the demographic consists 
of 83.1% white, 3.9% Asian, 3.4% African American, 5.5% Hispanic, and 3.4% multi-
race.  As detected by my survey statistics, the Bucknell community hosts a 395
predominantly white/ middle-upper class student population. However, it is important to 
recognize that although the demographic of my survey is consistent with that of 
Bucknell’s total population, the accuracy of the survey is compromised by the small 
 Bucknell University - CollegeData College Profile. (n.d.). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://395
www.collegedata.com/cs/data/college/college_pg01_tmpl.jhtml?schoolId=179
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campus population during the time of the recorded results. The size of the survey, 
involving only 58 participants at the time of data collection, demonstrates that statistical 
analysis of the results alone is not sufficient in developing a thesis or corresponding 
theory of a causal relationship between education and stereotype perception. However, 
the trends detected by this survey do maintain the conclusions of the psychological and 
philosophical theories analyzed, supporting the argument that exposure to Arab lived 
realities has potential to reduce implicit bias towards this social group. 
 While the quantitative analysis of this survey and its theoretical implications are 
helpful to an understanding of potential solutions to Arab discrimination in general, this 
chapter has greater applications in the nuanced connection between forces like implicit 
bias and the continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself. Implicit and explicit 
forms of bias and prejudice are effectively activated and reinforced by the stereotypical 
images essential to narrative formation. The terrorist label is so effective in Israeli and 
American narratives of the occupation because it creates a moral barrier that makes 
Palestinians distinct in their values, a process of moral distancing combined with 
systematic othering. 
  Naming a Palestinian group a ‘terrorist entity’ provides this moral distance by 
appealing to stereotypical notions of terrorism and by, in turn, further perpetuating the 
false stereotype that all Muslims are terrorists. As examined by instances of stereotype 
threat, these false associations can actually change the behavior of others, causing them 
to adhere to their assigned characterizations. As a result being labelled a terrorist group 
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and thereby isolated from interacting within the international community, Hamas has 
resorted to using terroristic practices on the citizens of Israel and Palestine in a blatant 
disregard for human rights and the ‘human rights industry.’ Together, prejudice, bias, and 
stereotypes have cyclical tendencies and are concentrated into the resulting in-group-
based we vs. them mentality. This mentality is arguably the root cause of the phenomenon 
of moral distancing, by which Americans exhibit blindness towards the selective nature 
of human rights abuses in Palestine. Without public pressure in the form of social action, 
American foreign policy initiatives utilize selective applications of human rights 
intervention in order to maneuver politically-orientated agendas. 
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Finding Palestine, Finding Ourselves 
A Synthetic Conclusion 
“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. 
 Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.” 
 — Margaret Mead 
 My identity as a white, American woman may be seen by some as an obstacle to 
my understanding of the Middle East and its sociopolitical contexts. Given that I do not 
identify as either Jewish or Arab, I cannot hope to know or speak from the the different 
perspective-based positionalities within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet, as an 
American, I am in fact uniquely positioned to see the ways in which the Israeli and 
Palestinian narratives operate within this dispute and their implications for US foreign 
policy initiatives. The active perpetuation of Arab and Muslim stereotypes in media and 
political platforms has created a phenomenon by which Americans have drawn barriers 
between themselves and Palestinians, selectively othering them through a process of 
moral distancing. As a result, the actions of our government, in providing both 
international political protection and economic sponsorship to the Israeli government, 
have contributed to the seemingly unsolvable reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as 
it stands today. The seeming intractability of this conflict can be attributed to the dueling 
Israeli and Palestinian narratives and their internal discrepancies, each reliant on language 
use, naming processes, the dissemination of stereotypes, and the contextless framing of 
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certain events and histories. For this reason, the strategically US-backed Israeli narrative 
has contributed to the epistemic injustice faced by Palestinians, discrediting their history 
and identity, and thereby constituting an especially problematic obstacle to achieving 
peace.  
Reconciling Dueling Narratives 
 Taking into account the ways in which these dueling narratives operate, a 
sustainable solution to this conflict must first create a singular history that seeks to 
highlight and reconcile both perspectives. This requires a change in the Israeli and 
Palestinian, and consequently, American, perceptions of one another— a new way of 
thinking that enables one’s opponent to be visualized not just as a perpetrator, but also as 
a victim. Bar-Tal and Salomon argue that “opponents need to be legitimized and 
personalized: legitimization grants humanity to adversaries and allows them to be viewed 
as an acceptable group with which to maintain peaceful relations; personalization enables 
hostile groups to view their rivals as humane, trustworthy individuals with legitimate 
needs and goals”  Establishing commonality, essential for reconciliation, also requires 396
acknowledging one’s own involvement in the conflict. This recognition in turn requires 
changing conceptual schemas and the beliefs they embed. Recognition of how we are 
implicated in this conflict will only be achieved when we can see the relevant others as 
 Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Gavriel Salomon. “Israeli-Jewish narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: 396
Evolvement, contents, functions and consequences.” History's double helix: The intertwined narratives of 
Israel/Palestine (2006). P 37.
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culturally and individually multifaceted and complex, escaping the monolithic depictions 
established through the use of stereotypes. 
 In intractable conflicts, each opposing side creates a monolithic identity by 
constructing itself in opposition to the other, making stereotyping inevitable and the 
debunking of stereotypes necessary. Constructing us in contrast to them involves 
recruiting historical facts to support the narratives associated with these monolithic 
constructions, thereby solidifying the interdependent relationship between the 
dissemination of stereotypes and the perpetuation of narratives through collective memory 
and the ethos of a time.  This form of self-critical revision can be achieved through 397
strategies that seek to deconstruct generalized stereotypes and challenge their presence in 
collective ideologies. Mordechai Bar-On presents three strategies for the recognition of 
one’s negative contribution to conflict: 
 1. To uncover and peel off the prevailing narrative’s exclusionist nationalistic and  
 self-congratulatory ideologies that tend to distort it. 
 2. To transcend simplistic generalizations and labeling, and discover the full  
 complexity of the disputed events, both their motives and causations. 
 3. To try to understand the motives and rationale of the “enemy’s” behavior, and  
 to present the narrative with maximum sensitivity to the sensibilities of the  
 opposite side, with human compassion and a deeper understanding of the tragic  
 nature of the conflict.  398
The strategies proposed by Bar-On represent the importance of naming processes and 
language use in creating the undertones of narrative-based ideologies. These ‘self-
 Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Yona Teichman. “Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in 397
Israeli Jewish society.” Cambridge University Press, 2005.
 Bar-On, Mordechai in Rotberg, Robert I. Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History's double 398
helix. Indiana University Press, 2006. P 153.
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congratulatory’ tones, when combined by simplistic generalizations of both oneself and 
the other, prevent the full complexity of conflicts from being perceived in all their nuance
— a complexity that allows for the recognition of multiple perspectives. 
 Changing collective memories in order to recognize the faults of both sides must be 
reliant on facts to the extent that when these facts, such as civilian death tolls and 
population counts, are disputed, both groups must agree on a number.  In his analysis of 399
the activation of stereotypes and prejudice in conflicts, Bar-Tal states that changing 
collective memories can be achieved through the phenomenon of ‘writing a common 
history,’ a fusion of the Israeli and Palestinian narratives. The approach I recommend 
requires “jointly recreating a version of the past that can be endorsed by both groups 
involved in the conflict,” requiring exposure to untold pasts, one’s own misdeeds, and the 
adherence to agreed upon facts.  When successful, this method serves as a powerful 400
means for changing the negative psychological intergroup repertoire about the rival 
because a common history can humanize and legitimize the other group. 
 One of the greatest obstacles to writing a common history involves the 
discrepancies in language use and the innate power of names in forming attitudes, beliefs, 
and even behaviors towards groups. As Yasir Suleiman argues, Israeli name changes from 
Arabic to Hebrew functioned within the ideological and political imperatives of the 
 Bar-Tal, Daniel, and Yona Teichman. “Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in 399
Israeli Jewish society.” Cambridge University Press, 2005.
 Ibid. P 405.400
!208
state.  For example, Kul al-Arab published a story in April 1999 about the change of an 401
Islamic building complex from Ribat al-Kurd to a Hebrew name. Directly after this name 
change, Palestinian quasi-national institutions in the surrounding area were shut down 
and the identity papers of native Palestinians residing in Jerusalem began to be forcibly 
withdrawn, in a process of synchronized ‘cartographic remembering.’  Julie Peteet 402
argues that while the rhetoric and particular forms of naming and renaming may not 
necessarily inform particular actions, when a synchronization occurs between forms of 
knowledge and practice, there is an underlying power structure by which those producing 
knowledge are in a position to enact as well as sustain and reproduce it.   403
 Therefore, the central issue involves how Zionist discourses, images, and forms of 
knowledge are coupled with sociopolitical practices and institutions, as demonstrated 
within the US. This is because names distinctly correlate with changes in political 
climate, and help construct the narratives used to justify political actions. George Kateb 
examines the ways in which these images create a form of underlying racism that is 
fostered by the media: 
 For terrorism to be adequate to the project of imperialism, for imperialism to be  
 sustainable publicly and rhetorically, terrorism must be falsely associated with  
 Arabs and Muslims everywhere. For this idea to take hold, ordinary people have  
 to refuse to make distinctions among Arabs and Muslims, all of whom are   
 Suleiman, Yasir. A War of Words: Language and conflict in the Middle East. Vol. 19. Cambridge 401
University Press, 2004.
 Ibid.402
 Peteet, Julie. "Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine: Israel Conflict." Third World Quarterly 403
26, no. 1 (2005): 153-72.
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 assumed to be actually or potentially guilty of terrorism, just by their ascribed  
 identity.  404
Here, Kateb points to the importance of social action. Because individuals have a central 
role in accepting and further perpetuating these narratives, they also have the potential to 
do the exact opposite: to dismantle narratives by refusing to make these associations in 
the first place. Kateb also alludes to Peteet’s understanding of the power-driven dynamics 
by which naming associations reinforce imperialistic political maneuvers. For example, 
Palestinians referred to Israel as Occupied Palestine or the Zionist entity for decades, 
ending precisely when the PLO recognized Palestine in the late 1980s. As a result, the use 
of these names in WAFA, the Palestinian news agency, and other radio and news 
broadcasts, diminished.  In the same way, settlements in the West Bank, illegal under 405
international law, are often referred to in American media as neighborhoods.  406
 The idea that processes of naming and labelling can influence and reproduce 
particular actions is supported by Wittgenstein’s understanding of the equation of 
language and action, where to speak is to act. Peteet attributes this synchronization to 
underlying power structures, by which those producing knowledge have the epistemic 
ability to enact as well as sustain and reproduce it. This suggests that while action and 
language may not be as seemingly correlated as Wittgensteinian philosophy implies, there 
 Kateb, George. "A Life of Fear." Social Research: FEAR: ITS POLITICAL USES & ABUSES 71,  404
no. 4 (April 2004). P 893.
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are distinct power structures that enable certain groups to couple naming processes with 
institutional or sociopolitical actions, making them more meaningful by appealing to 
narrative construction. This thereby preserves the Wittgensteinian value between 
language and action under the scope of strategic sociopolitical mechanisms. As José 
Medina and Miranda Fricker argue, marginalized groups, in this case, Palestinians, are 
excluded from these linguistic abilities through the process of epistemic injustice. 
Therefore, in order to even begin to eliminate the political use of naming techniques to 
enforce and strengthen corresponding actions, Palestinians must be granted epistemic 
justice by which their narratives are not systematically excluded by the influence of the 
Israeli-US alliance. 
 Truly uniting narratives would require a deconstruction of the underlying power 
structures within the Israeli-Palestinan conflict, by which a common history could help to 
reinforce attempts at establishing peace. An example of Bar-Tal’s notion of ‘writing a 
common history’ has been successfully demonstrated by the work of the Peace Research 
Institute in the Middle East (PRIME) through their integrated study on ‘disarming’ the 
teaching of the history of the Middle East in Israeli and Palestinian classrooms.  As a 407
non-governmental, non-profit organization, PRIME’s central purpose is to pursue mutual 
coexistence and peace-building through the joint research and outreach of Israeli and 
 Adwan, S and Bar-On, D. (In Press) PRIME shared histories project as an example of a peace building 407
project under fire. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society.
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Palestinian teachers.  During this study, beginning in 2000, six Palestinian and six 408
Jewish history teachers developed a joint history book over the course of ten years with 
the objective of introducing students to the other narrative. The hope was that this joint 
project would eventually lead to the type of joint narrative for which scholars such as 
Bar-Tal advocate. This project is important because textbooks are considered “the formal 
representations of the society’s ideology and its ethos,” imparting the values, goals, and 
myths that a society wants to implement within future generations.   409
 However, the success of this project, outlined in the book Side by Side: Parallel 
Histories of Israel-Palestine, was vastly limited by the human rights abuses that continue 
today, in a large part due to the US use of its UN Security Council veto power to prevent 
resolutions that seek to condemn Israel. While the Israeli participants experienced 
Palestinian restriction to movement first-hand as they witnessed Palestinian participants 
attempting to attend the workshops, this caused a different disparity by which “Israelis 
had more freedom to move, and so they had to obtain the Palestinian travel permits and 
bring the papers to the Palestinians.”  The study’s conductors noted that this was 410
 “Peace Research Institute in the Middle East.” PRIME homepage - Peace Research Institute in the 408
Middle East. Accessed March 28, 2017. https://www.vispo.com/PRIME/.
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interdependent narratives." Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History’s double helix (2006). P 
206.
 Adwan, Sami Abd al-Razzaq, Dan Bar-On, and Eyal J. Naveh, eds. Side by side: Parallel histories of 410
Israel-Palestine. New Press, 2012.
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actually detrimental to the project because it gave the representatives of the Israeli side 
more power within the project itself.  411
 Because of the continuing occupation, creating a single, unified narrative of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict that is fully accepted by both sides is not yet feasible. 
However, there is potential to eventually produce this level of historical integration by 
presenting the conflict’s history in a way that highlights the particular language use and 
perspectives of both Israelis and Palestinians, paying attention to what is left out and 
what is focused on in each. The Israeli and Palestinian dueling narratives are not 
accurately characterized as ‘parallel’ because they do not present mirror-image 
constructions of certain events. For example, even the work produced by the PRIME 
project omits any acknowledgement of Israel’s dominant military strength backed by its 
nuclear arsenal, or a broader context of the conflict within the strategic, imperial pursuits 
in the region.  This information is arguably vital to understanding the role of the US and 412
the ways in which this conflict has surpassed the boundaries of being characterized as 
simply a territorial dispute. Likewise, the Balfour Declaration will always be positive for 
the Jews, as the international community’s first recognition of the need for a Jewish state, 
but negative for the Palestinians, as the first of many events by which their right to the 
very same land was ignored by the international community. These Israeli-Palestinian 
dueling narratives are better understood as even more distant because they rely on not 
 Adwan, S and Bar-On, D. (In Press) PRIME shared histories project as an example of a peace building 411
project under fire. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society.
 Ibid.412
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only different names for events and facts, but different facts in themselves. The narratives 
in this conflict represent a modern day jig-saw puzzle which must be placed in the 
context of one another before being effectively combined. 
Exposure to Arab Lived Realities 
 The politicized tension in language use and the omission of certain facts and 
events altogether also presents difficulties in teaching the history of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict to Americans. American educational approaches often adopt the Israeli 
perspective, as Marcy Jane Knopf-Newman explains in her analysis of the political 
implications of teaching the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Knopf-Newman argues for a shift 
in the language use surrounding American teachings of Palestine by also including 
historical and cultural texts produced by Palestinians, instead of systematically favoring 
the Israeli-Zionist narrative.  Similarly, Howard Zinn argues that “the educational 413
system brings up whole generations of Americans who do not understand what we have 
done to other countries. What this does is it leads Americans to accept uncritically what 
their government tells them about current foreign policy.”  Zinn advocates for a critical 414
assessment of US foreign policy through the active citizenship and education of 
American citizens, an approach that mirrors Chomsky’s theory of reflective democracy. 
To achieve an informal American understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a 
way that properly addresses the nuances of both narratives, we must incorporate the 
 Knopf-Newman, M. “The politics of teaching Palestine to Americans: Addressing pedagogical 413
strategies.” Springer, 2011.
 Zinn, Howard and Donaldo Macedo, Howard Zinn on Democratic Education (Boulder, CO: Paradigm 414
Publishers, 2005), 49; 53.
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distinct but parallel roles of intergroup friendship and diversity education, anchored in the 
exposure to ‘lived realities.’  
 The concept of “lived realities” refers to the complex structures of everyday life 
by which everything we feel and sense, in respect to our immediate situation, is of central 
importance to our engagement with others. In such a way, lived realities function to 
highlight complex relationship in real time between facts, feelings, and action.  While 415
they differ on platforms of authenticity and perceptual understanding, both intergroup 
friendship and diversity education share aspects such as the role of narrative, first-person 
reporting, and the use of individual testimony. Friendship and education can help us 
transcend our own frames of reference and realize ‘the stories standing next to us.’ 
Knowledge gained through friendship is often self-knowledge because “we learn much 
from and with our friends, friendship broadens our perspectives and increases our range 
of experiences.”  In this manner, exposure to Arab lived realities is a critical approach 416
to creating the foundations necessary for unifying narratives precisely because it validates 
the complexities that oppose media-based stereotypes, thereby transforming even our 
own perceptions of ourselves. 
 Exposure to the lived realities of others requires that differently situated subjects 
and groups in terms of their power bear different responsibilities when attempting to 
 Roth, Michael. “The Pattern of Life: Personal, Emotional, Relational.” N.p., Jan. 2004. Web. 29 Mar. 415
2017. http://www.apesangelsandoutlaws.com/ei.htm
 Lintott, Sheila. "Friendship and Bias: Ethical and Epistemic Considerations." Journal of Social   416
Philosophy 46, no. 3 (2015): P 328.
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minimize hermeneutical gaps and other forms of epistemic injustice. This is a concept 
highlighted by the differences between the arguments of Fricker and Medina — Medina 
argues for a more pluralistic and relational interpretation of the ethics of knowing and 
interpreting. Context is important because psychic structures and cognitive schemas exist 
at all levels of consciousness and are not usually available for self-scrutiny.  As 417
Lawrence Blum points out, “there is often an emotional investment in prejudices and 
stereotypes not directly susceptible to cognitive treatment through disconfirmation.”  418
So, because our stereotypes involve abstract emotions, like security and fear, simply 
being told that a stereotype is inaccurate will not have the needed impact on the cognitive 
role of prejudices. For this reason, in addition to being actively aware of our language 
use, we must also respond to the oppression of others in an empathetic manner.  
 Empathy is central to the work of Saba Fatima, as she argues for empathy as a 
response that should inform US foreign policy in a manner that is inclusive of Muslim-
Americans. In terms of Medina’s pluralistic approach to combatting epistemic injustice, 
Fatima provides ways in which Muslim-Americans can present their realities in terms of 
their affective responses to the sociopolitical institutions advanced by selective naming 
practices and other forms of linguistic chicanery. An ‘affective response’ refers to an 
 Kelly, Daniel, Luc Faucher, and Edouard Machery. "Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals 417
in Light of Psychological Evidence." Journal of Social Philosophy 41, no. 3 (September 2010): 293-322.
 Blum, Lawrence. "Stereotypes and stereotyping: A moral analysis." Philosophical Papers 33, no. 3 418
(2004): 251-289.
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agent’s moral emotions or inclinations, such as anger or distrust, which inform their 
scripts as mediated by their social location within systems of domination.  Fatima 419
insightfully argues that Muslim-Americans should bring their knowledge cultivated from 
affective responses to the US government’s domestic and foreign policies regarding 
Muslims into the political arena.  Fatima loosely defines empathy as “a viscerally felt 420
comprehension of another’s emotional state.”  Empathy does not involve blindly 421
endorsing the position of another person, but rather sustaining a feeling of connection 
with the state of the other. Because the scope of our epistemic privilege contains the 
affective response that transcends ‘nation-state’ borders in favor of our proximity to the 
narratives of Muslims globally, as Wittgenstein argues, this response is essential to our 
‘selves’ remaining multifaceted and whole.   422
 Ultimately, Fatima argues for “empathy as the sort of affective response that 
should inform our political discourse in light of the power dynamics of global conflicts, 
diasporas, loyalties, values, and the relationships these dynamics sustain.”  Empathy 423
experienced by individuals in society shapes the boundaries of public discourse involving 
state policies. Therefore, there is a strong relationship between the affective responses 
that people have to certain narratives and the moral locus of the narratives that are 
 Fatima, Saba. "Muslim-American Scripts." Hypatia 28, no. 2 (2013). P 342.419
 Ibid. P 347.420
 Ibid. P 347.421
 Ibid. P 347.422
 Ibid. P 347.423
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systematically favored in the sociopolitical context of our society. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of Fatima’s conception of empathy as an affective response is its 
requirement to remove one’s own positional power when attempting to grant epistemic 
justice to others. Removing ourselves from our own social location requires the crucial 
step of placing ourselves within the proximal context of another’s narrative— “a 
precursor to affective response such as properly guided empathy.”   This is a 424
phenomenon referred to by Maria Lugones as ‘world-travelling,’ which seeks to 
illuminate the importance of empathy when attempting to perceive the lived realities of 
others.   425
 In her essay “Playfulness,“World”-Travelling, and Loving Perception,” Lugones 
provides the counterpart to the nuanced responsibilities Fatima prescribes for Muslim-
Americans. Lugones’s ‘world-travelling’ refers to a particular feature possessed by the 
others of society, by which they have necessarily acquired flexibility in shifting from 
mainstream constructions of life to other constructions in which they feel more 
comfortable and ‘at home.’  While this flexibility is necessary to others, it can also be 426
adopted by those who feel at home in mainstream society, for example the white, Anglo-
Saxon frameworks of life in America.  In such instances, Lugones recommends we 427
travel to ‘other worlds’ with an attitude that she calls playfulness. Appealing to Frye’s 
 Fatima, Saba. "Muslim-American Scripts." Hypatia 28, no. 2 (2013). P 351.424
 Lugones, Maria. "Playfulness,“world”-travelling, and loving perception." Hypatia 2, no. 2 (1987): 3-19.425
 Ibid. P 2.426
 Ibid. P 4.427
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conception of arrogant perception, the failure to love or identify with another person 
because of one’s own arrogant views, Lugones explains how abusing her mother taught 
her how to be abused herself. Lugones’ notion of how our actions help define ourselves 
relates to an understanding of the importance of upholding ‘universal human rights’ in a 
uniform way, because the human rights of others are also our human rights. 
 Lugones writes of how she did not want to become what her mother was and 
therefore had a sense of not being integrated within her mother’s world. This resulted in 
her inability to understand herself because she could not identify with her mother.  428
Lugones explains that she was only able to her understand her self as ‘made real’ when 
she was able to identify with the multiplicity of ‘worlds’ experienced by other women, 
including her mother: “I am incomplete and unreal without other women. I am 
profoundly dependent on others without having to be their subordinate, their slave, their 
servant.”  Lugones’s argument relates to the Wittgensteinian paradox of the self defined 429
by the other; through an analysis of arrogant versus loving perception, she concludes that 
we are fully dependent on each other for the possibility of being understood. Without this 
understanding, we lack intelligibility to ourselves and others. We are profoundly lacking 
in something — we are incomplete. In this manner, “travelling to each other’s ‘worlds’ 
would enable us to be through loving each other.”  When we approach other people 430
 Lugones, Maria. "Playfulness,“world”-travelling, and loving perception." Hypatia 2, no. 2 (1987). P 6.428
 Ibid. P 8.429
 Ibid. P 10.430
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with an arrogant perception, we learn to be treated arrogantly by others, seeing ourselves 
as removed and sometimes even lesser than the other.  
 The process of loving each other is intimately tied to Lugones’s notion of 
playfulness, not as subscribing to the rules of a game, but rather as having a certain 
attitude that carries us through the activity by turning it into play.  Playfulness, while 431
giving meaning to our activity, is embedded in a form of uncertainty as “an openness to 
surprise.”  This attitude creates a context in which the dismantling of monolithic 432
stereotypes is made possible, maybe even likely. Playfulness is a type of metaphysical 
attitude that is not adherent to a set or rules or norms— it is completely context-driven. 
Lugones also argues that this attitude involves a stripping of the self-important attitudes 
that often characterize arrogant perceptions that prevent us from being open to self-
construction.  
 Playfulness is, in part, an openness to being a fool, which is a combination of not  
 worrying about competance, not being self-important, not taking norms as sacred  
 and finding ambiguity and double edges a source of wisdom and delight.  433
Playfulness requires an understanding of our own limitations in our knowledge of others 
— recognizing the inaccuracy of prescribed stereotypes and approaching other people’s 
‘worlds,’ their lived realities, with an openness connected to the understanding that love 
reveals plurality.  
 Lugones, Maria. "Playfulness,“world”-travelling, and loving perception." Hypatia 2, no. 2 (1987). P 8.431
 Ibid. P 16.432
 Ibid. P 17.433
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 According to Lugones, a failure in love is a failure to identify or relate to other 
people, what Medina calls relationability. Relationability is related to Lugones’s ‘playful 
world-travelling’ because they are both rooted in epistemic empathy. To explore the 
worlds of others is to relate to them in a loving way that involves realizing one’s own 
place in the lived realities of others. Medina argues that what underlies the epistemology 
of resistance and polyphonic contextualism is not relativism but relationism as the focus 
of attempts to combat epistemic injustice. He asks a question that alludes to the tension 
between universalism and cultural relativism: How can we produce a form of shared 
sensibility — “a set of cognitive-affective attitudes toward one another that can guide our 
life in common”— on the basis of our epistemic differences rather than by attempting to 
suppress them?  The main problems with our approach to others, as outlined by 434
Lugones’s playfulness and Medina’s kaleidoscopic social sensibility, rest in this desire to 
fixate on universal commonalities.  
 In this manner, abstraction, as a manifestation of this desire, prevents us from 
understanding our affective emotions as our own and as deeply responsive to and reliant 
on the lived realities of those around us because it strips away understandings of the 
linguistic multiplicity present within our shared language. As both George Kateb and 
Mordechai Bar-On explain in their distinct analyses of fear and evil, abstraction is 
dangerous because it removes us from the actual horrors of concrete ‘evil’— evil as it 
exists in the lived experiences of others, and not as a name seamlessly applied to things 
 Medina, José. The epistemology of resistance: Gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and the 434
social imagination. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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like Hitler’s Third Reich and Hamas’ rocket attacks. Kateb argues that “one stops 
witnessing when one abstracts so much and gets away from the phenomenological 
experience of the suffering of real people.”  This consequently undermines the work of 435
the imagination, by which a spectator who is outside an event connects to embodied 
people in pain. Similarly, Bar-On argues that “Jewish Israelis and Palestinians vie with 
each other for such recognition and pursue their rivalry as a public relations campaign, 
thereby reifying the evils of terrorism and repression, a process that makes it so much 
harder to not use a single emblematic yardstick for evil.”  In such cases, there is a need 436
for a contextual and flexible understanding of evil because we call so many things evil 
when they share only a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance.’ Some comparisons are 
possible without establishing a universal idea of evil, yet we must avoid at all costs 
attempts to reduce all evils to one abstraction because this renders the binary of good vs. 
evil— us vs. them reified. Instead, we must see evil as a collective struggle by which we 
maintain the differences of distinct realities and their nuanced complexities. While both 
the Holocaust and the Israeli occupation of Palestine may both be termed evil, under no 
circumstance can these two distinct events be collapsed into one abstraction of evil. They 
both have implications in the human rights of others, representing the inaction of a world 
 Kateb, George. "A Life of Fear." Social Research: FEAR: ITS POLITICAL USES & ABUSES 71, no. 4 435
(April 2004): 887-926.
 Bar-On, Mordechai in Rotberg, Robert I. Israeli and Palestinian narratives of conflict: History's double 436
helix. Indiana University Press, 2006. P 161.
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of bystanders, but their many differences must be appreciated and maintained as their 
own. 
Working Within International Human Rights Frameworks: Al-Haq and the BDS Movement 
 The problem of abstraction surpasses the negative conceptions of fear and evil, 
remaining applicable to even the responses enacted by the universal human rights regime. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights seeks to provide an abstract conception of 
human rights in order to protect and make equal people all over the world as members of 
humanity. Yet, as the philosophical investigations of Medina and Lugones emphasize, 
abstraction reifies dangerous binaries, particularly when combined by linguistic chicanery 
and the selective applications of ‘universal’ norms. For example, as Peteet claims, “over 
the course of much of the previous century, rhetoric and words were selectively deployed, 
repeated, insisted upon and entered into mainstream language to construct Palestinians as 
discursively as beyond the pale of humanity.”  While there is a need to revisit the 437
multifaceted realities of what human rights look like in different places, when we declare 
a set of standards a “universal declaration of human rights” but do not condemn all 
violations we are denying the humanity of the victims. Peteet insists that these rights are 
granted by virtue of membership in the human community and therefore “the notions of 
humanity and the distribution of human rights are closely interwoven.”  438
 Peteet, Julie. "Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine: Israel Conflict." Third World Quarterly 437
26, no. 1 (2005). P 167.
 Peteet, Julie. "Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine: Israel Conflict." Third World Quarterly 438
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 Understanding the epistemic power of this illusory group, humanity, many 
Palestinian organizations attempt to appeal to these universal standards of human rights, 
as illustrated by the formation of the human rights organization, Al-Haq, and the social 
movement, BDS. The main critiques of the BDS movement center on its isolation of the 
Jews living in Israel as well as its potential to make the situation worse for Palestinians 
living in Gaza and the West Bank.  Here, it is critical to eliminate the reification of 439
binaries that we attempt to make abstract and applicable to temporally-bound historical 
contexts. Palestinian holocaustal fears are misplaced because the humanity of Israelis, as 
a dependent on Palestinian others for their own constructions of selfhood, is also 
threatened by the occupation. As Judith Butler maintains “if the structure of occupation 
remains the same, if Israeli citizenship is not democratized for all of its inhabitants, and if 
the rights of refugees continue to be dishonored, then such carefully structured instances 
of cohabitation become transient moments, eclipsed time and again by these 
overwhelming structural realities.”  Butler’s attention to the effect of the occupation on 440
Israeli citizenship is not an attempt to collapse distinctions between Palestinians and 
Israelis; rather, it is designed to prove the type of Wittgensteinian integration that these 
two groups share— a form of proximal understanding limited by their unwanted 
closeness in a battle over the same land they both call ‘home.’ The problem with BDS 
 Bhandar, Brenna. "Some Reflections on BDS and Feminist Political Solidarity." feminists@ law 4, no. 1 439
(2014).
 Butler, Judith. “Palestine, State Politics, and the Anarchist Impasse,” in Blumenfeld, Jacob, Chiara 440
Bottici, and Simon Critchley. The Anarchist Turn. (2013).
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critics is their reliance on a Kantian view that presupposes that we are all people here and 
there is a basic respect between us, systematically ignoring existing political realities.  441
 Many sources of criticism also derive from the BDS’s attack on Israeli academia. 
Yet, as argued by Israeli scholars including Norman Finkelstein and Ilan Pappe, 
academics, having access to the highest level of knowledge, have special responsibilities. 
Academia doesn't function in a void in such a way that it is distinct from the world’s 
problems. In an interview with Arab media source Al-Mayadeen, Professor Keith 
Hammond of the Scottish University of Glasgow explicitly argues that Israeli academics 
should support their Palestinian colleagues and speak out against their own 
government.  The central objective of the BDS movement is its role as a communicator, 442
informing Israel that its actions in Palestine are not acceptable by applying economic and 
social pressure within the international framework. Yet it is important to note that Israel 
will not be able to be held accountable to international law as long as it has the backing of 
the US. Because the BDS movement gives ordinary people an opportunity to act simply 
by refusing to buy Sabra hummus at their local grocer, this form of activism, when 
combined by an understanding of the epistemic value of recognizing ourselves in the 
struggles of others, has remarkable potency. Given that the centerpiece of the BDS 
movement is American awareness and action, it reflects a successful challenge to the we 
 Butler, Judith. “Palestine, State Politics, and the Anarchist Impasse,” in Blumenfeld, Jacob, Chiara 441
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vs. they mentality. This movement also accomplishes the goals of Chomsky’s theory of 
reflective democracy, by which our human rights abroad directly reflect our liberties at 
home— a political manifestation of Medina’s and Butler’s conception that here is also 
there. While BDS and Al-Haq both work within international humanitarian legal 
frameworks in order to activate the dispute-resolving potential of these movements, they 
must be referenced universally, and Israel must be held accountable for its human rights 
abuses and corresponding violations of international law.  
 In terms of the Wittgensteinian notion of the self defined by the other, my 
argument should not be read as merely a reduced humanist approach reliant on the 
emphasis that both Jews and Arabs are human. Rather, we must understand that our 
actions, as extensions of our own subconscious biases, our explicit beliefs, and our value 
hierarchies, represent us. We are only made intelligible when we are recognized or 
understood by others through the shared frameworks of our language. Through linguistic 
chicanery and the process of creating others, dueling narratives perpetuate the illusion of 
a private language. Epistemic injustice occurs when we exclude others by denying their 
intelligibility, their intelligence, and their reliability as knowers. This is why epistemic 
injustice, as we see in the erasure of a Palestinian voice, is so effective in dehumanizing 
and delegitimizing the other side. Therefore, by seeing Palestinians as others, we are 
misunderstanding the logic of our language and the ‘way of our world.’  
 The illusory binaries made visible by philosophical, feminist, psychological, and 
political analyses of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the tension between 
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cultural relativism and universalism in the implementation of human rights law, the 
selective disparities in our language use, the dueling narratives that naming processes 
both rely upon and enforce, the epistemological injustice of silencing those marginalized 
by society, and the psychological construction of the we vs. they mentality all contribute 
to an imbalanced distinction between ourselves and others. In order to resolve the 
underlying source of this conflict —the dueling Israeli and Palestinian narratives— we 
must provide an environment conducive to the reconciliation of these narratives. Such an 
environment would require the prevention of further human rights abuses from both 
Israeli and Palestinian sources, addressed through regulations codified in international 
law. The role of the United States in this conflict presents an opportunity for Americans 
to know the other, thereby knowing themselves. 
 When we seek to understand real people— our neighbors, our fellow students, our 
peers— we begin to dissociate these people from the media-based caricatures that 
effectively dehumanize them. There is always an acute need to reconcile with the other 
and, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this requires unraveling decades of 
religious, ethnic, and political hostility towards both Jews and Arabs as victims of 
interrelated forms of oppression. In the end, both the Israeli and the Palestinian narratives 
are based in a sense of justice — more importantly, in a sense of being denied this justice 
in the context of international humanitarian intervention. If Americans become 
empathetic towards Arab people, they will begin to question and critically assess US 
foreign policy. Thus, the most effective thing that can pressure the American government 
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to change its policies and objectives is the American people. My argument attempts to 
reveal the importance of the lived realities of Palestinians, from the human rights abuses 
they face daily, to the falsified stereotypes that represent them in American media 
platforms. As Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language tells us, we are functionally bound 
to those around us, and therefore we must seek to preserve the other. We can do this by 
recognizing our humanity in the struggles of others, through the empowerment of their 
voices and perspectives. In this manner, the beginning of a feasible solution for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict rests deep within the notion that we need to find Palestine, in 
order to find ourselves. 
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